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In the online culture of the 21
st
 century, people worldwide re-create and 
disseminate works by using existing works. Facilitated by the Internet and digital 
technologies, ―online re-creations‖ have become much more common, more widespread, 
and more sophisticated than ever before. Online re-creations are new works created based 
on pre-existing copyright protected materials: they are for instance fan fiction, parody, 
mash-up, fanvid, machinima and virtual world. Due to the difficulties to obtain 
authorisation from right owners of the original works, online re-creations are potentially 
infringing the rights of copyright holders. Infringements are usually assumed to occur 
despite the uncertain legal status and the various nature of online re-creation. Nevertheless 
copyright and online re-creations are both essential. Re-creations and their online culture 
are beneficial to individuals and the society at large due to the three principles i.e. 
creativity, freedom of speech and the public interest. This thesis finds that copyright law 
that should encourage creative expressions has restrained and discouraged creative re-
creations. Besides, the existing copyright exceptions are insufficient and ineffective to 
safeguard the rights of the re-creators and the interest of the public in accessing and 
reworking from copyright protected works. It is therefore vital to reconcile the conflicting 
interests: the exclusive rights of the copyright owners, the rights of re-creators and the 
interest of the public. To achieve a fair and reasonable balance between the conflicting 
rights and interests, this thesis proposes that everyone should have a right to use existing 
works in making creative re-use of such works without infringing copyright. The ―right to 
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“Law may function either to hold back given social changes or to accelerate them, 
depending on the interests that are effectively brought to bear on the legal system.”
1
 
Nowadays, a large number of people all over the world particularly the young 
generations are engaging in online activities of the 21
st
 century by making, sharing and 
viewing works created based on pre-existing copyright protected materials such as books, 
movies, comics, anime and television series. Those activities include writing fan fictions, 
making fan films, parody works and mash-ups and creating virtual worlds. 
This thesis studies the online phenomenon in particular regard to copyright law. 
Under the current law, these subsequent works can be considered copyright infringements 
since they incorporate some elements of copyright works without authorisation. 
Nevertheless, many of them involve new creativity and convey new messages different 
from the underlying protected work. Being a potential copyright infringement affects the 
re-users‘ rights, particularly the human rights to freedom of expression and to participate 
in cultural life. It also interrupts the process of creativity and deters general people from 
benefiting from the online creative culture; as a result, it affects the public interest. 
Therefore, copyright law needs to be re-shaped to allow reasonable space for re-creation 
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Objective and Scope of Research 
This thesis studies the global culture of re-creation in the digital age particularly 
subsequent works involving copyright protected materials rather than the content that 
internet users purely generated of their own. It focuses on potential copyright 
infringement of online re-creators who use protected works in their re-creations without 
authorisation. Copyright liability of intermediaries such as online service providers or 
platform providers is beyond the scope of this research.  
The thesis describes the nature of online re-creation and criticises its legal status 
and the effect of copyright law on creative re-uses of existing works from the perspectives 
of the law in both civil law and common law countries primarily the US, UK, Germany 
and Canada. It provides a critical analysis on the benefits of copyright and online re-
creations and on the correlation between the conflicting rights and interests of the three 
parties, namely, copyright holder of original work, re-creator of subsequent work, and the 
general public. Ultimately, this thesis aims to propose an approach to achieve a fair and 
reasonable balance between the conflicting rights and interests of the stakeholders 
concerning copyright and the online culture of re-creations by analysing the existing 
pertinent copyright exceptions in the primary jurisdictions and taking into account the 
developing social norm. The approach forms a guidance to amend copyright law for any 
jurisdiction to adopt and adapt according to their national laws and policies.  
 
Methodology and Thesis Outline 
This research adopts a doctrinal methodology drawing mainly from legal literature, 
instruments and judicial decisions on international, regional and national copyright and 
human rights and from the literature in the fields of psychology, philosophy, anthropology 
and sociology as relevant to the research. As a support to the doctrinal analyses, the 
empirical research methodology was selected to discover the perspectives of the 
stakeholders i.e. original authors and online re-creators towards the online practice of re-
creation. The research methodology of this thesis is delineated further below with the 




 The thesis is divided into 6 chapters. 
 The first chapter describes the phenomenon of the online culture of re-creations 
and the nature and definition of the term ―online re-creations‖. Online re-creations are also 
categorised and exemplified in this chapter. Chapter 2 then studies copyright issues 
concerning the online practice of re-creation particularly potential copyright 
infringements, the difficulties of obtaining permission, the uncertainties of the application 
of the existing copyright rules, and the effects of prompt copyright enforcements. While 
chapter 1 substantially involves analysing copyright literature and empirical observation 
of the nature of re-creations on the internet, the methodology of the research in chapter 2 
mainly encompasses literature reviews, judicial decisions, and international, regional, and 
national copyright legislation including the Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, and 
the EU InfoSoc Directive. 
 Since re-creations are potentially infringing copyright, chapter 3 aims to 
investigate whether and to what extent online re-creations are harmful or beneficial to the 
society. It also explores the correlation between copyright and online re-creations in 
regard to the following three principles:  creativity, freedom of speech, and the public 
interest. The first part of this chapter discusses the nature of human creativity and the 
relation between copyright, creativity and online re-creation which involve a substantial 
research on the studies of creativity in different disciplines including sociology, 
psychology, anthropology, science and philosophy. The second part of chapter 3 focuses 
on the doctrine of freedom of speech. The primary source of research is the human rights 
literature, legislation and judicial decisions. The international instruments and regional 
conventions are the UDHR and the ICCPR, and ECHR. Relevant national instruments and 
constitutions such as the UK Human Rights Act 1998, the First Amendment to the US 
Constitution, and the French Constitution of 1958 are also studied. In the final part of 
chapter 3, this thesis critically analyses the correlation between creativity, freedom of 
speech and the general interests of the public concerning copyright and the re-creation 




 Regarding the legal attempt to achieve a balance between the conflicting interests 
analysed in chapter 3, the thesis criticises the existing copyright exceptions which are 
pertinent to online re-creations in chapter 4. It refers to the copyright law in both civil and 
common law systems particularly the fair use doctrine of the US law, the UK fair dealing, 
free use doctrine in Germany, UGC exceptions of Canada and the parody exceptions in the 
EU and US. The relevant case law, legal provisions and important literatures are critically 
analysed. 
To make copyright law more reasonable and well-balanced with other rights, it is 
important to understand the social perception concerning the online activities of re-
creations. Chapter 5 therefore evaluates the perspectives of the stakeholders towards 
online re-creations from an original qualitative research conducted for the purpose of this 
thesis. This chapter analyses the empirical data collected from the interviews undertaken 
between 2014 and 2015. The analysis of the empirical research findings contributes to the 
support of the proposal in chapter 6. 













CHAPTER 1 - Emergence of Online Re-creation Culture 
 
1.1 The Change of Technology, Society and Culture 
The human ability to make and remake creative works is nothing new.
15
 However, 
using existing materials to make new works is now significantly endorsed by the digital 
technologies. With marginal costs, people are enabled to create, disseminate, access and 
re-use various forms of works, ranging from written fictions, audio and/or visual art works 
to virtual environments; as a result, become more active writers and publishers of written 
stories or creators and broadcasters of music and videos without depending on printing 
press or recording companies. Various types of content produced and distributed by 
internet users are often referred to as ―user-generated content‖ or ―UGC‖.  
In this century, the digital technologies have enabled the making of UGC which is 
a highly significant part of the online world. A notable platform to investigate human 
behaviour in the digital age is YouTube
16
, a video-sharing website launched in May 
2005.17 It has since become the dominant platform for online videos uploaded by users 
worldwide.
18
 Content on the website is extremely varied: it encompasses official trailers, 
music videos, amateur video clips and video blogs. In 2007, over half of YouTube videos 
were user-created.19 YouTube proclaims that it now has over a billion users which amount 
to one-third of all internet users.
20
  
                                                          
 
15
 See chapter 3.1 for an analysis on human creativity.  
16
 YouTube <www.youtube.com>. 
17
 Since 2005, non-branded video content produced by non-traditional media dominate the online content-
sharing platforms. (Peggy Valcke and Marieke Lenaerts, ‗Who‘s author, editor and publisher in user-
generated content? Applying traditional media concepts to UGC providers‘ (2010) 24 Int‘l Rev. L. 
Computers & Tech. 119). 
18
 YouTube is ranked the most popular Web 2.0 websites with estimated unique monthly visitors of 
1,000,000,000 (as of 29 June 2016) <http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/web-2.0-websites>. 
19
 According to a survey in 2007, over half the videos uploaded on YouTube (or 2,177 videos) were coded as 
user-created. Just over 60 per cent of YouTube video uploaders are users who were outside of the 
mainstream, broadcast, or established media. (Jean Burgess and Joshua Green, YouTube: Online Video and 
Participatory Culture (Polity 2009)). 
20
 YouTube, ‗Statistics‘ (YouTube) <https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html> accessed 29 June 





Figure 1 - Who uploaded the Top 100 videos on three platforms:  




The global trend that user-generated content proliferates and dominates Web 2.0 is 
continuing. The charts in Figure 1 demonstrate that, in 2015, the number of UGC
22
 plus 
videos generated by influencers (platform users who have at least 250,000 followers/ 
subscribers/ or fans) makes up more than 50% of the top videos on YouTube; 
approximately 74% on the most popular social media platform, Facebook
23
; and over 90% 
of the top 100 videos on Vine. 
UGC including remixes has become a pervasive part of people‘s lives especially 
young generations.
24
 The term ―remix‖ has been used to describe a style of mixing and 
mashing up prior art forms to create new ones; this can be in various forms ranging from 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
previous year. See also, Statista, ‗Number of internet users worldwide from 2000 to 2015 (in millions)‘ 
<http://www.statista.com/statistics/273018/number-of-internet-users-worldwide/> accessed 29 June 2016. 
21
 Mark Robertson, ‗Tubular Quick Guide to YouTube, Facebook video & Vine‘ (Tubular Labs, 20 
February 2015) <https://tubularlabs.com/thought-leadership/multi-platform-video-guide/> accessed 29 June 
2016. 
22
 UGC is identified by Tubular Labs as content uploaded by general users. 
23
 Facebook is ranked the first for the ‗Top 15 Most Popular Social Networking Sites‘ as of 29 June 2016 
<http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/social-networking-websites>. 
24
 As of November 2014, 53.2 % of global internet users were between 15-34 years old. Among all the 
internet users worldwide, users between 15 and 24 years old amount to 26.5 percent. (Statista, ‗Distribution 
of internet users worldwide as of November 2014, by age group‘ 





cut-ups of literary works or pictures (collage) to rearrangement of media.
25
 There are 
plenty of online platforms which enable people to engage in social communities and 
cultural remixes. YouTube, for example, is not only a platform to create and disseminate 
content generated by users particularly in the form of video
26
, it also provides a forum for 
people all over the world to connect, inform, discuss and inspire others. People 
communicate with one another simply by creating, viewing, sharing and commenting on 
the distributed works. The practice of remix or creative appropriation
27
 as a way of 
communication and participation is not limited to audio-visual forms but encompasses all 
forms of creation. Fan writers compose fictions based on their favourite popular works. 
Online fan fictions are disseminated mainly for like-minded people as an exchange of 
views and expression of devotion in a fan community. YouTube content and written fan 
fiction can also be regarded as individuals‘ speech.
28
  
The online global culture of UGC involves peer-to-peer and collaborative 
production. It is a co-produced culture in two ways: first, through vertical distribution of 
cultural products from a centre to a number of users; and second, through horizontal and 
symmetrical communicative and interactive exchanges between peers virtually unlimited 
in time and space. Digitally networked environment of decentralised creativity and 
communication contributes to peer production
29
. Such expression and interaction can be 
                                                          
 
25
 See, e.g., Damien O‘Brien and Brian Fitzgerald, ‗Mashups, Remixes and Copyright law‘ (2006) 9(2) 
Internet Law Bulletin 17; Lawrence Lessig, Remix (The Penguin Press 2008); Steven Hetcher, ‗Using Social 
Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Culture‘ (2009) 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1869; Carmit Soliman, 
‗Remixing Sharing: Sharing Platforms as a Tool for Advancement of UGC Sharing‘ (2012) 22 Alb. L.J. Sci. 
& Tech. 279. 
26
 Aufderheide and Jaszi note that online video as creative practice in the convergence and participatory 
culture contributes to business opportunity and political importance. (Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi, 
‗Recut, Reframe, Recycle: The Shaping of Fair Use Best Practices for Online Video‘ (2010) 6 Journal of 
Law and Policy for the Information Society13). 
27
 Netanel discusses creative appropriation culture in his book, Neil Netanel, Copyright‟s Paradox (Oxford 
University Press 2008). 
28
 For an analysis on free expression and digital speech, see chapter 3.2.  
29
 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 
(Yale University Press 2006); Steven Hetcher, ‗Hume's Penguin, or, Yochai Benkler and the Nature of Peer 
Production‘ (2009) 11 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 963; According to Bankler:  
―Commons-based peer production, […], relies on decentralized information gathering and 
exchange to reduce the uncertainty of participants. It has particular advantages as an 
information process for identifying and allocating human creativity available to work on 




categorised as a form of a participatory culture
30
 which can be described as ―a culture with 
relatively low barriers to artistic expression and civic engagement, strong support for 
creating and sharing creations, and some type of informal mentorship whereby 
experienced participants pass along knowledge to novices.‖
31
 In the modern world, people 
are endorsed to actively participate and interact in the online communities of their choice. 
Online activities and interactivities have now become a part of the digital culture. 
The digital culture of this era significantly entails reworking of existing materials 
that are usually under copyright protection. Such practice forms the subject matter of this 
thesis. The relevant terms and definitions as well as the nature and categories of the 
subject are delineated below. 
 
 
1.2 Online Re-creations 
Since UGC encompasses various types of works including original works 
generated by users and pure copies of others‘ works, this thesis will concentrate on the 
practice of re-using and re-mixing others‘ works to make a new creation. This part 
therefore provides comprehensive definitions of the relevant terminologies and introduces 
common types of such practice. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
independently scouring their information environment in search of opportunities to be creative 
in small or large increments.‖ (Yochai Benkler, ‗Coase‘s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature 
of the Firm‘ (2002) 112 Yale L.J. 369). 
30
 See e.g. Jean Burgess and Joshua Green, YouTube: Online Video and Participatory Culture (Polity 2009); 
See also Henry Jenkins‘ works: Textual Poachers: Television Fans & Participatory Culture (Routledge 
1992); Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide (New York University Press 2006); Fans, 
Bloggers, and Gamers: Exploring Participatory Culture (New York University Press 2006); Confronting 
the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media Education for the 21st Century (MIT Press 2009); ‗Quentin 
Tarantino's Star Wars? Digital Cinema, Media Convergence, and Participatory Culture‘ in Meenakshi Gigi 
Durham and Douglas M. Kellner (eds), Media and Cultural Studies (John Wiley & Sons 2012).  
31
 Henry Jenkins, et al., Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media Education for the 21st 




1.2.1 Definition and Nature of Re-creation 
User-generated content
32
 (―UGC‖) or user-created content
33
 (―UCC‖) is a term 
generally and broadly referred to content generated or created by consumers or users on 
the internet platforms known as Web 2.0 where users are not merely passive viewers but 
also active creators of new works. Gervais proposes a broad definition of UGC as ―content 
that is created using tools specific to the online environment and/or disseminated using 
such tools.‖
34
 Its production and dissemination is among people in a network of relative 
equals. This type of content is referred to as ‗networked‘, as opposed to ‗broadcasted‘.
35
  
Gervais divides UGC into three categories: user-authored content, user-copied 
content and user-derived content.
36
 User-authored content involves ―neither copying nor 
derivation nor adaptation.‖ It is content created by an original author such as reviews, blog 
posts and original photographs and videos. Unlike the first category, user-copied content 
is generally illegal and illegitimate as the user merely copies pre-existing content such as 
uploading an unauthorised and unaltered copy of a novel, song or movie on peer-to-peer 
file sharing networks. The third type is user-derived content. It involves reproduction and 
derivation of earlier content. This type of UGC is particularly interesting as it intrigues 
complicated copyright discussion.
37
 User-derived content is therefore the type of UGC 
                                                          
 
32
 See e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, ‗User-Generated Discontent: Transformation in Practice‘ (2007) 31 Colum. J. 
L. & Arts 497; Edward Lee, ‗Warming Up to User-Generated Content‘ (2008) 5 U. III. L. Rev. 1459; Greg 
Lastowka, ‗User-Generated Content and Virtual Worlds‘ (2008) 10(4) Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 893; 
Lawrence Lessig, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy (Penguin Press 2008); 
Patrick McKay, ‗Culture of the Future: Adapting Copyright Law to Accommodate Fan-Made Derivative 
Works in the Twenty-First Century‘ (2011) 24 Regent U. L. Rev. 117. 
33
 The OECD adopted the term ‗user-created content‘ or ‗UCC‘ and defined it as ―i) content made publicly 
available over the Internet, ii) which reflects a ―certain amount of creative effort‖, and iii) which is created 
outside of professional routines and practices.‖ (OECD, ‗Participative Web: User-Created Content‘ 
(Working Party on the Information Economy, 12 April 2007) 4). 
34
 Daniel Gervais, ‗User-Generated Content and Music File-Sharing‘ in Michael Geist (ed), From Radical 
Extremism to Balanced Copyright (Irwin Law 2010) 465. 
35
 Amber Westcott-Baker, Rebekah Pure and Christopher Seaman, ‗Copyright Law and the Implications for 
User-Generated Content‘ (2012) 3 U. Balt. J. Media L. & Ethics 171, 182. 
36
 Daniel Gervais, ‗The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated Content‘ (2009) 
11 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 841, 858-859. 
37
 See e.g., Ibid; Fraser Turnbull, ‗The Morality of Mash-Ups: Moral Rights and Canada's Non-Commercial 
User-Generated Content Exception‘ (2014) 26 I.P.J. 217; Len Glickman and Jessica Fingerhut, ‗User-





that forms the core discussion in this thesis. However, this thesis will adopt a more 
pertinent terminology to specifically refer to the subject matter for the purpose of this 
thesis: the broad sub-category of UGC is hereinafter termed as ―online re-creation‖. 
This research will focus on the use of an existing work to ―re-create‖ (meaning ―to 
make something exist or happen again‖
38
) and the end product i.e. ―re-creation‖
39
 on the 
internet platforms. ―Online re-creation‖ indicates online content with an emphasis on the 
action of using an existing work to re-create a new work and distributing such re-creation 
on the internet. Particularly, online re-creations are new works created based on pre-
existing copyright protected materials such as books, movies, comics, anime and 
television shows without authorisation of the right owners of the original works. Every 
minute, a large number of people all over the world especially young generations are 
making, sharing, and viewing ―online re-creations‖.
40
 This phenomenon has become a part 
of the online culture of this century.  
 It is worth emphasising that re-creation is nothing new. Even in the pre-digital era, 
re-creations required copying. Nevertheless, in the digital world the kinds of copying 
involved are different, in particular, more sophisticated.
41
 Pre-digital re-creations such as 
collages, fan fiction, fan music or filk
42
, play and cosplay
43
 fundamentally involve writing, 
drawing, cutting and pasting, and performing the original works. Picasso‘s collages which 
include appropriation of preceding materials, e.g. newspaper clippings, fragments of sheet 
                                                          
 
38
 The word ―recreate‖ (verb) means to ―make something exist or happen again‖. This term adopted herein is 
with a hyphen, i.e. ―re-create‖. (Cambridge Dictionary, 
<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/recreate> accessed 29 June 2016). 
39
 According to Cambridge Dictionary, the word ―recreation‖ (noun) consists of two meanings i.e. 
―enjoyment‖ and ―make again‖. The term ―re-creation‖ (with a hyphen) adopted in this thesis emphasises 
that the two words, ―re‖ and ―creation‖, are joined as an indication that the word means ―make again‖. 
<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/recreation> accessed 29 June 2016. 
40
 This phenomenon is illustrated further below (chapter 1.2.2). 
41
 ―[T]he Internet has made [fan works] much more common, more visible, and more sophisticated than ever 
before.‖ (Patrick McKay, ‗Culture of the Future: Adapting Copyright Law to Accommodate Fan-Made 
Derivative Works in the Twenty-First Century‘ (2011) 24 Regent U. L. Rev. 117, 128 (citation omitted)). 
42
 The definition and examples of ―filk‖ is provided below in chapter 1.2.2.2. 
43
 Cosplay, a contraction of the words ―costume‖ and ―play‖, is an activity where fans make and wear 
costumes and make-up to adorn themselves as their favourite fictional characters. These cosplayers typically 
perform their cosplay at a popular culture convention for personal satisfaction and/or to compete for costume 
awards. (See e.g., Christina Evola, ‗The Next Generation of Cosplay and Conventions: Is Cosplay Copyright 




music, photographs, cut papers and other applied objects, are by way of example.
44
 Re-
creations of the pre-digital age still exist in the 21
st
 century; but as everything is (or at 
least, can be) digitised, these works are also distributed and even created on the digital 
platforms. Re-creators are now armed with advanced tools for more verbatim taking 
especially copying whole or part of an original work. The digital technologies have 
significantly changed the way people re-create by changing (enhancing) the way people 




1.2.2 Categories of Online Re-creations 
Apart from the three categories divided by Gervais, UGC can be classified 
differently using different measures. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) gives an overview of the common types of UGC by the formats of 
the content e.g. text, photo and images, music and audio, video and film, mobile content, 
and virtual content.
46
 UGC can also be identified by the types of the purposes of works: 
e.g. commentary, parody and satire, pastiche or collage, personal reportage or diaries, re-
interpretations, incidental use, quoting to trigger discussion, illustration or example, and 
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 Such collages created by Pablo Picasso (1881-1973) are such as Guitar with Sheet Music and Wine Glass 
(1912), Composition with Fruit, Guitar and Glass (1912), and Bottle of Vieux Marc, Glass, Guitar and 
Newspaper (1913). 
45
 ―Technology now makes possible the attainment of decentralization and democratization by enabling 
small groups of constituents and individuals to become users – participants in the production of their 
information environment – rather than by lightly regulating concentrated commercial mass media to make 
them better serve individuals conceived as passive consumers.‖ (Yochai Benkler, ‗From Consumers to 
Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access‘ (1999-
2000) 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 561, 562); ―The digital technologies have put the power to copy and make other 
uses of works into the hands of pretty much every cyberspace users, and as a consequence a wide range of 
copyright-using communities has developed.‖ (Chris Reed, Making Laws for Cyberspace (OUP 2013) 124; 
Graham Reynolds, ‗Towards a Right to Engage in the Fair Transformative Use of Copyright‑Protected 
Expression‘ in Michael Geist (ed), From “Radical Extremism” to “Balanced Copyright” (Irwin Law 2010) 
395-397. 
46





information and knowledge sharing.
47
 Online re-creations as a subset of UGC can 
therefore be differently categorised using different criteria. 
For this thesis, online re-creations are broadly classified by two criteria: firstly, the 
purposes of the works; and secondly, the common types of copying the original work. It is 
noteworthy that it is not possible to categorise the types of online re-creations using these 
criteria as a work may have more than one objective (e.g. a work made by a fan devoted to 
a popular work may also have a parody element in it) and the levels of taking from the 
original works are extremely varied even in the same common type of work. Nevertheless, 
these two main classifications of online re-creations are beneficial for the discussion of 
potential copyright infringement in chapter 2 and possible copyright exceptions in chapter 
4; it is also useful for an analysis of social norms concerning online re-creations in chapter 
5 and for the consideration of the proposal in chapter 6. 
 
1.2.2.1 Purposes of Re-creations 
This thesis broadly divides online re-creations into two groups by reference to their 
objectives: parody/satire and fan works. 
 
(i) Parody/satire 
The purpose of parody and satire is to criticise, comment, mock or ridicule an 
object. Parody is generally a work that intentionally copies the style and expression of 
someone or something and makes the features or qualities of the original more noticeable 
in a way that is humorous or critical. A work that borrows an earlier work to criticise or 
ridicule the object that does not concern the borrowed work can be referred to as ‗weapon 
parody‘ or ‗satire‘. Parody and satire and the distinction between the two are discussed in 
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 Warren Chik, ‗Paying it Forward: The Case for a Specific Statutory Limitation on Exclusive Rights for 
User-Generated Content under Copyright Law‘ (2011) 11 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 240, 281-287; 
Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi, ‗Recut, Reframe, Recycle: The Shaping of Fair Use Best Practices for 

















, and virtual art. The nature of parody/satire is also varied. 
Some parody/satire indirectly borrows an underlying work (such as parody novels and 
songs) while some need a literal copying from an original work (such as satirical videos).  
 
(ii) Fan works 
Many fans of popular works worldwide are engaging in fan productions especially 





Interestingly, the numbers of people who express their loves (and likes) for certain popular 
works are greater than the population of many nations. For example, approximately 75.2 
million people clicked ‗Like‘ on the Harry Potter‘s verified page on Facebook
55
; the 
number of the likes is more than twice of the population of Canada
56
. The number of 




an American animated sitcom, is also higher than the 
                                                          
 
48
 For example, The Wind Done Gone, the parody novel which criticised the original best-selling novel Gone 
with the Wind‘s depiction of slavery and the Civil-War era American South. (Suntrust v Houghton Mifflin 
Co, 268 F3d 1257 (11th Cir 2001)).  
49
 For example, the parody song by 2 Live Crew, a rap music group, which is composed based on Oh, Pretty 
Woman, Roy Orbison's rock ballad, Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc, 510 US 569 (1994)).  
50
 See, e.g., Deckmyn v Vandersteen (C- 201/ 13) European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) [2014] Bus. 
L.R. 1368; [2014] E.C.D.R. 21.  
51
 For instance, a parody picture of a celebrity Demi Moore while she was seven months pregnant (Leibovitz 
v Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F3d 109 (2d Cir 1998)).  
52
 A lot of parody videos including parody/satire of music videos can be found on video-sharing platforms 
such as YouTube. 
53
 For example, Scary Movie (2000) a parody movie of the horror and mystery genres and Fifty Shades of 
Black (2016), a parody of an erotic romantic drama film, Fifty Shades of Grey (2015). 
54
 Jenkins notes that there are significant resemblances between contemporary fan culture and traditional 
folk culture. (Henry Jenkins, Textual Poachers: Television Fans & Participatory Culture (Routledge 1992) 
272-273). 
55
 The data is as of 29 June 2016, Facebook, ‗Harry Potter‘ page < 
https://www.facebook.com/harrypottermovie/?brand_redir=64501422481>. 
56
 As of 2015, there are approximately 35.8 million people in Canada. (Statistics Canada, ‗Population by 
year, by province and territory (Number)‘ (Statistics Canada, 29 September 2015) 
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/demo02a-eng.htm>) accessed 29 June 2016.  
57





estimated population for the UK
58
. In addition, the number of Facebook users who express 
their ―Likes‖ for Twilight
59
 is almost two times higher than the population of Australia
60
.  
A lot of re-creations are made by fans
61
 and can be labelled as ―fan-based 
activities‖
62
 or ―fan works‖
63
. However, it is worth emphasising that many re-creations are 
not fan works. Fan works are based on popular cultural phenomena which are usually 
under copyright protection. The main objective of fan-based activities is being active 
―fans‖ or ―enthusiasts‖. Fan works are made as tributes to popular works, for self-
satisfaction, and/or for participation in a fan community.
64
 In the pre-internet age, fan 
activities are created offline. Nowadays, these subsequent works can be found in digitised 
forms. Fan works can be in any formats including literary work (i.e. fan fiction), fan-made 
music or filk, or fan-made videos and virtual worlds. Written fan fiction and filk music are 
the types of fan works which involve indirect taking of original materials. Other types of 
fan activities such as fan sites and fan videos typically require direct taking of original 
popular works. These examples of fan works are examined in detail in the next section. 
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 At 30 June 2014, the UK population is estimated to be 64.5 million. (Office for National Statistics, 
‗Statistical bulletin: Annual Mid-year Population Estimates: 2014‘ (Office for National Statistics, 25 June 
2015) 
<http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/bulle
tins/annualmidyearpopulationestimates/2015-06-25>) accessed 29 June 2016. 
59
 As of 29 June 2016, an official Facebook webpage of Twilight received 46.6 million likes 
<https://www.facebook.com/twilight?fref=ts>. 
60
 The population of Australia as of June 2016 is projected to be 24 million. (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
‗Population Clock‘ (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 29 June 2016) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs%40.nsf/94713ad445ff1425ca25682000192af2/1647509ef7e25faaca256
8a900154b63?OpenDocument>) accessed 29 June 2016. 
61
 ―‗Fan‘ is an abbreviated form of the word ‗fanatic‘, which has its roots in the Latin word ‗fanaticus‘.‖ 
(Henry Jenkins, Textual Poachers: Television Fans & Participatory Culture (Routledge 1992) 12). 
62
 According to Nathaniel, ―[a]n activity is fanbased if it is (1) undertaken as a complement to, rather than in 
competition with, the underlying work, and (2) enhances, in aggregate, the author‘s economic and creative 
interests.‖ (Noda Nathaniel, ‗Copyrights Retold: How Interpretive Rights Foster Creativity and Justify Fan-
Based Activities‘, (2010) 20(1) Seton Hall Journal of Sports & Entertainment Law 131, 139). 
63
 See e.g., Raizel Liebler, ‗Copyright and ownership of fan created works: fanfiction and beyond‘ in 
Matthew David and Debora Halbert (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Intellectual Property (Sage 2015). 
64




1.2.2.2 Types of Copying  
Apart from the classification by the purposes of the maker, online re-creations can 
also be categorised by the kinds of copying and typical degrees of borrowing from the 
original works to re-create: (i) non-literal copying or indirect taking, and (ii) literal 




 copying or indirect taking 
The first major category of re-creations is where re-creators take inspiration from 
the original works but do not copy them directly. The typical types of re-creation 
involving non-verbatim copying are fan fiction, fan film and filk music. 
Fan fiction can be defined as ―any kind of written creativity that is based on an 
identifiable segment of popular culture, such as a television show, and is not produced as 
‗professional‘ writing.‖
66
 Fan fiction authors borrow the characters, events, settings or 
original concept of a work (so-called ―canon‖ or fictional universe) from the underlying 
work to create unique stories which reflect their own imagination and interpretation 
without copying the original story or image verbatim.
67
 There are a number of fan-fiction 
sites from numerous different fandoms such as Doctor Who, Star Trek, Star Wars, and 
Harry Potter. The largest online fan-fiction archive and forum is probably 
FanFiction.net
68
 with an extensive archive of online fan fictions; there are for example 
                                                          
 
65
 For the purpose of this thesis, ―literal‖ and ―verbatim‖ copying do not only mean copying exactly the 
same words or texts as the original literary work but also refer to reproducing exact copy of elements of 
other types of original works e.g. movies, pictures, drawings and music. 
66
 Rebecca Tushnet, ‗Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law‘ (1997) 17 Loy. L.A. 
Ent. L. Rev. 651, 655. Tushnet argues for the legality of non-commercial fan works in relation to copyright 
law. 
67
 A number of scholars argue for the legality of non-commercial fan fiction in relation to copyright law. See 
e.g. Rebecca Tushnet, ‗Legal Fictions‘ (1997) 17 Loy LA Ent L Rev 651; Leanne Stendell, ‗Fanfic And Fan 
Fact: How Current Copyright Law Ignores the Reality of Copyright Owner and Consumer Interests in Fan 
Fiction‘ (2005) 58 SMU L Rev 1551; Cory Doctorow, Content: selected essays on technology, creativity, 
copyright and the future of the future (Tachyon 2008) 89-93; Aaron Schwabach, Fan Fiction and Copyright 
(Ashgate 2011); Viva Moffat, ‗Borrowed Fiction and the Rightful Copyright Position‘ (2014) 32 Cardozo 
Arts & Ent. L.J. 839. 
68












 are typically produced by fans as prequels, sequels or new episodes of 
popular works. Fan films are the video equivalent of fan fiction and are typically either 
new fictional stories based on popular works or parodies of them. These fan filmmakers 
organise the whole production by themselves such as writing a new storyline, finding 
locations, providing costume, casting actors and actresses and sometimes playing the roles 
by themselves.  
Another kind of fan works that usually involve non-literal copying is filk music. 
―Filk starts off at conventions.‖
72
 Filk, filking or filk song
73
 is a style of music that 
combines words that have a science fiction or fantasy theme such as names of places and 
characters from popular works into lyrics. Filks can be complete original songs (i.e. 
original lyrics and music)
74
 as well as new lyrics combined with pre-existing music
75
. Filk 
songs can vary from funny to heart wrenching and from silly to serious. People who write 
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 Anime is the abbreviated pronunciation of ‗animation‘ in Japanese. It generally means Japanese 
animation. 
70
 Manga is from a Japanese word meaning comics and cartooning. The term is now widely used to refer to 
Japanese comics. 
71
 See e.g., Will Brooker, Using the Force: Creativity, Community and Star Wars Fans (Continuum 
International Publishing Group 2002) 173-198. 
72
 Filk originated by groups of fans at conventions who played old folk songs and added science fiction 
elements into the lyrics. The quotation is from an interview with Tom Smith, a well-known filker (cited with 
permission). The interview was conducted at the World Science Fiction Convention 2015 in August 2015. 
See Chapter 5 for further detail of the empirical research at the Convention. 
73
 The word ―filk‖ was originally a typographical error for ―folk‖ in a 1950s essay circulated among science 
fiction fans. The term had since been accepted and used to generally mean science-fiction folk music. (Lee 
Gold, ‗An Egocentric and Convoluted History of Early ―Filk‖ and Filking‘ (1997) 
<http://www.fanac.org/Fan_Histories/filkhist.html>) accessed 29 June 2016.  
74
 See, e.g., filk songs called ‗Waking Up Jedi‘ and ‗Hey, it‘s Can(n)on - [Hermione Granger the Pirate 
Queen]‘ by Tom Smith (<http://www.tomsmithonline.com/freestuff/oddio/iT041_192.mp3>; 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k3p_Kewu7jc>); See, also, a filk music video based on Star Wars 
named ‗Wastin‘ Away Again on Tatooine‘ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=wl_-
ol7_uJU> accessed 29 June 2016.  
75
 See, e.g., ‗Midichlorian Rhapsody‘, a filk song with the lyrics about Star Wars series and music from the 
song ‗Bohemian Rhapsody‘ by Queen <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpvlTVgeivU&feature=share> 




or sing filk are called filksingers
76
 or filkers. Although filks are traditionally to be 
performed at conventions, nowadays more fans post their filk songs and videos of filking 
performance online. 
 
(ii) Literal copying or direct taking 
There are a number of online re-creations that involve literal copying or direct 
taking of original works. Since there is a varying degree of direct copying, this thesis will 
exemplify re-creations of this category by the typical level of copying ranging from 
copying part of the original work to taking the entirety of the work. 
 
Copying parts of an original work 
Online re-creations involving literal copying of some portions of original works 
can be sub-divided into two groups of formats: (i) literary and visual works and (ii) audio 
and audio-visual works. 
The re-creations in the forms of literary works and visual arts that usually include 
literal copying parts of copyright protected works are such as fanzine, fan site and 
doujinshi. 
Fanzine is a portmanteau word of ―fan‖ and ―magazine‖. A fanzine is "[a]n 
amateur-produced magazine written for a subculture of enthusiasts devoted to a particular 
interest‖
 77
. From the original empirical research in 2015
78
, the interviewed fanzine 
creators considered fanzines to be about science fiction and fans. They engage in the 
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 ―Traditionally a filksinger is someone who comes from the Science Fiction Fannish community. They 
have also tended to be amateur performers and songwriters because they do this once in a while and they 
don‘t do it to make any kind of money, they do it because it is fun.‖ (Three Penny Opry, ‗Filk Night‘ (Three 
Penny Opry, 11 May 2006) <http://threepennyopry.blogspot.co.uk/2006_05_01_archive.html> accessed 29 
June 2016).  
77
 TheFreeDictionary, ‗Fanzine‘, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/fanzine> accessed 29 June 2016. 
78
 The interviews with two fanzine creators were undertaken exclusively for the purpose of investigating the 
nature of fanzines. The interviews were conducted at the World Science Fiction Convention 2015 in August 




production of the fanzines to communicate with friends as well as exchange thoughts, 
experience and information on conventions and activities within the fan communities. 
Most of the contents are news and criticism relating to the popular works (typically 
science fiction genre), book reviews, and personal experiences or non-fictions. However, 
fanzines may contain images owned by others or art works created originally by the fan 
artists. Fanzines may also include other fan works such as written fan fictions, poetry, and 
fan drawings. Fanzines were traditionally made and circulated offline; with the digital 
facilities, they are now widely available on the internet. 
As to fan blog, fan page or fan site
79
, it is a website devoted to a particular cultural 
phenomenon. This fan-created website displays information about a popular subject such 
as history, criticism, interviews, plots, storyline, episode listings, bibliography, fan fiction, 
discussion boards, the latest news and links to other relevant websites. It usually embeds 
images, sound recordings as well as videos of the subject. The displayed items on the fan 
site include both copyright works owned by others and original elements made by the fan. 
The means of gathering these materials are varied and usually without permission of the 
copyright owners. The materials can be scanned from a hard copy to create the digital files 
and uploaded onto the fan site or can simply be copied from other websites or internet 
sources. The fan‘s creativity in a fan site can be found in the arrangement and decoration 
of the webpage as well as the new created contents such as news reports, statistics, Q&As, 
and discussion boards. Some fan sites contain a high insertion of fan creators‘ own 
creativities whereas some merely distribute or provide links for copyright infringing 
materials relevant to the popular work. 
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 For articles discussing the legality of fan sites, see e.g., Jessica Elliott, ‗Copyright Fair Use and Private 
Ordering‘ (2011) 11 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 329; Jennifer C Moore, ‗Comment: Copyright Protection 
or Fan Loyalty-Must Entertainment Companies Choose? Alternate Solutions for Addressing Internet Fan 
Sites‘ (2001) 3 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 273; Cecilia Ogbu, ‗I Put Up a Website About My Favorite Show and All 
I Got Was This Lousy Cease-and-Desist Letter: The Intersection of Fan Sites, Internet Culture, and 
Copyright Owners‘ (2002) 12 S. Cal. Interdisc. LJ 279; Krissi Geary-Boehm, ‗Cyber Chaos: The Clash 




Another example of visual re-creation is doujinshi
80
. Doujinshi are fan-made 
comics often produced by amateurs. Mehra describes doujinshi as ―Japanese manga 
(roughly, comic books or graphic novels) written by authors using the well-known 
characters of another, more famous, author‖.
81
 They are commonly created by deriving 
characters and backgrounds from manga, anime, and video games. 
Online re-creations in the forms of audio and audio-visual arts or online videos
82
 
usually involve direct copying of various parts of original works. Online re-creations of 
this kind are for instance mash-up, fanvid, machinima, and virtual world. 
Re-creators produce ―mash-ups‖
83
 by taking content from multiple original works 
and combining them together. They are usually in the forms of audio and audio-visual 
works. A music mash-up is a composition of two or more pre-recorded music or songs. It 
is also known as ―music sampling‖.
84
 A prominent music mash-up is The Grey Album by 
D.J. Danger Mouse released in 2004. It mixes the vocal content of Jay-Z‘s Black Album 
with samples from The Beatles‘ album known as the White Album.
85
 Another type of 
mash-up is in a form of video that takes content of visual and/or audio works from 
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 The term is sometimes written as Dōjinshi. See also, Mariko Foster, ‗Parody‘s Precarious Place: The Need 
to Legally Recognize Parody as Japan‘s Cultural Property‘ (2013) 23(2) Seton Hall Journal of Sports & 
Entertainment Law 313; Nathaniel Noda, ‗Copyrights Retold: How Interpretive Rights Foster Creativity and 
Justify Fan-Based Activities‘ (2010) 20 Seton Hall J Sports & Ent L 131; Nathaniel Noda, ‗When Holding 
on Means Letting Go: Why Fair Use Should Extend to Fan-based Activities‘ (2008) 5 U. Denv. Sports & 
Ent. L.J. 64. 
81
 Salil Mehra, ‗Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain Why All the Cartoons My Kid Watches 
are Japanese Imports?‘ (2002) 55 Rutgers L. Rev. 155, 156. 
82
 For an interesting discussion about online video and copyright, see Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi, 
‗Recut, Reframe, Recycle: The Shaping of Fair Use Best Practices for Online Video‘ (2010) 6 Journal of 
Law and Policy for the Information Society 13. 
83
 For a legal discussion concerning mash-ups and remix see e.g., Vera Golosker, 'The Transformative 
Tribute: How Mash-Up Music Constitutes Fair Use of Copyrights' (2012) 34 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 
381; Michael J. Hughes, ‗Dealing with Talking Girls and Dangerous Mice: An Assessment of Mashups and 
their Place in Copyright in Canada‘ (LLM thesis, University of Toronto 2011); Rebecca Tushnet, ‗Hybrid 
Vigor: Mashups, Cyborgs, and Other Necessary Monsters‘ (2010) 6 Journal of Law and Policy for the 
Information Society 1; Andrew S. Long, ‗Mashed Up Videos and Broken Down Copyright‘ (2007) 60 Okl. 
L. Rev. 317; Urs Gasser and Silke Ernst, ‗From Shakespeare to DJ Danger Mouse: A Quick Look at 
Copyright and User Creativity in the Digital Age‘ (2006) Berkman Center Research Publication 1; Damien 
O‘Brien and Brian Fitzgerald, ‗Mashups, Remixes and Copyright law‘ (2006) 9(2) Internet Law Bulletin 17. 
84
 For a discussion on music sampling and copyright, see e.g. Michael B. Landau, ‗Are the Courts Singing a 
Different Tune When it Comes to Music?‘ (2015) 5 IP Theory 1. 
85
 Nicholas Lewis, ‗Shades of Grey: Can the Copyright Fair Use Defense Adapt to New Re-Contextualized 




multiple sources to create a new work. Generally, video mash-ups are used to retell the 
narrative of the underlying works. For example, the YouTube video, ‗Buffy vs Edward: 
Twilight Remixed‟
86
 involves selected scenes from a movie and a TV series depicting an 
imagined story when Edward Cullen, the main character who is a vampire from the series 
Twilight, meets Buffy from Buffy the Vampire Slayer. 




 is another re-creation where 
―vidders‖ remix footage from movies, television shows, or videogames, and synchronise 
the clips to a soundtrack or a popular song to express different aspects of the story or the 
characters or to create entirely new storylines. Vidders‘ creativity comes purely from 
selection, arrangement, and editing.
89
 The popular sub-genre of fanvids is ―Anime Music 
Videos‖ (―AMVs‖) which are music videos based on Japanese anime and video games.
90
 
AnimeMusicVideos.org is possibly the largest online community dedicated to AMVs. As 




Another type of online re-creations in the form of video is ―machinima‖. 
Machinima production is a new audio-visual work emerging from virtual realities; in other 
words, it is a film made from video games and virtual worlds. Machinima is the art of 
making animated movies in a real-time 3D virtual environment
92
 or the technique of 
taking a viewpoint on a virtual world and recording that, editing it, and displaying it as 
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 ‗Buffy vs Edward: Twilight Remixed‘ is a mash-up video by Jonathan McIntosh 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RZwM3GvaTRM> accessed 30 April 2016.  
87
 Rebecca Tushnet, ‗Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity‘ (2007) 70 Law & 
Contemp Probs 135; Sarah Trombley, ‗Visions and Revisions: Fanvids and Fair Use‘ (2007) 25 Cardozo 
Arts & Ent. L.J. 647. 
88
 Patrick McKay, ‗Culture of the Future‘ (2011) 24 Regent U L Rev 117. 
89
 For an example of fanvid, see ‗Doctor Who | Counting Stars‘ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1x-
QAeG2wM> accessed 30 April 2016. 
90
 Patrick McKay, ‗Culture of the Future: Adapting Copyright Law to Accommodate Fan-Made Derivative 
Works in the Twenty-First Century‘ (2011) 24 Regent U L Rev 117, 133; See e.g., ‗Final Fantasy 7: Midgar 
Burning (Red - Let it Burn - Until We Have Faces) AMV‘ 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3eiza_LXjq8> accessed 29 June 2016. 
91
AnimeMusicVideos.org, ‗Members Main Page - Global Statistics‘ 
<http://www.animemusicvideos.org/members/members_main.php> (user login required) accessed 30 April 
2016. 
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. A notable example of machinima is Tales of the Past series which narrates a 




A similar kind of online video involves roleplaying and narrating virtual worlds 
and video games. As of January 2016, the YouTube channel, PewDiePie
95
, created by a 
video game commentator was ranked as the most popular YouTube channel with 41.62 
million subscribers.
96
 The videos uploaded on the channel contain images, moving 
pictures, and audio works from a number of video games. Apart from PewDiePie, there 
are a lot of channels involving appropriated segments from popular games. YouTube 







have earned their popularity from creating videos with images, commenting, roleplaying, 
and narrating movies from Minecraft
100
, the sandbox video game of breaking and placing 
blocks. Other famous video games playing channels are for example VEGETTA777
101
 
(with over 13.5 million subscribers) and VanossGaming
102
 (with approximately 17 million 
subscribers) which involves many video games such as Dragon Ball Xenoverse, Grand 
Theft Auto, and Garry's Mod. 
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 Hugh Hancock and Johnnie Ingram, Machinima For Dummies (Wiley Publishing, 2007) 10. 
94
 Wikia, ‗Tales of the Past‘ <http://wowwiki.wikia.com/wiki/Tales_of_the_Past> accessed 30 April 2016. 
95
 ‗PewDiePie‘ <https://www.youtube.com/user/PewDiePie> accessed 30 April 2016. 
96
 Statista, ‗Most popular YouTube channels as of January 2016, ranked by number of subscribers (in 
millions)‘ <http://www.statista.com/statistics/277758/most-popular-youtube-channels-ranked-by-
subscribers/>; As of 30 April 2016, PewDiePie channel has 43,647,281 subscribers with 11,940,087,315 
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Another example of audio-visual re-creation is virtual world. Virtual worlds are 
particularly interesting as this type of re-creation is only possible because of the advanced 
digital technologies. Virtual worlds are venues for creation, commerce and community.
103
 
The term ―virtual world‖ describes online immersive ―game-like‖ environments where 
multiple users engage in socialisation, entertainment, education, and commerce 
simultaneously.
104
 It can be a goal-based game such as World of Warcraft or the so-called 
―pure‖ environment like Second Life, Minecraft and Garry's Mod (worlds that are open 
ended, without explicit objectives).
105
 An open world game without specific goals allows 
players to choose how to play the game and gives them freedom and facilities to create 
any virtual items which display on computer screen in sophisticated three-dimensional 
figures
106
. Players can even build virtual environments (called ―sims‖
107
) from their own 
imagination or based on works of popular culture such as Tatooine from Star Wars and 
Hogwarts from Harry Potter. Typically, creators of these sims would strive to create the 
virtual environments imitating the underlying works as close as can be. These sims 
undoubtedly consist of a number of reproductions of copyright works.  
 
Copying the entirety of an original work 
In making online re-creations of this kind, re-creators copy the entire original work 
to literally translate the original narration or text without a meaningful modification of the 
visual and/or audio of the original works. These works are the so-called fansub, fandub 
and scanlation. 
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 (short for fan-subtitled) is the term referred to the production of fan-
produced, translated, subtitled version of a Japanese anime episode or foreign film and 
television shows. A similar practice is called ―fandub‖ (or fan-made dub) which also 
involves a reproduction of a whole episode of an original anime where fandubbers 
translate and mix the original sound with a re-recorded soundtrack in a different language. 
The last example for this type of re-creation is ―scanlation‖
109
 (a portmanteau word of 
―scan‖ and ―translation‖). Scanlation is produced by scanning an original Japanese comics 
or manga, digitally erasing the Japanese characters and inserting a translation into another 
language. Typically, the appropriated original anime and manga have not been officially 
released or commercially licensed in that other countries that fansub, fandub and 
scanlation are distributed. 
 
1.3 Conclusion 
The digital technologies and the internet make it possible for anyone to easily 
make perfect copies of precedent works as well as freely re-create works by cutting, 
pasting, remixing and re-imagining existing works. They have made UGC including 
―online re-creations‖ much more common, more widespread, and more sophisticated than 
ever before. The rapid development of technologies leads to the change of society and 
culture. The nature of the online culture encompasses some prominent characteristics; the 
cultural phenomenon involves remixing existing materials, peer-to-peer communication, 
and participation and interaction in an online community. These characteristics are 
correlated to one another and will also be further discussed in later chapters. Since online 
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re-creations involve certain degree of direct and indirect copying of copyright protected 
works, the questions concerning possible copyright infringement will be substantially 

























CHAPTER 2 - Copyright Problems of Online Re-creations 
 
Copyright law has a problematic application in the age of online re-creations in 
which people are re-using others‘ works to make new creations and share them online. 
This chapter will analyse the correlation and conflict between copyright and online re-
creations: how the current copyright law makes it difficult for online re-creations to be 
made lawfully. 
As previously discussed in chapter 1, the technologies have significantly altered 
the patterns of production, reproduction and distribution of works. Unauthorised re-
creations can easily be disseminated to wider audience, at the global level. From a rights 
owner‘s business perspective, the digital copy, reproduction and distribution appear as 
threats. The initial response to these digital threats was a more aggressive regime of 
copyright protection and enforcement.110 Copyright‘s target in the pre-digital era was the 
enforcement against professional infringers, not individual consumer and end-users.111 The 
purpose of copyright seems to shift from a right to fight against professional pirates to a 
right targeting at individual internet users who have now become content providers, 
though they are mostly amateurs.112  
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 The current copyright law affects online re-creations in several ways: (i) it limits 
activities concerning re-creation; (ii) there are problems on obtaining permission from 
copyright holders; (iii) there are moral rights concerns; (iv) there are insufficient viable 
limitations and exceptions; and (v) there is a threat of litigation and abrupt enforcement. 
 
2.1 Copyright Limits Activities for Re-creation 
This part will specifically discuss copyright infringement of online re-creators113: 
the activities and elements involving in the infringement of copyright holders‘ exclusive 
rights. Copyright liability of intermediaries, such as online service providers or platform 
providers like YouTube and Facebook, is beyond the scope of this research. 
The exclusive economic rights114 discussed for the purpose of this thesis are those 
that are most important and most relevant to online re-creations.115 Two main groups of 
rights relevant to online re-creations can be classified as the rights concerned with using or 
copying elements of the original work and the rights concerned with sharing the 
appropriated copyright materials. This part therefore analyses these two sets of rights. 
 
2.1.1 Copying and alteration 
In its production process, a re-creation involves reproducing, sampling, borrowing, 
quoting or remixing elements of preceding works. These activities fundamentally 
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constitute copy, reproduction or adaptation116 of the original work which are restricted acts 
under national copyright laws of many countries.117 Some jurisdictions provide the right 
holders with other rights related to alterations of copyright work such as the rights to 
translation118 and to prepare derivative work119. 
Different types of re-creations involve very different ways of using the original 
works; thus it is worth examining each in turn.  
 
2.1.1.1 Literal copying of the entire original work: fansubs and related 
activities 
Fansub, as explained in chapter 1, is the term used for the production and 
distribution of fan-produced, translated, subtitled version of original copyright works 
which are typically Japanese anime episodes, television shows and films.  
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There is usually a group of people involved in the fansubbing process; though all 
phases can also be conducted by one person. These fansubbers are responsible for each 
stage of fansubbing: raw acquisition, translation, timing, editing, typesetting, quality 
control and encoding.120 The activities of these fansubbers involve direct copying of 
original copyright protected works. The very first stage is acquiring an entire anime 
episode by copying it from a TV source or a DVD. TV and DVD rips are verbatim copy of 
the anime. The translators then translate the anime from the original soundtrack language 
or sometimes from English subtitles into other languages. The timers then set the in and 
out times of each subtitle. Typesetters will next be responsible for defining the font style 
of the subtitles. Editor or proof-readers control the coherence and natural sound of the 
target language. They then use an encoding program to produce the subtitled version of 
the anime episode.  
Fansubbers directly copy the whole episode or the whole movie or anime. It 
therefore infringes the exclusive rights of the copyright holder significantly the right to 
reproduction. Article 9 of the Berne Convention recognises that ―[a]uthors of literary and 
artistic works protected by this Convention shall have the exclusive right of authorizing 
the reproduction of these works, in any manner or form‖. This clearly covers reproduction 
in computer storage, cloud storage and any other online medium.121 Thus copying the 
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anime by ripping off DVD or TV and storing it by electronic means fall within the scope 
of this right.  
This restricted act also covers reproduction or re-creation of virtual worlds in which 
the re-creators turn a fictional character in a story or in two dimensions into a virtual 




Fansubbers do not alter the content of the original work but reproduce and 
disseminate the whole of the original audio-visual works with subtitles. The only creative 
contributions to the fansub are the translation and the effort to make the subtitles. Some 
fansubbers do their own translation while some fansubbers use software which 
automatically recognises the voice of the original video and transforms it into written 
words. 
Apart from fansubbing of audio-visual works e.g. movies and animes, a related type 
of re-creation is scanlation. Scanlation is usually produced by using an automated 
program which scans various manga or Japanese comic books, digitally erases the 
Japanese characters, and inserts English translations. Adding subtitles to a video and 
replacing textual translations mean that the original works are edited in the way that can 
be considered an adaptation123 or derivative of the original copyright work. The subtitling 
and translation activities therefore potentially infringe the owner‘s rights of adaptation and 
preparing a derivative work.  
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2.1.1.2 Literal copying of part of original work: vidding, mashups and related 
activities 
Fanvids and mashups take and re-arrange audio and/or visual segments from 
original anime, films or television series; therefore, these types of re-creations definitely 
constitute an act of direct copying of the copyright works. Some fanvids merely reiterate 
the original concept of the underlying work while some demonstrate different aspects of 
the original stories or unique storylines. Creative contributions of fanvids and mashups 
therefore vary widely in the story being told and in discretion on selection, arrangement 
and editing of video segments. 
One general element of copyright infringement not explicitly stated in the 
international legislations but adopted in many jurisdictions is the concept of 
‗substantiality‘. Under this concept of law, to establish an infringement, copyright law 
does not require that the entirety of the copyright work be copied. Copying a substantial 
amount of the original expression will be sufficiently actionable. ‗Substantiality‘ is an 
elusive copyright concept and is differently developed in each national copyright law. It is 
an infringement under the UK copyright law if the restricted acts carried out in relation to 
either the whole copyright work or a ‗substantial part‘ of the work124, and either directly or 
indirectly.125 The US copyright law adopts the ‗substantial similarity‘ approach to 
determine an infringement of copyright.126 Substantiality is commonly assessed by 
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quantity and quality of the copied content.127 Since fansubs involve verbatim copy the 
whole original works, the copied parts are therefore very likely to be substantial. Though 
they are not whole copy like fansubs, mash-ups and viddings necessarily incorporate 
identifiable copyright components of original audio and/or visual works which are 
verbatim copied. Besides, fanvids usually involve taking of the entirety of an audio track. 
For example, an Anime Music Video (or A.M.V.) typically copies fragments of Japanese-
style anime or video games and synchronises the selected and edited clips to an original 
soundtrack or a popular song which the re-creator thinks most appropriate for the A.M.V. 
Hence these types of re-creations arguably involve a substantial use of that original work. 
 
2.1.1.3 Non-literal copying of original work: fan fiction and related activities 
Fan fiction authors usually derive the main characters, settings or original concept 
from the original works which are usually fictional stories to produce distinct stories of 
their own imagination and interpretation. These re-creators do not reproduce an exact copy 
of any part of the expression of original works, e.g., original texts of a novel or scenes or 
pictures from movies; instead they create their own stories indirectly based on fragments 
of original works but with their own writing skills.  
Comparing to fansubs, fanvids and mash-ups which directly incorporate whole or 
part of original audio-visual works, fan fictions at most involve indirect copying not 
verbatim copying or plagiarising. In case of literal reproduction, it is not complicated to 
prove direct taking of identifiable parts of original work to claim a copyright infringement. 
Non-literal copying, however, is problematic: no direct and exact elements is taken from 
the original work, instead the reproduced parts are for example the theme, characters or 
the plot of a fictional story without using the actual words from an original novel or 
verbatim copy of a scene in an original film.128 









Under the substantiality concept, copyright law does not require that the entirety of 
the copyright work be copied to constitute an infringement; however, using the plot, 
characters and setting of a novel for a fan fiction without reproducing a single sentence of 
the original is difficult to determine whether it involves substantial taking.129 
It is a complex task to determine whether a non-literal copying is substantial and 
thus constitutes copyright infringement. From an analysis of a number of cases concerning 
non-literal copying in various jurisdictions, courts usually first identify what has been 
taken i.e. determine whether the second work has copied elements from the first work, 
find the ‗chains‘ between the two works and identify the similarity. If the similar elements 
have been found, then courts would consider whether such elements are protected by 
copyright and whether they are substantial similarities.  
To assert a successful claim of copyright infringement, the original source work 
must constitute copyright protected material.130 Fundamentally, to have copyright 
protection131, the work must be original132 and must be a subject matter of copyright 
protection.133 In relation to fan fiction, the owner of original work must demonstrate that 
the fictional facts or characters used in a fan fiction are his personal expression not just 
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ideas134 and that they are not in the public domain which can freely be used by anyone. 
The derived fictional elements must also pass copyright protection criteria.  
Some fan fiction authors may only use the characters from the original work but 
create completely different plots or concepts. In this case, assessing the copyrightablity of 
fictional characters is a complicated task since there is no uniform guideline of how to 
determine whether a character described in text is protected by copyright. Regarding 
copyright in characters, the US courts have applied two tests: the ―sufficiently delineated‖ 
test and the ―story being told‖ test.  
For the first test, a fictional character is protected if it is ―sufficiently delineated‖ 
independently of the work in which it appears. For instance, Tarzan was distinctively 
delineated in the original book, Tarzan of the Apes and therefore was protected
135
:  
―Tarzan is the ape-man. He is an individual closely in tune with his jungle 
environment, able to communicate with animals yet able to experience 




Under this test, Harry Potter and Captain Kirk are possibly ―sufficiently 
delineated‖ and thus protected as well. 
According to the second test, a literary character is protected if it constitutes ―the 
story being told‖; but if the character is ―only the chessman in the game of telling the 
story‖
137
 it is not protected by copyright. As addressed in a case of Sam Spade, since the 
novel The Maltese Falcon is driven by plot and atmosphere, Sam Spade the fictional 
private detective and the protagonist of the story was not protected by copyright.
138
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These two tests however could yield different results in some cases. For example, 
while Professor Dumbledore may be ―sufficiently delineated‖ for protection, he might not 
constitute ―the story being told‖ in the Harry Potter series. Besides, the tests are debatable 
and only applied in the US courts.
139
 Despite the ambiguity of copyright in fictional 
characters, original authors and fans tend to consider that popular characters are protected 
by copyright. 
Generally, in regard to non-literal copying of original elements either characters or 
non-characters, courts in many jurisdictions adopt the following principles to decline 
copyright protection in some forms of expression: idea/expression dichotomy, merger 
doctrine and scènes à faire.140 
The most important doctrine for non-literal infringement analysis is probably the 
idea/expression dichotomy that copyright law protects the expression of an idea but not 
the idea itself.141 Copyright therefore inhibits the use of the expression of the copyright 
holder but does not deter the use of the underlying ideas. The principle of idea and 
expression dichotomy forms the core consideration in much case law regarding non-literal 
copy infringement involving various types of works e.g. novels142, films143, images and 
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other artistic works144, fabric design145, TV formats146, TV programmes147 and computer 
programmes148. In most of the cases, the plaintiffs were not successful in claiming a 
copyright infringement because the alleged taking was found to be unprotected ideas 
unless the appropriation from the original work was unique, detailed or original expression 
of ideas, not just ideas. 
Under the merger doctrine149, if an expression inextricably merged with its 
underlying idea i.e. if there is only one or very limited number of ways to express certain 
idea, expression of such idea cannot be protected by copyright because granting exclusive 
ownership for any particular form of expression would deter all possible future use of the 
idea.150 
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Under the related doctrine of scènes à faire151, incidents, characters or settings 
which inevitably follow from a common theme and can only be expressed in a stereotyped 
form affords no copyright protection152 because granting a copyright ―would give the first 
author a monopoly on the commonplace ideas behind the scenes a faire‖153. Stock scenes 
and standard ideas considered as unprotected scènes à faire are, for example, a general 
―story from the adventures of a young professional who courageously investigates, and 
finally exposes, the criminal organization‖154; ―[e]lements such as drunks, prostitutes, 
vermin and derelict cars ...  appear in any realistic work about the work of policemen in 
the South Bronx‖155; common theme of underwater civilization156; ―the idea of a mosque-
style palace with minarets ... in a story about Arabian or African royalty‖ and ―visits to 
fast-food restaurants and nightclub sequences‖157; and photographing a vodka bottle for 
advertisements with limited possible ways to do so.158 
After identifying similar elements in the two works and separating protected from 
non-protected materials, courts would consider whether the similar elements in the second 
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work are substantially similar with the protected elements of the first work.159 If the 
similar elements are merely ideas (idea/expression dichotomy) or stereotypical scenes (as 
scènes à faire) or expression that merged with the underlying idea (merger doctrine) or 
simply exist in the public domain, substantial similarity usually would not be found and 
copyright infringement claim would likely be rejected.  
To determine legality of fan fiction, the above analysis applies. For example, a fan 
fiction which uses the theme of vampire and werewolf or a concept of a wizard boarding 
school may be considered as scene a faire or merely an idea, therefore not protected by 
copyright. However it is more complex when a fan fiction author uses the names of the 
places and characters written in a fictional story such as the names of the protagonists in 
Twilight, Edward and Bella, with the storyline of a vampire and a werewolf who fall in 
love with a girl, or the names of the places such as Hogwarts School from Harry Potter. It 
is clear that ideas cannot be protected; however detailed scenes, plot outlines and 
characters may be protectable elements; specific and unique scenes and texts of a novel 
are most likely to be protected.  
Despite the complexity to prove infringement, most writers and fans seem to 
assume that infringement occurs. The possibility that fan fiction is an infringement chills 
its creation and thus creativity; online re-creators tend to comply with cease and desist 
letters from copyright holders by removing their re-creations. This issue is further 
discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
 
2.1.2 Online communication and making available to the public 
In the culture of online re-creation, disseminating or sharing works is one of the 
primary motives of re-creating. As discussed in chapter 1, online re-creators share their re-
creations on the internet platforms such as uploading fansubs and mashups on YouTube 
and posting fan fiction on FanFiction.net. This action potentially constitutes an 
                                                          
 
159





infringement of the exclusive rights of the right owner to communicate and make the work 
available to the public and to perform the copyright protected work publicly. 
 The crucial right related to online sharing of work is the right to communicate the 
work to the public. This right was conferred to cope with the modern technology.160 In 
compliance with the WIPO treaties161, the right of communication to the public including 
making available on demand was implemented in national laws in many countries.162 The 
exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any communication to the public of the work 
includes making available on-demand access: the making available to the public of the 
work in such a way that members of the public may access it from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them.163 Following the 23rd recital in the preamble to the EU 
InfoSoc Directive164, the ECJ determined that ―communication to the public‖ must be 
interpreted broadly.165 Broad interpretation might however encroach upon the right to 
freedom of speech. Freedom of expression or free speech will be critically discussed in 
chapter 3.2. 
 In summary, an online re-creator typically carries out one of the activities 
exclusively conferred on the copyright owner without permission; a copyright 
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infringement therefore potentially occurs. If a re-creation is made with authorisation from 
the right holders, such re-creation would be lawful. However, as we will see in part 2.2, 
obtaining permission to re-create is almost impossible for general re-creators. 
 
2.2 Authorisation Difficulties 
Permission or a licence from the copyright holder allows the licensee to exploit the 
work without infringing. Although right holders enforce their copyright against amateur 
re-creators as analogised to professional content providers, licensing mechanisms do not 
operate well for those re-creators.  
First of all, it is difficult for a re-creator to identify and locate the proper owners of 
copyright due to the absence of registration requirement and due to the fact that copyright 
interests in a work (such as sound recording and musical composition) can be split 
between a number of parties166. After finding the right owners, re-creators may face a 
problem of unwillingness to license. Copyright owners tend to contractually grant 
permission to professional users, but do not easily give authorisation to individual amateur 
users.167 Moreover, collective administration, a system that enables licensing from 
numerous owners to multiple users, is for non-altering uses rather than for re-creation of 
works.168 This is possibly due to the fact that most licensing is based on revenue sharing, 
but amateur re-creations produce minimal or no revenue to share. 
 Not only that it is a tremendous hurdle to obtain licences from multiple copyright 
holders, licensing fees for a use of their content are potentially cost-prohibitive.169 This is 
inextricably linked to the valuable asset approach of right holders. Negotiating a deal to 
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authorise a use of their works for re-creations would also be extremely difficult. There is 
no guarantee that the right owners will grant licences for use of re-creations. The most 
likely outcome of the negotiation is a licence refusal.170 Normal copyright licensing system 
therefore dissuades online re-creations. 
 Sometimes right holders may voluntarily grant permission to re-creators to use 
their works. Some original creators may declare their permission for fans to use their 
works for re-creations such as fan fictions and fanvids and some authors join the open-
access licensing scheme allowing members of the public to access and use their online 
content for free under standardised licences. Nevertheless, as previously discussed, it is 
more likely that copyright owners will not give authorisation.  
To conclude, it is almost impossible for an online re-creator to obtain permission 
to re-create due to some obstacles discussed above and due to some practical issues 
identified in the social norms analysis in chapter 5.2.2. Thus, online re-creations tend to be 
created without authorisation and consequently tend to be infringing. 
 
2.3 Moral Rights Concerns 
Alongside the conferred economic rights, the author of the copyright protected 
work is also granted moral rights to protect his non-pecuniary interests. Civil law 
countries tend to provide more rigorous moral rights protection than those countries in 
common law systems. In France, for example, moral rights are ―perpetual, inalienable and 
imprescriptible‖,171 whereas in most countries including the UK172, moral rights last for the 
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same period as economic rights173. The rights are generally not alienable174 but can be 
waived in some jurisdictions175.  
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention secures protection of the two moral rights 
which are the author‘s right of attribution or paternity to claim authorship of the work and 
the right of integrity to object to any distortion of his work. Article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention states that: 
―Independent of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of 
the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the 
work and to object to any distortion, modification of, or other derogatory 
action in relation to the said work, which would be prejudicial to the 
author's honor or reputation.‖ 
Members of the Berne Convention are bound to comply with Article 6bis. For 
instance, France grants the right of respect namely respect for name (attribution right) and 
respect for work (integrity right) in article L121-1 of its Intellectual Property Code. 
Section 106A of the US Copyright Act
176
 also recognises the two moral rights however 
limited for authors of works of visual art. 
Though not being recognised under the international framework, the right of 
divulgation and the right of withdrawal are specific rights in some countries such as France 
and Germany. Divulgation right allows the author of the work to have control of when, 
where and how his work will first be divulged to the public.177 As for the right of 
withdrawal, the author can withdraw his work from further reproduction and circulation in 
return for indemnification to the assigned distributor for the damage that might occur to 
him.178 These two moral rights do not have a significant implication in terms of online re-
creations; re-creators generally use the work that has already been published and the right 
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of withdrawal is available only in a small number of countries and rarely asserted.179 Thus 
for the purpose of this thesis, these two rights will be set aside. 
 
The Attribution right 
The right of attribution or paternity is relatively broad as it gives the author the 
right to assert that he is the creator of his work so that his authorship will be recognised 
and exercised as he wishes including publishing his work anonymously or 
pseudonymously.180 The author can also prevent false attribution, the use of his name as 
the author of the work he did not create.181 
Regarding the attribution right, some online re-creators give credits by stating the 
names of the owners of original works, but many do not. In case of fan fiction, from a 
sample of 100 Harry Potter stories from FanFicion.net, only twenty-one fan authors cited 
a disclaimer that original Harry Potter story belongs to J.K. Rowling.
182
 This raised a 
potential infringement problem of attribution right in most online re-creations. Besides, 
acknowledging the name of the original author must be adequate to attribute authorship of 
the work, not merely tributes. For example, in Sawkins v Hyperion Records
183
, the English 
court held that the acknowledgement by Hyperion of the contribution of Sawkins, the 
author of a musical work, in the CD booklets that ―With thanks to Dr Lionel Sawkins for 
his preparation of performance materials for this recording‖ was insufficient to identify 
Sawkins as the author of the work. Hyperion therefore infringed the moral right of 
Sawkins under section 77 of the 1988 CDPA.  
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The Integrity Right 
The right of integrity allows the author to object to any distortion, mutilation or 
modification of his work which would prejudice the author‘s honour or reputation. 
Generally, following the Berne formulation, the author must demonstrate that the claimed 
distortion is prejudicial to his honour or reputation. The formulation and application of the 
integrity right vary in national laws. 
 It is arguable that music sampling or video mash-ups that involve cutting and 
rearranging original materials infringe the moral right of integrity. In a French case, 
Schoendoerffer v Mod Films
184
, a reduction of the length of a movie from 131 to 119 
minutes without consent of the director infringed his moral right. In an English case, 
Morrison Leahy Music v Lightbond
185
, George Michael objected that a mix of samples 
from his musical work distorted his work. Though the issue was not decided, the judge 
accepted that it is an arguable case whether the change of context of musical selections 
constitute a derogatory treatment of the composition. However, in Confetti Records v 
Warner Music
186
, an addition of a rap to a track of garage music did not constitute 
derogatory treatment because the court did not find that the distortion or mutilation 
prejudiced the author‘s honour or reputation. It is therefore an arguable case that a remix 
of extracts of original work may derogate the primary work such that the author‘s honour 
or reputation is prejudiced. 
One of the most interesting fans‘ practice which could distort the original work and 
thus affect the integrity right is ‗slash‘ which is a genre of fan fiction exploring the 
romantic and sexual relationship between the fictional characters mostly of the same sex.  
The term ‗slash‘
187
 comes from the slash punctuation mark used to indicate the names of 
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the characters in a pairing such as Harry/Hermione, Edward/Bella and the popular same-
sex parings: Kirk/ Spock, Holmes/Watson, and Harry/Draco. Though ‗slash‘ genre 
typically refers to written fan fiction, nowadays there are a number of drawings, photo 
manipulations and fanvids that depict erotic situations between popular characters.  
But whose perspective does the court apply when considering whether a 
derogation of a work prejudices the author‘s honour or reputation? The UK court tends to 
apply an objective test of reasonableness
188
 while the civil law approach (such as in 
France) adopts a subjective test rather than an objective test. Nevertheless, some countries 
may apply both perspectives such as in a Canadian case, Snow v Eaton Centre
189
. In this 
case, the Ontario High Court of Justice found that the integrity right of Snow, the sculptor 
of a flock of geese, was infringed because Christmas red ribbons decorated around the 
geese necks distorted the sculpture‘s integrity which was prejudicial to Snow‘s honour and 
reputation. In this case, the court applied both subjective and objective tests. It considered 
the author‘s perspective that his work had been made to look ridiculous by the addition of 
ribbons. It also took into account the testimony of experts in the field which supported the 
prejudice of the author‘s honour or reputation. Therefore, in conclusion, whether a 
distortion of a work prejudices the creator‘s honour or reputation may depend on the 
perspective of the author and/or the opinion of other people. 
Hence, in general, whether a re-creation prejudices the honour or reputation of the 
original author depends on the perspectives of the author and/or members of the society. 
Accordingly, in case of a homoerotic slash, in a society where homosexuality is a crime 
and if the original author is a member of that society, the derogatory argument seems 
strong; whereas in a country which prohibits discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation, such derogatory treatment claim may be declined. Slash specifically 
homoerotic fictions may therefore infringe the author‘s right of integrity if they are found 
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as a distortion of the original works and harmful to the original authors‘ honour and 
reputation. 
As discussed above, copyright both economic rights and moral rights significantly 
limit activities involving re-creation and obtaining authorisation from a right holder would 
not be possible. Moreover, in spite of a number of copyright exceptions that permit limited 
use of copyright works without permission of the copyright owner, there is no viable 
copyright defence which is really useful for online re-creators. 
 
2.4 Inadequacy of Copyright Defences 
There are certain defences to copyright infringement to allow a reasonable use of 
copyright work without permission of the right owners.190 Exemptions relevant to online 
re-creations are such as private copying in continental Europe, the fair use doctrine in the 
US, fair dealing provisions in the common law countries and the Canadian user-generated 
content exception.  
The InfoSoc Directive191 allows EU member states to introduce private copying 
limitation for non-commercial use of copyright content in return for a fair compensation192 
to the right holders. In the countries where private copying exemptions are provided193, 
online re-creators can freely use copyright content to produce their re-creations under 
general conditions that they are not for commercial and not for public uses.194 Therefore, 
under the private copying provisions, re-creators can lawfully write fan fictions and edit 
mash-ups for pure personal enjoyment of the original works as long as they keep the 
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works on the shelf and do not share them with other people (in some countries, sharing the 
works with family and close friends are acceptable).195 However, online re-creations are 
usually communicated online to reach the widest audience; in such situation, re-creators 
therefore cannot avail themselves of private copying limitations. 
Other defences to copyright are such as the US fair use doctrine and the UK fair 
dealing. Though the US courts regularly held that parody amounts to fair use, it is not 
certain that a parody work or other forms of criticism such as satire falls within the scope 
of the fair use doctrine. Besides, other types of online re-creations such as fan fictions
196
 
and mash-ups are still problematic under the fair use exception. Fanvids, mash-ups and 
other works involving direct taking of original works are not likely to be fair uses. The UK 
fair dealing defence does not provide any specific exception for online re-creations, apart 
from private copying and parody exceptions implemented in October 2014. The existing 
limitations and exceptions in various jurisdictions including the US fair use and the UK 
fair dealing do not sufficiently provide a reasonable space for online re-creations. The free 
use doctrine under German law and the non-commercial user-generated content provision 
implemented in Canada are also limited and have some issues that need to be addressed. 
All these pertinent limitations and exceptions will be critically analysed in chapter 4.  
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2.5 The „Giant Grey Zone‟ 
Online re-creations constitute a ‗giant grey zone‘ within copyright.
197
 As 
previously demonstrated, though online re-creations involve unauthorised use of copyright 
protected materials and therefore are potential copyright infringements, these works have 
uncertain legal status due to the lack of case law in this area.
198
 Moreover, existing 
copyright exceptions such as the US fair use doctrine are notoriously difficult to predict, 
again, due to the lack of precedent decisions relating to various types of online re-
creations. Re-creators would not possibly know if their works categorised as a fair use or 
not.
199
 Thus, upon receipt of a cease and desist order or a takedown notice, they would not 
fight back or file a counter notification; instead they would shun possible litigation and 
remove their contents.
200
 Because of the absence of other applicable copyright exceptions, 
and thus, the lack of clarity about its legal status, an online re-creation can easily be 
alleged to be an infringement and can promptly be taken down as discussed below. 
The legal environment of online re-creation culture is ―not only murky, it is also 
hostile‖.201 Online re-creators face the threat of litigation and removal of their re-creations. 
Not only causing anxiety and fearfulness on the part of online re-creators, current 
copyright law also appears as a threat for the general public. Considering the risk of being 
sued by the content owners, the public including students, schools and universities fear to 
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engage with or do anything related to the online culture since the re-creations are 
presumptively illegal.202 
 Although online re-creations are potential copyright infringements, copyright 
owners of the underlying works are not enthusiastic in bringing the case to court. Due to 
the absence of relevant case law, the legality of online re-creations is left speculative. 
Hence there is still a threat of litigation if copyright owners choose to enforce their rights 
in courts. 
The reasons why it is relatively unusual for the copyright holders to take a legal 
action against online re-creations especially fan-based creations can be outlined as 
follows. First, it is usually not worth litigating when considering that the costs of legal 
enforcement likely outweigh any possible economic harm203. Second, ―[c]opyright holders 
seem to be aware of the potential for backlash if the public perceives them as targeting 
enthusiastic fans who only wish to support the show through their Internet activities‖204. 
Third, in the online environment, instead of heading to court, copyright owners can opt to 
exercise their rights through the copyright enforcing tool i.e. ‗notice and take down‘ 
procedure which yields an active and effective result of the allegedly infringing contents 
to be removed or taken down.  
 
Notice and Takedown 
 Without going to court, copyright can enforce their copyright against re-creators 
by issuing cease and desist letters.205 This alternative usually gives successful results since 
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 In the online environment, the equivalent option for copyright holders is the 
enforcing tool, ―notice and take down‖ procedure.207 The notice and take down regime 
provides immunity or ―safe harbour‖ for an intermediary such as YouTube that it will not 
be liable if upon obtaining a proper notice, it expeditiously removes or disables access to 
the material that is claimed to be infringing. Under this procedure, once the hosting 
service provider is notified by copyright owners or their agents or becomes aware of the 
presence of copyright infringing material on its server, it must act expeditiously to remove 
or disable access to such material.  
The DMCA was believed to balance ―the interests of content owners, on-line and 
other service providers, and information users in a way that will foster the continued 
development of electronic commerce and the growth of the Internet‖208. To safeguard the 
rights of the internet users, the DMCA allows the user to issue a counter notification209 
stating that his content is not unlawful and he ―has a good faith belief that the material was 
removed or disabled as a result of mistake or misidentification of the material to be 
removed or disabled.‖210 Unless the copyright holder has started court proceedings to 
remove the allegedly infringing material, the online service provider is obliged to replace 
the removed content and cease disabling access to such material between 10-14 business 
days following receipt of the counter notification.211 
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A prominent case regarding the DMCA takedown notice and the US fair use 
defence212 is Lenz v Universal.213 In 2007, Stephanie Lenz posted a home video of her 
children dancing in a kitchen on YouTube. In the twenty-nine seconds video, a poor 
quality sound of Prince‘s song, ‗Let‘s Go Crazy‘, was being played in the background. 
YouTube removed Lenz‘s video due to the DMCA takedown notice by Universal, the 
copyright owner of the song. Pursuant to section 512(g) of the US Copyright Act, Lenz 
issued a DMCA counter notification to YouTube who put the video back online about six 
weeks later. Lenz then filed a lawsuit against Universal for misrepresentation under the 
DMCA and sought a declaration judgment that her content was non-infringing. The court 
satisfied that Lenz‘s video was a fair use and thus not an infringement. The court in this 
case set a good faith requirement from the perspective of copyright owner to evaluate 
whether the material constitutes a fair use before issuing a takedown notice.214 The 
requirement helps reducing overused and abusive takedown notices215 from copyright 
owners such as by automated search programs for titles or fragments of copyright 
protected works without examining the allegedly infringing content216. 
This case can also be seen as a role model for internet users especially YouTube 
users to argue with DMCA takedown notices by filing counter notifications that their 
contents are non-infringing due to the fair use defence. Nevertheless, for most online re-
creations217, it is very unlikely that re-creators would fight back by counter notices: 
because they will have the burden to prove that their re-creations are not infringements 
while there is no landmark case of re-creations especially fanvids and mashups that could 
successfully avail of the US fair use doctrine or any other applicable exemption.  
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Virtual worlds created based on works of popular culture are also threatened by the 
notice and takedown regime. For instance, in 2009, a sim created based on Frank Herbert's 
Dune novels in Second Life was ordered to be removed by a DMCA takedown notice.218 
The sim creators did not contest but complied with the notice; as a result, all Dune-related 
items and names were removed and the Dune-themed sim was converted to a generic sci-
fi desert environment.219 
Hence, due to the lack of court case and obscure legal status of online re-creations, 
counter notification procedure does not conduce to the balance between the interests of 
copyright holders and those of the re-creators. The online re-creators are not competent to 
challenge the copyright enforcement and their rights to freedom of speech220 are not 
sufficiently considered. Since online re-creations can possibly constitute copyright 
infringement and may easily be taken down, the re-creators might be restrained from 
making the new works especially when they are aware of potential copyright litigation. 
This gives a chilling effect that these creative works will be considered as unlawful, if not 
ultimately be decreased or blocked completely.  
In summary, pursuant to the current copyright law and its active enforcing 
mechanism, an online re-creation can easily be considered as copyright infringement and 
can ―expeditiously‖ be removed or taken down by the copyright holders and online service 
providers, and not by the court. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Due to the difficulties to obtain authorisation from the right owners, online re-
creations are potentially infringing the economic rights of copyright holders particularly 
the rights to reproduction and communication. Apart from economic rights, re-creators 
may also infringe the author‘s moral rights mainly the attribution right and integrity right. 
                                                          
 
218








Infringements are usually assumed to occur despite the various nature of each type of re-
creations; ranging from works that usually have high level of originality and incorporate 
minimal fragments of copyright works such as fan fictions, works that are in between for 
example mash-ups, fanvids and virtual worlds to those involve highly substantial amount 
of original work with small amount of creative input such as fansubs. Under the notice and 
takedown procedures, online re-creations can easily be removed by a copyright claim 
despite the fact that they may not actually be infringing. This active copyright 
enforcement affects the rights of the re-creators and the interest of the society provided by 
the online re-creation culture. The rights and interests of re-creators and the public which 
















CHAPTER 3 - Justifications of Online Re-creations: the Rights 
of the Re-creators and the Interests of the Public 
 
As delineated in the previous chapter, online re-creations are potentially infringing 
copyright of the underlying protected works, and thus their making is discouraged by 
copyright law. The crucial question is: are these re-creations harmful to society, and thus 
justly discouraged? This chapter proposes that re-creations and their online culture are 
beneficial to individuals and the society at large due to the three principles: creativity, 
freedom of speech and the public interest.  
 
3.1 Creativity  
This chapter analyses the conceptions of creativity and the relation between 
creativity, copyright and re-creations. Human creativity naturally involves borrowing, 
imitating and reproducing earlier works of others. Creative re-creations are the result of 
the natural process and they are new creativity which should be encouraged. However, 
copyright law which has the purpose of stimulating creativity is currently suppressing 
creative re-uses of protected works. Chapter 3.1.1 will first discuss the notion and 
importance of creativity and the nature of the human creative process. Chapter 3.1.2 then 
analyses the relationship between copyright, creativity and online re-creations.  
 
3.1.1 Human and Creativity 
Creativity is associated with all areas of human activity including the arts, sciences 
and business and the outputs of creativity regularly used in everyday living. Because of 




from. The value of creativity is at both the individual and societal levels.
221
At an 
individual level, creativity is involved in problem solving in everyday life; while at a 
societal level, it ―can lead to new scientific findings, new movements in art, new 
inventions, and new social programs.‖
222
  
Creativity is essential for the production of culture. Both creativity and culture 
have great importance for social quality.
223
 Santagata comments that ―creativity and 
culture are the pillars of social quality, seen as a context of a free, economically 
developed, fair and culturally lively community with a high quality of life. Creativity and 
culture are inextricably bound.‖
224
 Social quality includes the ability of people to engage 
in social, economic and cultural life and participate in the development of their 
communities to improve well-being and individual potential. The more creative products 
there are, the better the quality of life is.  
 
3.1.1.1 The Conceptions of Creativity  
Remarkably, the concept of creativity is complex and there is no single 
comprehensive definition of creativity.
225
 Scholars provide different explanations and 
definitions of creativity since they examine different aspects of the phenomenon.
226
 
Creativity therefore has a number of conceptions from diverse disciplines and 
                                                          
 
221
 Robert Sternberg and Todd Lubart, ‗The Concept of Creativity‘ in Robert Sternberg (ed), Handbook of 




 Walter Santagata, The Culture Factory: Creativity and the Production of Culture (Springer 2010) 33-41. 
224
 Ibid, 34-35. 
225
 From the historical research on creativity, the thoughts of creativity differ from periods of time: from the 
pre-Christian views, to Christian views (or early Western), Renaissance (or science), to Western and Eastern 
views. (Robert Albert and Mark Runco, ‗A History of Research on Creativity‘ in Robert Sternberg (ed), 
Handbook of Creativity (CUP 1999) 16-19). 
226
 For instance, ―[p]sychologists have tended to view creativity as an individual-level phenomenon. That is, 
they have tended to concentrate on the cognitive processes, personality traits, and developmental 
antecedents associated with individual creators. This focus follows naturally from the very nature of 
psychology as a scientific enterprise dedicated to understanding individual mind and behavior.‖ (Dean 
Simonton, ‗Creative Cultures, Nations and Civilizations‘, in Paul Paulus and Bernard Nijstad (eds), Group 






 This chapter will concentrate on the prominent aspects of creativity and 
conclude on a definition of creativity for the purposes of this thesis. 
From the creativity studies in various disciplines, the common aspects of creativity 
are something novel (or original), appropriate (or fitting) and fulfilled. Besides, creativity 
crucially involves co-operation between individuals in the society both in the past and at 
the present by re-using works of others.   
In the field of philosophy of art, creativity can be defined as ―the capacity to 
generate ideas or artefacts that are both new and positively valuable‖.
228
 Sawyer also 
provides the sociocultural definition of creativity as ―the generation of a product that is 
judged to be novel and also to be appropriate, useful, or valuable by a suitably 
knowledgeable social group.‖
229
 From a Western perspective in psychology, creativity can 
be defined as the ability to produce work that is novel and appropriate.
230
 Similarly, Pope 
proposes ‗original‘ and ‗fitting‘ as two parts of a notion of creativity: 
―Creativity may be ‗original‘ in the sense both of drawing on ancient origins 
and of originating something in its own right: either way, the overall aim or 
end is a ‗fitting‘ – an active exploration of the changing proportions, 
measure, ratios – between older modes of understanding and newer ones.‖
231
 
Novelty is often viewed as a distinctive characteristic of creative products. Novel 
work is original, distinct from previous work and unexpected. Nickerson notes that 
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―originality should be understood to mean original or novel to the individual involved, so 
that a thought would be considered creative if it is novel to the one who produces it, 
irrespective of how many others may have entertained that thought.‖
232
 This concept of 
originality is similar to a thought in the philosophy of art that originality has an aspect of 
novelty: a new work must have ―a recognizably discrete identity, a qualitative difference, 
but that may not be sufficient for artistic creativity‖.
233
 
Appropriate work is useful, adaptive, fulfils a need or satisfies the problem 
constraints. This aspect of creativity relates to ‗fitting‘. Fitting is to be appropriate and 
approved and can be referred to as the process of ‗filling an appropriate space‘.
234
 
Creativity draws upon the conception of ― ‗fitting‘ into old patterns that already exist and 
of finding new patterns that will ‗fit‘ current and constantly changing circumstances, 
needs and desires.‖
235
 The concept of fitting therefore involves solving a mechanical 
problem as well as fitting an unfulfilled need for amusement, entertainment, 
enlightenment, etc. such as affixing a fragment of a photograph to a collage where 
appropriate to satisfy an artistic value and producing a fan work to achieve a new 
understanding of the original work. 
 Another characteristic of creativity is fulfilment. As Evans and Deehan put it, 
―anyone who fulfils his or her potential, who expresses an inner drive or capacity ... may 
be described as creative‖.
236
 Eastern views of creativity involve ―a state of personal 
fulfilment, a connection to a primordial realm, or the expression of an inner essence or 
ultimate reality‖
237
 rather than focusing on innovative products. Creativity can also be 
viewed as human expression of communicative experience.
238
 In this sense, ―creativity 
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requires the capacity to reach others and achieve a resonance within their lives.‖
239
 
Expressive form and narrative are important to make meaning out of one‘s experience; 
and through them, we achieve communicative value.
240
 When the communicative value is 
achieved, it is the moment of fulfilment.
241
 Human expression and self-fulfilment are 
crucially related to freedom of speech and the interest of the public and are further 
discussed in chapters 3.2 and 3.3. 
For this thesis, the notion of creativity includes two main features concluded from 
the above conceptions of creativity. First, from an objective aspect, creativity can be 
defined as the ability to produce work that is original and appropriate. To be original, the 
work must be independently created and originated by its creator (either by drawing on 
ancient origins or emanating from its own right). This is similar to the concept of 
originality under copyright law (see chapter 3.1.2.1). The work is appropriate in the sense 
that it fits a need, satisfies a problem or fulfils an artistic or communicative value. Second, 
from a subjective perspective of the creator, creativity involves personal fulfilment or 
communicative experience.  
The process of creativity, in a broad sense, involves re-using previous materials 
through social collaboration. Creativity is not merely a matter of an individual but a matter 
of ―people working in intended or unintended collaboration‖;
242
 and to co-operate, 
participated co-creators need not agree with one another.
243
 This aspect of creativity 
corresponds with the definition of creativity offered by Csikszentmihalyi that: 
 ―What we call creativity is a phenomenon that is constructed through an 
interaction between producers and audience. Creativity is not the product of 
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An emphasis on the notion of creative co-operation is that, in the presently 
preferred sense, co-operation ―involves kinds of interaction indirectly and at a distance, in 
different spaces and times, not just direct collaboration in a shared space- and time-
frame.‖
245
 In this regard, creators in the modern world can virtually co-operate with the 
creators of the former works. This is also particularly precise in the internet age where 
people can co-create a work, both with and without intention to co-operate, regardless of 
the place and time difference. In this perspective, creativity is perceived as a collective, 
team-based process rather than as individual genius.  
 
3.1.1.2 The Natural Creative Process 
“Practically speaking, there is no „creation from nothing‟ (ex nihilo). There is 




  “The truth is that all matter arises from a set of antecedent conditions.”
247
  
 Creation has long been thought of as a divine, mystery and the supernatural. The 
orthodox religious notion of creation was that God was the Creator of things from the 
Void or Nothing (ex nihilo).
248
 While Plato‘s writing on creativity discussed divine 
inspiration or supernaturalism as the source of creative acts
249
, Aristotle perceived creation 
as a natural ceaselessly on-going process of re-using existing materials
250
. Since the mid-
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nineteenth century, the notion of divine creation from nothing has significantly been 
contested. All scholars now agree that creativity should be conceived as natural re-creation 
from something that previously existed.
251 
As a natural creative process, human have 
always built on existing works of the past either by incorporating parts of them in the new 
work or by taking them as inspiration. McIntyre concludes a conception of human 
creativity as ―the use of imagination, expertise and perseverance to make something new 
and fresh, transforming the old into something novel or original which may then lead to 
astounding cultural works.‖
252
 Similarly, Dutfield and Suthersanen find that:  
―Creation does not occur in a vacuum. A vast majority of scientific and 
cultural creations, if not all, are built on pre-existing creations and 
discoveries. This type of innovation can be said to be cumulative in that it is 
based on multiple steps or increments. New ‗things‘ are produced by 
combining existing elements to [produce] new combinations or variations.‖
253
 
All creative works are therefore inevitably built on works of former creators. Even 
the most creative works are rooted in the past experience, influenced by preceding 
products of others and have built upon an improvement of craftsmanship and ideas over a 
period of years. It is impossible to imagine the famous artists, writers and composers 
without immersing themselves with the dozens of earlier talented works of others. 
Einstein acknowledged that his theory of relativity could not have been conceived 
without the benefit of the precedent theories and discoveries of other great physicists 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
―Of things that come to be, some come to be by nature, some by art, some spontaneously. 
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who had come before him.
254
 The past is embodied in every new creation. Even so-
called child prodigies must have grown their experience and competence within a 





, the development of Mozart‘s musical experience indicates that his earliest 
works involved immersion in the works of contemporaries among whom he grew and 
possibly involved using former composers‘ music as models of composition. Howe 
also points out that Mozart only produced the distinctive music after a lengthy period 
of training as the outcome of a combination of personality, environment and hard 
work, not due to magic or miracles or some innate gift that he possessed since he was 
born.
257
 The thoughts that led to the focus on the individual genius of divine inspiration 
are no longer tenable to explain creativity. Besides, if creativity is understood as 
―requiring radical change, productive of far-reaching new value, then we should confine 
our study to special talent or genius.‖
258
 Thus, in a very brief summary, ―[c]reation is 
always from something not ‗from nothing‘.‖
 259
  
The human ability of creating and collecting knowledge and material artefacts, 
sharing them among themselves and passing them along to the following generations is 
necessary for individuals‘ self-improvement and social development. Cumulative 
creativity is what makes human culture unique. In a psychological study, Aunger states 
that: 
―… what distinguishes humans is cumulative culture. Human culture includes 
traditions that build on their earlier accomplishments to reach more 
sophisticated culminations, either in thought or in material form. Thus the key 
to human cultural evolution is that a new ‗ratchet‘ effect arose, in which 
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cultural advances were built upon progressively in a way not seen in the 
social traditions of other animals.‖
260
 
Rogers provides a definition of the creative process as ―the emergence in action of a 
novel relational product, growing out of the uniqueness of the individual on the one hand, 
and the materials, events, people, or circumstances of his life on the other.‖
261
  
Human creativity is a mental process of uniting existing elements with new or useful 
connections by which the mind transforms information into concepts and produces new 
ideas with the power of the brain.
262
 This mental process is significantly influenced by the 
environmental and social conditions of the external world which happened through 
communication.
263
 Creativity is crucially a result of an interactive process between 
individuals and social and cultural contexts. In this regard, Csikszentmihalyi views that 
creativity involves an interaction between a person, a field and a domain: 
―[W]hat we call creativity is never the result of individual action alone; it is the 
product of three main shaping forces: a set of social institutions, or field, that 
selects from the variations produced by the individual those that are worth 
preserving; a stable cultural domain that will preserve and transmit the selected 
new ideas or forms to the following generations; and finally the individual, 
who brings about some change in the domain, a change that the field will 
consider to be creative.‖
264
 
The information or domain existed and stored in the culture long before the creative 
individual arrived on the scene. The person should have access to the domain and then 
work within the creative process to produce new combinations or some variations in the 
inherited cultural domain.
265
 Similarly, Cohen proposes that creative processes involve 
interactions between the individual and the cultural landscape:  
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―[I]t is neither individual creators nor social and cultural patterns that produce 
artistic and intellectual culture, but rather the dynamic interactions between 
them. The artistic and intellectual value that emerges from these interactions is 
simultaneously real and contingent; it is possible to say both that particular 
outputs represent valuable additions to collective culture and that their value is 




Engagement with cultural resources is indispensable for self-constitution and 
creative play. Indeed, an efficient process of creation requires access to and use of 
preceding works and artefacts.
267
 Therefore a significant way the domain can contribute 
to the creative system is by enhancing the accessibility of those sources.
268
   
 
3.1.1.3 Conclusion 
Human creativity is an on-going process of re-using preceding materials. A creation 
is therefore always built from something, not from nothing. Creativity involves building 
on those sources to produce something that is original or novel and fits into pre-existing 
patterns or is appropriate in the current circumstances. It also involves a state of personal 
fulfilment and expressive forms of communication. In regard to the natural creation 
process, cumulative creativity needs co-operation between individuals and interaction 
between individuals and intellectual contexts or domains. Engagement is thus required 
for individuals to be able to immerse themselves in and benefit from the creative and 
cultural domain of the antecedents. Therefore the ability to access and use the domains is 
indispensable for the human intellectual process.  
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3.1.2 Copyright, Creativity and Online Re-creations 
As previously discussed, creativity is the ability to create work that is original, 
appropriate and fulfils a need. The process of creativity also involves re-using of existing 
works in a social collaboration. Nevertheless, the current copyright law is obstructing the 
natural creative process. This part therefore discusses the correlation between copyright 
and creativity. It will analyse the roles of copyright law in encouraging and discouraging 
the process of creativity and re-creation. 
 
3.1.2.1 Copyright and Creativity 
From the legislative statements in different jurisdictions, copyright is regarded as a 
mechanism for the stimulation of creativity for the benefit of the society.   
  The Statute of Anne 1709
269
 was the first parliamentary English act for copyright 
regulation in books and other writings. It is described as ―[a]n Act for the encouragement 
of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such 
copies, during the times therein mentioned.‖
270
 The UK revision act of July 1842 
recognised that ―it is expedient to amend the law relating to copyright and to afford greater 
encouragement to the production of literary works of lasing benefit to the world‖. The idea 
of copyright encouraging new creations has remained throughout from 1842.
271
 The UK 
Government‘s White Paper of 1986 also stressed that ―[i]ntellectual property is about 
creative ideas – the products of the mind such as inventions, designs, music and drama. 
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In the US, the goal of copyright to encourage creativity is stated in its Constitution. 
The copyright clause of the US Constitution 1787 is the direct descendant of the Statute of 
Anne.
273
 It states that ―[t]he Congress shall have power… to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries‖.
274
 The word ―science‖ in this 
clause retains its eighteenth-century meaning of ―knowledge or learning‖.
275
 It is also 
emphasised in a number of judicial decisions
276
 and articles that copyright is designed to 
―stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the public‖
277
, 
to protect the public domain, and to grant an exclusive right to the author.
278
 
In the Anglo-American systems, creativity is recognised in policy documents but 
not explicitly mentioned in the copyright statutes. In contrast, creative works are clearly 
protected in copyright law of civil law countries. 
France and Germany explicitly declares protection for creative works of human 
minds. The copyright statute of France provides protection for ―all works of the mind, 
whatever their kind, form of expression, merit or purpose‖.
279
 Under German copyright 
law, ―personal intellectual creations‖ constitutes creative works that will be protected.
280
 
In addition, the EU Directive 2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain 
related rights also recognises that copyright protection ―ensures the maintenance and 
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development of creativity in the interest of authors, cultural industries, consumers and 
society as a whole‖.
281
 
 The implications from these legislations are that copyright protection is granted for 
the interest of the right holders (authors and publishers) and for the purpose of 
encouraging knowledge, learning and creativity for the ultimate benefit of the public. An 
important element of the public interest is the dissemination of the works; in return, 
authors are granted protection but only for a limited period of time.
282
 Ultimately, an 
increase in the number of works in the public domain advances the interest of the public in 
access and use of the works. In this regard, Davies comments that ―[t]he premise is 
accepted that creating is worthwhile and that copyright provides a means of giving 
creators what is properly due to them, thereby stimulating cultural activity and the 
production and distribution of new works for the public, a result which cannot be other 
than for the common good.‖
283
 
What is ‗creativity‘ under the copyright policy? In a general consideration of 
creativity under copyright law, the conception of ‗originality‘
284
 could be considered as a 
minimum threshold of creativity required by the law.
285
 Originality contains elements of 
the definition of creativity provided above. As a fundamental rule in many jurisdictions, a 
work must originate from its maker to obtain protection. This level of originality merely 
emphasises the independence from preceding works. Under the US copyright law, not 
merely being independently created, the work must also possess at least some minimal 
degree of creativity.
286
 The strictest test of originality
287
 can be found in the system of 
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author‘s rights where the author‘s effort or investment is not sufficient, but the object to be 
protected must be a ‗work of the mind‘
288
 or a ‗personal intellectual creation‘
289
 where 
there is a personal input of a creative element.  
However, as previously discussed, there is no single conformed definition of 
creativity. Creativity as an object which copyright aims to foster has never been clearly 
defined by copyright policymakers. A concern is raised that the minimal investigation of 
the theories of creativity and the creative process is a serious shortcoming for copyright 
theorists.
290
 Patry criticises that proclaiming that we wish to encourage creativity without 
knowing the kind of creativity we aim to encourage and then figuring out how to stimulate 
that creativity is ―an empty gesture‖.
291
 Interestingly, Sawyer suggests that many of the 
implicit beliefs about creativity from the Western and European cultures, which are the 
grounds for several aspects of the current intellectual property regime, are false or highly 
misleading.
292
 If the law is not aligned with the empirically observed nature of creativity, 
its goal to promote knowledge and creative works will be less effective. He concludes that 
the overall creativity of society may be better enhanced by modifying intellectual property 
law to better align with the empirical process of creativity and innovation.  
Despite the absence of substantial understanding of creativity, lobbyists for the 
copyright industries tend to assert that copyright is the single most important prerequisite 
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 and since ―[n]o one wants to be against creativity, and if copyright 
equals creativity then no one wants to be against copyright.‖
294
 Under such influence, 
copyright lawyers and scholars are in the habit of assuming that copyright law is centrally 
critical in stimulating creativity.
295
 Nonetheless, there are two contradictions to such 
assumption: First, though copyright fulfils some important functions to encourage creative 
practices and provide economic benefits
296
, it does not play a single and direct role in 
generating creative inspiration and output.
297
 Other motivations particularly inner drives to 
create works are discussed below in chapter 3.3.3.1 and supported by the empirical data 
analysis in chapter 5.2.1. Second, excessive copyright control of the ability to access to 
and exploit existing cultural and artistic products creates significant constraints on creative 
practices. This issue is substantially discussed further below. 
 
3.1.2.2 Creative Copying: Copyright Constraints on Creative Re-creation 
Interestingly, a number of copyright scholars
298
 have acknowledged the natural 
process of creativity that creative activity is a result of cultural and social play based on 
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preceding works and that humans cannot create out of nothing.  Human intellectual 
creations are built on cumulative creativity
299
 and thus a work that is truly created ex 
nihilo is impossible.
300
 This means that new works will always copy or borrow some 
aspects of the past. As in Justice Laddie‘s words: 
―The whole of human development is derivative. We stand on the shoulders 
of the scientists, artists and craftsmen who preceded us. We borrow and 
develop what they have done; not necessarily as parasites, but simply as the 
next generation. It is at the heart of what we know as progress. When we are 
asked to remember the Eighth Commandment, ―thou shalt not steal‖, bear in 
mind that borrowing and developing have always been acceptable.‖
301
 
In addition, Arewa comments that: 
―Borrowing and varied types of copying have long been norms in creation. 
Similarly, sharing and copying of existing works, including copyrighted 
works, have long been characteristic aspects of a broad range of activities on 
both the distribution and creation sides. Intellectual property frameworks 




In specific regard to the common uses of fictional facts, Kellogg suggests that the 
idea of borrowing plots, characters and other fictional facts is as old as storytelling 
itself.
303
 For example, Virgil‘s The Aeneid built on the works of Homer‘s Odyssey
304
 and 
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Shakespeare's works came from predecessors and contemporaries.
305
 Gervais also states 
that ―[i]t is abundantly clear that creating original content by reusing preexisting content is 
nothing new.‖
306
 He then illustrates that many Walt Disney productions are created based 
on medieval fairy tales and a number of adaptations of novels and plays. For example, 
Cinderella, Sleeping Beauty and Snow White, the movies produced by Disney, are based 
on the stories by the Brothers Grimm. The literary works of Hans Christian Anderson 
have also been utilised by a numerous artists and authors with myriad modifications.
307
 
His works, such as The Little Mermaid and The Ugly Duckling, have been adapted into 
famous Disney‘s animated films. In 2013, another movie called Frozen has been added to 
the Walt Disney Animated Classics series. The story of this children‘s favourite movie is 
again inspired by Hans Christian Andersen‘s fairy tale entitled The Snow Queen. 
From the traditional oral transmission of culture, facilitated by the advanced 
technologies, there are now new forms of cultural communication. Frosio notes that 
emerging creative re-creations in the digital age such as mash-ups, music sampling and 
vidding and the creative process in an environment like YouTube correspond to the logic 
of the creative production of the oral-formulaic tradition.
308
 The early tradition of re-
creation involved copying. However, in the digital world, the kinds of copying involved 
are different: they are more sophisticated and much more verbatim taking. Though many 
online re-creations are not wholesale taking but involve new alteration or addition to 
communicate new meaning, the nature of digital copying potentially makes creative 
borrowing an infringement. 
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As discussed in chapter 1, online re-creation is a culture of the digital era. This 
culture involves communication, interaction and co-operation between a significant 
number of individuals all over the world by remixing and reusing the works of others and 
producing new creations. Re-creation entails modifications of a single work and 
adaptations of a range of discrete elements from numerous existing works such as 
samplings and mash-ups. These re-creations can be regarded as ―creative appropriation‖
309
 
or ―creative copying‖ resulting from imaginative minds, expression of new idea and 
concept, or a critique of something. The benefits of online re-creations are that of 
creativity
310
: self-fulfilment and self-expression; social communication and cultural 
participation; and individual improvement and social development.
311
  
Many of these subsequent creations are not simply copies. To illustrate, fan fiction 
writers usually derive the main characters, events and/or settings from the underlying 
popular works to create distinctive stories which reflect their own imagination and 
interpretation. They narrate the stories of the protected works in new ways, using their 
own writing skills. Effective expression sometimes requires reasonable portions of 
copying, recasting or distributing existing works without modification. For instance, 
fanvids and AMVs entail selecting and copying of unmodified images, sounds and texts of 
popular works; vidders then rearrange those original components and add their own 
creative and self-expressive commentary into it.  
Nevertheless, as a fundamental rule, copyright law deters people from using 
existing works in creation of new works without permission of the right holders. Where 
works are created by incorporating preceding works protected by copyright, there is an 
inevitable question of potential infringement.
312
 As critically analysed in chapter 2, an 
unauthorised re-creation can easily be claimed a copyright infringement. In this regard, 
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Vaidhyanathan argues that copyright is negatively affecting creativity particularly in the 
arts.
313
 He illustrates that artists who borrow from and build upon earlier cultural 
expressions by sampling and remixing music have been facing copyright lawsuits and 
forced to pay substantial amount of damages. Bearing in mind that ―all artists build on 
what comes before them,‖ Lewis proposes that the re-contextualised works of music and 
art such as mash-up and music sampling that are truly transformative should also be 




3.1.2.3 Revising Copyright for Creativity 
“If we genuinely want to encourage creativity, we must encourage copying.”
315
 
Due to the consensus that all creative products are built upon prior works, 
excessive scope of copyright protection would restrain the stimulation of authorship and 
creativity. Indeed, creative and cultural productions can be harmed by monopoly 
protection of copyright that impedes the development of new expressions out of old ones 
and inhibits the creative process.
316
 Judge Kozinski expresses the concern about the 
adverse impact of the overprotection of works: 
―Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. 
Culture is impossible without a rich public domain. Nothing today, likely 
nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science and 
technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of 
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Besides, copyright law neglects that copying is inherent in the creative process.
318
 
Such copyright failure has now revealed adverse consequences in the creative productions. 
First, copyright generates a monopoly on creative content. Macmillan comments that the 
rationale for copyright that it promotes the production of creative works that enable 
culture and democracy to develop has been misused to allow an aggregation of private 
power over cultural output: big media and entertainment companies are empowered to act 
as a cultural filter, controlling what people can consume.
319
 Second, as critically analysed 
above, copyright law threatens the remix of creativity and culture.
320
  
 The ideal relationship between copyright, creativity and the public interest can be 
summarised as follows: Copyright provides rewards to incentivise authors or artists in 
creation of useful arts and knowledge. This stimulates knowledge and creativity for the 
society as a whole. The copyright protection lasts for a limited period of time. With the 
lapse of protection terms, copyright works will enter the public domain and become the 
common good which people can freely use. The distribution and stimulation of creativity 
as well as works in the public domain constitute the public interest. Nevertheless, new 
creative works may significantly involve use of others‘ works which are still under 
copyright protection. 
 As discussed above in chapter 3.1.1, the ability to access and use existing works 
is crucial for the natural creative process. Individuals should be able to immerse 
themselves with and make use of the materials of the social and cultural domain. 
However, copyright protection, which is considered to be for the purpose of the 
stimulation of creative production, has become an obstruction to intellectual domain. 
Consequently, copyright which aims to encourage creativity and innovation and stimulate 
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further creative activity prevents accessibility to cultural domain of society and interrupts 
the natural process of human creativity. 
The process of requiring permission is unworkable due to certain difficulties 
discussed in chapter 2.2. Creativity based on copying therefore arises mainly from 
unauthorised use.
321
  Creative copying of existing works to re-create a new intellectual 
creation should not be prohibited. Indeed, re-used and re-contextualised works should 
reasonably be permitted if copyright law does aim to encourage the distribution of new 
expressions with the public.
322
 When amending the copyright policy, the creative process 
and the nature of creativity as being communal, cumulative, social and collaborative 
should be taken into consideration.
323
 Copyright law therefore needs to be revised to better 
serve creativity by allowing for greater access and less restriction.
324
 ―The less extensive 
copyright protection is, the more an author, composer, or other creator can borrow from 
previous works without infringing copyright and the lower, therefore, the costs of creating 
a new work.‖
325
 It is therefore necessary to seek the optimal point between encouraging 
the creation and dissemination of new works and allowing the prosperity of subsequent 
creativity. 
     
                                                          
 
321
 William Patry, How to Fix Copyright (OUP 2011) 213. 
322
 ―An intellectual property regime which provides for the protection of traditional cultural creativity should 
also permit the natural development of culture through permissible borrowings.‖ (Michael Blakeney, ‗Hans 
Christian Andersen and the protection of traditional cultural expressions‘ in Helle Porsdam (ed), Copyright 
and Other Fairy Tales: Hans Christian Andersen and the Commodification of Creativity (Edward Elgar 
2006) 115). 
323
 David Simon, ‗Culture, Creativity & Copyright‘ (2011) 29 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 279; Giancarlo 
Frosio, ‗Rediscovering Cumulative Creativity from the Oral Formulaic Tradition to Digital Remix‘ (2014) 
13 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 341; Julie Cohen, ‗Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory‘ (2007) 
40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1151. 
324
 Lawrence Liang, ‗Beyond Representation: The Figure of the Pirate‘ in Mario Biagioli, Peter Jaszi and 
Martha Woodmansee (eds), Making and Unmaking Intellectual Property: Creative Production in Legal and 
Cultural Perspective (University of Chicago Press 2011) 175; Graham Reynolds, ‗Towards a Right to 
Engage in the Fair Transformative Use of Copyright‑Protected Expression‘ in Michael Geist (ed), From 
“Radical Extremism” to “Balanced Copyright” (Irwin Law 2010) 397; Christophe Geiger, ‗Promoting 
Creativity through Copyright Limitations‘ (2010) 12(3) Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 515. 
325
 William Landes and Richard Posner, ‗An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law‘ (1989) 18(2) Journal of 





Creativity is based on copying. It is a natural and fundamental process that 
individuals use existing materials to re-create. A number of online re-creations combining 
prior works with new creative elements are creative copying. These subsequent creations 
are the result of the creative process and they are new creativity which should be 
encouraged. Copyright law which is currently suppressing creative re-uses of protected 
works and cultural icons should be amended to achieve its goal to stimulate creativity. The 
law should reasonably allow people to gain access to and engage in the intellectual 
cumulative domain and to exchange communicative expressions which are essential for 
the process of creative productions.  
  
 
3.2 Freedom of Speech 
Another principle that justifies online re-creation is the right to freedom of speech. 
In the 21
st
 century, online re-creation is a form of speech that contributes to human self-
fulfilment and autonomy as well as participation in community and culture. Re-creators of 
creative expression have the human rights to freedom of speech and to participate in 
cultural life. However, the current copyright law can conflict with free speech particularly 
when it restricts utilisation of an existing work in making a new expression. 
 









3.2.1.1 Why Freedom of Speech? 
There are several arguments for the justification of a free speech principle.
326
 The 
predominant argument is concerning the importance of discovering truth.
327
 It is 
associated with Milton‘s Areopagitica
328
 and John Stuart Mill‘s thesis, ―On Liberty‖
329
 
that an opinion ought not to be suppressed as its value is for truth to be discovered.
330
 The 
rationale has its role in some US cases
331
 including Abrams v US
332
 in which Justice 
Holmes, the dissenting judge, proposed that freedom of speech creates a ‗marketplace of 
ideas‘ which promulgates truth.
333
 
Another argument is that free speech is essential for democratic participation. 
Freedom of speech protects the rights of citizens and enables them to engage in the 
democracy or self-government
334
. Alexander Meiklejohn, the leading proponent of this 
principle, stated that ―[a]s the self-governing community seeks, by the method of voting, 
to gain wisdom in action, it can find it only in the minds of its individual citizens. If they 
fail, it fails. That is why freedom of discussion for those minds may not be abridged.‖
335
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The theory has an obvious drawback that it is merely limited to political speech and leaves 
out other areas of expression including artistic and literary.
336
 
 The most significant principle for this discussion is freedom of expression as an 
aspect of autonomy and self-fulfilment. This links to the nature of creativity previously 
discussed in chapter 3.1. As human beings, we are cognitive and communicative by 
nature. The ability to formulate and express our thoughts is valuable in self-determination 
and autonomy. The constraints on such ability adversely affect our individual personality 
and its growth. The argument does not only justify political speech, but also applies to all 
speech including artistic discourse. Freedom of speech ―serves not only the needs of the 
polity but also those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression. Such 
expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of identity. To 
suppress expression is to reject the basic human desire for recognition and affront the 
individual's worth and dignity‖.
337
 
 In the law of copyright, the exclusive right to copy obviously inhibits a person to 
duplicate and express something in exactly the same way that another does. Is this 
detrimental to human self-fulfilment and autonomy? As Nimmer put it, ―free speech as a 
function of self-fulfilment does not come into play. One who pirates the expression of 
another is not engaging in self-expression in any meaningful sense‖.
338
 From this 
perspective, repeating another person‘s expression verbatim does nothing for self-
improvement and personality. Haungs also comments that ―[c]opyright does nothing to 
inhibit self-fulfillment, since expressing the beliefs and opinions of another person in the 
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 This may seem persuasive that copyright does not interfere with freedom of speech 
as a contribution to self-fulfilment. Nevertheless, the conflict does arise when a person 
needs to use an existing expression as a raw material in making another expression.  In 
circumstances where a person cannot communicate his opinion without mentioning or 
using another person‘s work, the prohibition on such copying results not only in a 
restriction of an individual's freedom of speech but also in a restriction of that individual‘s 
autonomy and self-fulfilment.
340
 Loughlan illustrated two forms of speech namely, 
appropriation art and parody which, by their very nature and purpose, are necessary to be 
created ―by the incorporation within themselves of the prior expression of another 
individual and while neither can exist as an original, independent, autonomous creation, 
both are themselves undoubtedly ‗authored‘ by individuals who are expressing themselves 
through their creation‖.
341
 There are also other forms of expression which have the same 
nature of basing the re-creation upon other people‘s works such as fan fiction, vidding, 
mash-up and virtual world. The crucial consideration is that the right to free expression 
and self-fulfilment of those re-creators is necessarily limited if their new expression 
breaches copyright law. 
The aforementioned free speech principles may deserve a revision when it comes 
to speech on cyberspace. Online media do not only distribute and give access to 
information and expression, but also allow participation and interaction which 
subsequently alter forms of speech. So, perhaps, there should be a reconsideration of these 
principles to be consistent with the change of speech.  
For the digital age, Balkin believes that the purpose of freedom of speech is to 
promote a democratic culture.
342
 In his definition, a democratic culture is a culture in 
which people can actively participate in the production of cultural meanings that, in turn, 
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constitute themselves and other people in the society.
343
 Balkin points out that salient 
characteristics of internet speech are that; it covers a wide range of subjects and mode of 
expression (not only politics but also popular culture); it reflects how creative an ordinary 
individual can be; it is a new creativity developed from the ability to build on what existed 
before; it is participatory and interactive; and lastly, internet speech is a social activity 
which creates new communities, cultures and subcultures.
344
 Freedom of speech allows 
people to freely participate in the growth and development of the cultures which, in turn, 
help constitute them as individuals. 
The new digital activities have an impact on private rights particularly copyright in 
new ways. Therefore a consideration of the relation between free speech and copyright is 
necessary and thus discussed in chapter 3.2.2.  
 
3.2.1.2 “Speech” 
An interesting question is whether free speech should cover speech involving all 
types of fact, information, and opinion, in other words, what types of speech should be 
safeguarded by a freedom of speech principle. 
Though not all self-expression constitutes ―speech‖ and not all ―speech‖ implicates 
―freedom of speech‖
345
; political speech is considered as the archetypal kind of 
communication covered by free speech. This view is effectively influenced by the 
argument from self-governance that the purpose of free speech is for well-functioning 
democracy. The democracy argument, however, does not directly justify artistic speech.  
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The perspective that speech under the scope of free speech covers only political 
speech is highly contestable. Firstly, many creative or artistic expressions are valuable for 
individuals and for society. They may also have political and social implications; art 
speech, for instance, can have a vital function in a representative democracy, and 
therefore, deserves free speech protection in the same way as overtly political speech.
346
 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, human rights are not merely for the protection of 
individuals, but also for the protection of activities and relations that make individuals‘ 
lives more valuable.
347
 The right to freedom of expression and communication must 
therefore protect both artistic expression and communication of information. Thirdly, 
within the online communication culture, people not only make speech and expression 
about politics, but also exchange views on other topics such as fashion, television show, 
music, art and popular culture. This exchange also makes their lives more valuable. 
Interestingly, in some jurisdictions, the right to freedom of expression explicitly 
comprises artistic expression. For example, section 16 of the South African Constitution 
proclaims that everyone has the right to freedom of expression which includes ―freedom 
of artistic creativity‖.348 
 As a result, one may simply draw a conclusion that ―[i]t is far better to 
acknowledge that speech goes well beyond the boundaries of deliberation about public 
issues.‖
349
 Indeed, freedom of speech would ―encompass not just speech that delivers a 
clear political message but also creative expression that is neither overtly political nor 
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 In summary, speech should not solely involve political 
discourse but should also include artistic and creative expression.  
 
3.2.1.3 Freedom of Speech and Human Rights 
The statement, ―[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and right‖
351
, 
illustrates the nature of human rights discourse. Society agreed that certain fundamental 
and inalienable rights are inherent to every individual by the virtue of his or her 
humanity.
352
  All human beings are all equally entitled to human rights without 
discrimination; besides, ―one cannot stop being human, no matter how inhuman one's 
behaviour or the treatment one is forced to endure, they are inalienable rights‖
353
.  
The right to ―freedom of speech‖ or ―freedom of expression‖ is recognised as one 
of the human rights in international human rights law. The primary international 
instruments are the UDHR and the ICCPR; in regional conventions, significantly the 
ECHR; as well as in national instruments and constitutions such as the UK Human Rights 
Act 1998, the First Amendment to the US Constitution  and the French Constitution of 
1958. 
The Preamble to the UDHR declares that ―human beings shall enjoy freedom of 
speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest 
aspiration of the common people‖. The terms ―freedom of speech‖ and ―freedom of 
expression‖ are sometimes used interchangeably
354
. It is noteworthy that the two terms are 
not synonymous; freedom of expression includes the right to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas
355
. Article 19 of the UDHR states that ―[e]veryone has the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without 
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interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers‖. 
Article 19(1) of the ICCPR provides that ―[e]veryone shall have the right to hold 
opinions without interference‖. Article 19(2) continues to say that ―[e]veryone shall have 
the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing 
or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.‖ The exercise of 
the right to freedom of expression under Article 19(2) may be subject to certain 
restrictions including those for respect of the ―rights or reputations of others‖. Copyright 




3.2.2 Copyright and Freedom of Speech 
The right to freedom of speech imposes limits on the scope of copyright, and vice 
versa. An understanding of the interplay between copyright and freedom of speech, 
particularly the negative consequence of the curtailment of free speech by copyright, can 
help to establish a borderline of expanding copyright protection and to achieve a proper 
balance between the two bodies of law.  
 
3.2.2.1 Copyright and Human Rights 
(i) The Interface between Intellectual Property and Human Rights 
 The interface between intellectual property rights (particularly copyright) and 
human rights needs to be explored here due to the three main reasons. Firstly, the rapid 
changes in technological and cultural environments as well as the emergence of user-
generated contents
357
 in creative communities have significantly triggered a debate on the 









conflict between the rights of intellectual property holders and the rights of individuals 
and cultural communities.
358
 Secondly, the enforcement measures that encounter copyright 
infringements particularly in the digital environment such as notice and take down 
procedure
359
 have arguably failed to sufficiently recognise the rights of online users. 
Thirdly, the intersection between the two legal regimes has been expanded in many ways 
including by non-multilateral agreements
360
 which impose higher standards of intellectual 
property protection and enforcement than those provided in the TRIPS agreement
361
 or the 
so-called ―TRIPS-plus‖
362
 provisions.  
The discussion on the interplay between intellectual property and human rights 
traditionally concerns the conflict approach, which views that the two rights are 
fundamentally in conflict, and the coexistence approach which considers them essentially 
compatible.
363
 Beyond the two approaches, when there are conflicts at the intersection of 
the human rights and intellectual property regimes, Yu argues that it is crucial to 
distinguish between the human rights and non-human rights aspects of intellectual 
property protection; and the non-human rights basis of intellectual property protection 
should be subordinated to human rights obligations under the principle of human rights 
primacy.
364
 Intellectual property rights that protect economic investments of legal entities 
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like business companies rather than individuals are examples of those that have no human 
rights attributes.
365
 In this regard, copyrights or author‘s rights have a stronger human 
rights basis than patents and trademarks. 
 
(ii) Copyright as a Human Right 
Copyright can be recognised under several international human rights instruments 
including the UDHR.
366
 Copyright as an intellectual property, is also regarded as a 
property right guaranteed by Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR.
367
 In a UNDP 
Discussion Paper, Correa and Matthews pointed out that intellectual property rights may 
have a human rights dimension because intellectual property is ―essentially the same as 




The human rights aspect of intellectual property also reflects in Article 27(2) of the 
UDHR and Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR
369
 which proclaim that everyone has the right 
to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary 
or artistic production of which he is the author. Accordingly, copyright can be considered 
as an instrument for the protection of ―moral and material interests‖ of authors and 
creators, and therefore, elevated to the status of a human right.
370
 However, it should be 
noted that some commentators use the terms ―creators‘ rights‖,  ―creators‘ human rights‖ 
                                                          
 
365
Audrey Chapman, ‗Core Obligations Related to ICESCR Article 15(1)(c)‘ in Audrey Chapman and Sage 
Russell (eds), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Intersentia, 2002) 316-17 (noting that there is no ―basis in human rights to justify using intellectual property 
instruments as a means to protect economic investments‖). 
366
 The three most important IP-related international documents are the 1984 UDHR and two legally binding 
1966 ICESCR and the ICCPR.  
367
 (Paris, 20th March 1952); Copyright is considered to be a property right under this Article. (See, e.g., 
Ashdown v Telegraph Group (2001) Ch 685). 
368
 Carlos Correa and Duncan Matthews, ‗Discussion Paper: The Doha Declaration Ten Years on and Its 
Impact on Access to Medicines and the Right to Health‘ (UNDP 2011) 13. 
369
 For a discussion of this provision, see, Audrey Chapman, ‗Approaching Intellectual Property as a Human 
Right: Obligations Related to Article 15(1)(c)‘, Vol. XXXV, No. 3, Copyright Bulletin 4 (UNESCO 2001).  
370
 Paul Torremans (ed), ‗Copyright As A Human Right‘ in Copyright and Human Rights (Kluwer 2004); 
Peter Drahos ,‘The Universality of Intellectual Property Rights‘ in Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 




or ―the right to the protection of interests in intellectual creations‖ to refer to the human 
rights to ―moral and material interests‖ under the UDHR and the ICESCR as distinct from 
―intellectual property rights‖.
371
 This is compatible with the General Comment no.17 
(2005) of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) which 
emphasises that the scope of protection of the author‘s moral and material interests as set 
forth in Article 15(1)(c) ―does not necessarily coincide with what is referred to as 
intellectual property rights under national legislation or international agreements‖.
372
 
Specifically for copyright, Loverdou comments that copyright is capable of being a 
human right in itself.
373
 One reason is that copyright recognises both economic and moral 
rights of the author in regard to a personality right which is fundamentally subsisted in the 
author‘s right system.
374
Afori also considers that moral rights (especially those strongly 
protected within author‘s right system in Continental Europe) are considered as being 
closest to the heart of the human rights protections for creators.
375
 This rationale, however, 
seems to suggest that copyright can be counted as a human right only if it is originated 
from a personality right, and so leaves out copyright from a common law background. 
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3.2.2.2 Copyright and Freedom of Speech in relation to Human Rights 
As previously stated, freedom of speech is a human right recognised under human 
rights law. The relationship between intellectual property rights (including copyrights) 
and human rights, on the other hand, is complicated and controversial.
376
 
In my view, the right to freedom of speech seems to deserve a stronger position in 
the human rights hierarchy than copyright does. As discussed above, copyright may have a 
human rights and non-human rights basis. Under the principle of human rights primacy, 
the protection of the non-human rights aspects of copyright should be subordinated to the 
right to freedom of speech which is a fundamental human right in the event of a conflict 
between the two sets of rights.
377
 
However, no rights, not even human rights, are ultimately absolute: even the right 
to life has limitations.
378
 All are subject to reasonable restrictions, for example, in the 
public interest, on the ground of national security and public order, and to secure due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others.
379
 In other words, a right has 
its own limits and is to be balanced with other conflicting rights. Nothing suggests that 
copyright is inviolable and must for that reason be absolutely protected.
380
 In fact, 
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Historically, copyright‘s contour has been shaped by the right to freedom of 
speech. This demonstrates how society achieved the balance when the two rights collide. 
Some examples of the historical reconciliation between the two rights are illustrated below 
in chapter 3.2.2.3. To be able to balance the two rights, we need to examine the correlation 
between them; to what extent they complement and collide with each other. 
 
3.2.2.3 Copyright and Freedom of Speech: Co-Existence with Harmony or 
Conflict? 
Before the late nineteenth century, the implication of the intellectual property for 
the human rights protection was rather overlooked.
382
 During the 1990s, there was a wide-
spread human rights movement and the incorporation of human rights principles in 
treaties.
383
 At the same time, the international intellectual property rules and institutions 
ware rapidly expanded.
384
 Then, the TRIPS agreement provoked the debate with 
provisions and expansion of intellectual property rights
385
. It is therefore only recently that 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
reason be absolutely protected.‖(Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs 
SCRL (SABAM), C-70/10  [2011] para 43). 
381
 ―[I]n the context of measures adopted to protect copyright holders, national authorities and courts must 
strike a fair balance between the protection of copyright and the protection of the fundamental rights of 
individuals who are affected by such measures‖ (Scarlet Extended SA v Sociétébelge des auteurs, 
compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), C-70/10 [2011] para 45); ―[C]onvictions (based on copyright 
protection) interfered with [the] right to freedom of expression. Such interference breaches Article 10 unless 
it was ‗prescribed by law, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in Article 10 § 2 and was 
‗necessary in a democratic society‘ to attain such aim or aims.‖(Neij and SundeKolmisoppi v. Sweden, no. 
40397/12 [2013]). 
382
 P Bernt Hugenholtz, ‗Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe‘ in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
Harry First and Diane Leenheer Zimmerman (eds), Innovation Policy in an Information Age (OUP 2000) 
343; Peter Yu, ‗Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the NonmultilateralEra‘(2012) 64 Fla L Rev 
1045, 1049; Laurence Helfer and Graeme Austin, Human Rights and Intellectual Property (CUP 2011) 1-2. 
383
 Laurence Helfer and Graeme Austin, Human Rights and Intellectual Property (CUP 2011) 1-2. 
384
 Ibid; ―In the past, intellectual property issues were considered arcane, obscure, complex, and highly 
technical.‖ (Peter Yu, ‗Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime‘ (2004) 
38 Loy LA L Rev 323, 419). 
385
 Graeme Austin and Amy Zavidow, ‗Copyright Law Reform Through a Human Rights Lens‘ in Paul 




these two fields have been intensively explored by scholars and recognised within the 
international instruments. There are questions on whether these two concepts conform to, 
or instead, collide with each other. 
 
(i) In Conformity 
There are some arguments that copyright supports freedom of speech. One simple 
argument is that copyright, by providing economic incentives, encourages authors and 
artists to express their ideas, and in that process, create a new work.
386
 Therefore, 
copyright is an engine of free expression. Copyright and freedom of expression can be 
viewed as ―harmonious and complementary concepts‖.
387
  
A doctrinal argument that copyright does not conflict with free speech is 
concerning idea/expression dichotomy.
388
 Copyright does not suppress others to express 
the same idea in different expression, but only inhibit the use of the expression of the 
copyright holder. This is well balanced between the deterrence of copying someone else‘s 
expression and the public interests in the copyright encouragement of creative works.
389
 
Nimmer commented that ―[o]ne who pirates the expression of another is not engaging in 
self-expression in any meaningful sense.‖
390
 Barendt contends that Nimmer significantly 
disregarded works in which idea and expression are inseparable. Besides, Nimmer‘s 
comments did not sufficiently consider the right to free speech in regards to a creation of 
works that need to use or mimic the distinctive expression of the copyright holder in order 
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to be able to communicate his ideas or make significant political or artistic points out of 
the copyright work as in parody and appropriation arts.
391
 
The doctrinal argument that freedom of speech is recognised within copyright 
legislation itself through intrinsic limitation devices, such as the US ‗fair use‘ and the UK 
‗fair dealing‘ defence, is accurate to some degree. However, these defences guarantee 
freedom of speech only to limited extents, and which, I will argue, are insufficient.
392
 For 
instance, whereas there are a number of articles and case law which claim to demonstrate 
that the US fair use doctrine sufficiently secures protection of free speech
393
, some argue 
that the exception does not adequately accommodate free speech concerns
394
 due to a 
number of factors for fair use scrutiny and its characters of case-by-case analysis
395
 (see 
chapter 4.1.1). Fair dealing under the UK CDPA safeguards the right to free speech
396
 in 
relation to the use of copyright work for a limited range of purposes such as for reporting 
current events, parody, private copying and quotation. Nevertheless the fair dealing 
provisions do not effectively and sufficiently lessen the conflict between copyright and 
free speech since their applications are still too limited (see chapter 4.2.1). 
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(ii) In Conflict 
In Ashdown v Telegraph, the English court has considered, for the first time, the 
intersection between copyright and the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by 
Article 10 of the ECHR.
397
 It acknowledged that copyright could constraint the exercise of 
the right to free speech
398
 and the conflict between the two rights may exist even though 
the fair dealing defence was provided within the copyright statute.
399
 
In Ashdown v Telegraph, the newspaper, Sunday Telegraph, published a series of 
articles containing verbatim extracts and substantial sections from a confidential minute of 
a meeting between Ashdown and the then Prime Minister when they discussed the 
possibility of forming a coalition between the Labour and Liberal Democratic parties. 
Ashdown claimed that the unauthorised publication of his minute was a copyright 
infringement. The Telegraph Group sought to rely on the defences of fair dealing for the 
purpose of criticism or review
400
, fair dealing for the purpose of reporting current events
401
 
and the common law defence of public interest
402
 in compatibility with the right to 
freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR. These defences were not successful 
for this particular case.  
The Court of Appeal in this case essentially recognised that, in most 
circumstances, the right to free speech in copyright cases is sufficiently protected because 
copyright law normally allows the publication of information and ideas contained in a 
literary work, if not copying the exact same words
403
, and because copyright exceptions 
and limitations, particularly fair dealing, are provided within the copyright legislation 
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. It conceded that in exceptional circumstances copyright may conflict with the 
right to freedom of expression despite the existence and application of fair dealing 
provision: 
―…rare circumstances can arise where the right of freedom of expression will 
come into conflict with the protection afforded by the Copyright Act, 
notwithstanding the express exceptions to be found in the Act. In these 
circumstances, we consider that the court is bound, insofar as it is able, to 
apply the Act in a manner that accommodates the right of freedom of 
expression. This will make it necessary for the court to look closely at the 




Such rare circumstances are for example to report information of the greatest 
public interest not related to a current event but to a document produced in the past.
406
 
Such publications seem to have great public significance if concern political speech. Thus 
rare cases implied in Ashdown may not be adequate to safeguard free speech in 
circumstances where copying is a fundamental part of the expressive re-creations not 
concerning political or public events. 
The clash between copyright and free speech has become more visible due to 
copyright expansion
407
. Over recent years, particularly in the digital era, copyright has 
greatly expanded its scope through intensive pressure from recording companies, movie 
studios and other mass media corporations.
408
  
Vertically, copyright‘s term of protection has been extended. For instance, in 
England
409
, the term of protection under the Statute of Anne lasted for fourteen years from 
publication for the author of a book or his assignee. The duration, since then, has been 
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extended for various reasons. Until the Copyright Act 1911, the term was extended to the 
life of the author plus fifty years post mortem auctoris (―p.m.a.”) into conformity with the 
standard set by the Berne Convention. Then, in 1996, in order to harmonise the duration of 
copyright throughout the European Economic Community, the duration of copyright under 
the UK law was increased the term of copyright to the life of the author plus seventy years 
p.m.a. 
In the US, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA)
410
 of 1998, 
enlarged the duration of copyright by twenty years. The copyright term under the US law 
was, therefore, extended from life plus fifty years to life plus seventy years. In Eldred v 
Ashcroft
411
, the Court rejected the First Amendment challenge to extension of copyright 
term under the CTEA on holding that when ―Congress has not altered the traditional 
contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary‖.
412
 
The Court simply denied that there were legislative restrictions on freedom of speech on 
the ground that they are intended to promote free speech. Nonetheless, it is obvious that 
copyright term extension does cause a delay for creative works to enter the public domain 
which leads to the deterrence of other‘s use of pre-existing expression. 
Horizontally, copyright has been expanded beyond merely protecting literal 
copying. It now prevents others from parodying, deriving, recasting, remixing or 
incorporating parts of existing works into a new creation. Pre-existing expression 
constitutes raw materials for others to build upon, criticise, translate, parody, refer, remake 




The tension between copyright and free speech, at the time when copyright did 
little more than protect merely verbatim copying, was minimal. Whereas, at the present, a 
re-creation which results in a similarity, non-verbatim copying, or includes literal copying 
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of small portions of copyright work might be infringing.
414
  It is clear that copyright has 
restricted an author‘s freedom to utilise others‘ expression in creating an independent 
expressive work. By this, the conflict between the right to freedom of speech and 
copyright is increased. Netanel suggests that ―[o]nce copyright holders‘ exclusive rights 
extended beyond mere verbatim and near-verbatim copying, it became necessary to define 
some outer limit to those rights, lest copyright holders‘ proprietary control over existing 
expression unduly burden new speech.‖
415
 
In summary, some arguments seem to support that copyright does serve as an 
engine of free speech whilst collision between the two rights is still presenting.  
 
(iii) In Conciliation 
Over the years, society has attempted to reconcile copyright with other competing 
rights including the right to free speech in the event of conflicts. For example, many 
intrinsic copyright exceptions are a result of such balancing exercise. For public uses, 
copyright exceptions include, for instance, quotation416, library and archival uses417, access 
to books for the visually impaired418 and uses by the media419 in order to balance copyright 
with the freedom of the press to carry news of the day and the interest of the public at 
large in receiving information. 
Besides, in a number of cases concerning reporting of news and historical events, 
courts in many countries are required to reconcile between copyright and the right to free 
speech as well as the public interest. In the US, the use of several stills from Zapruder 
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footage of President Kennedy‘s assassination for a historical book was allowed.
420
 The 
court held that such use was ―fair and reasonable‖ since it was in the public interest to 
provide information on the factual and historical event. 
In the UK, the lower court permitted media use of still images of Princess Diana 
and Dodi Fayed to convey the facts about their visit to the Villa Windsor before their 
deaths. However, the Court of Appeal found that there was no public interest in having the 





, the Court of Appeal ruled that the defendant could 
have made limited quotation instead of printing Ashdown‘s secret minute verbatim.  
These achievements in balancing copyright with other rights illustrate that 
copyright cannot be used to prevent re-use of a work when it clashes against the right to 
freedom of speech and the public interest.
423
 Such circumstances, however, cannot be 
specified in advance; the appropriate balance varies in accordance with the social 
dynamics of the particular re-use. Therefore, individual reconciliation of copyright and 
other competing rights is always needed.  
 
(iv) Digital Media 
The intersection between copyright and the right of freedom of speech was 
aggravated when the scope and term of copyright protection were extended; the potential 
for friction has become exacerbated when the digital technology has changed the social 
standard and forms of speech.  
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With the advent of the internet and the rapid growth of digital technology, the 
conflict between copyright and free speech is increasing.
424
 The digital revolution has 
modified social relations, and at the same time, fostered interactivity. It has reduced the 
costs of copying and circulating digital information over the internet and has developed 
common standards of information exchange.
425
 As a result, online social communities and 
platforms have sprung into existence. The result is a culture of social exchange of ideas 
and expressions in a digital arena.  
Balkin suggests that internet speech has two significant characteristics.
426
 Firstly, it 
routes around traditional mass media by avoiding the old gatekeepers who controlled 
public speech. Secondly, it non-exclusively appropriates or takes some contents from mass 
media and uses them as raw materials for creativity. Internet speech includes blogs, 
critique website, fan fiction, and a fan‘s remake of a popular movie. Balkin also illustrates 
that a fan-made sequel is another way of ―talking back‖ to a mass media product.  
Internet users are no longer mere passive consumer of media but are also active 
producers by using digital technologies to comment on, and appropriate, existing materials 
for their own expression. This evokes a more severe conflict between copyright and 
freedom of speech; whereas copyright insists on suppressing online re-creators with 
intensive control over their use of copyright materials, the nature of online culture together 
with free speech encourages digital consumers to liberally make a new expression out of 
old ideas or pre-existing methods of expression. The right to free speech of online re-
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creators is even more affected by use of an extra copyright power such as the DMCA
427
 
and the digital right management instruments
428
 to suppress internet speech. 
 
3.2.3 Copyright, Freedom of Speech and Online Re-creations 
The type of speech which is most restrained by copyright is speech that involves 
―creative appropriation‖. Creative appropriation ranges from ―modifications and 
adaptations of a single work to samplings, remixes, and mash-ups that incorporate an array 
of discrete components from numerous existing works.‖
429
 These online creative works 
are, for instance, written works such as fan fictions, videos such as a cover of a song, 
mash-up or parody on YouTube, and a virtual reality of existing places or scenes from a 
popular culture. Creative re-creations require reproduction of existing elements in order to 
communicate new expressions. Fan authors express their thoughts and imagination 
concerning a popular work by writing a fiction using fragments from the original story. 
Re-creators incorporate or remix some original audio-visual materials to create a video 
parodying an object or demonstrating another aspect of the original works with their own 
effort, originality, and creativity. These activities fulfil and satisfy the re-creators; these 
online re-creations are also a means of communicating their messages to the society and 
opening floor for discussion.
430
 
As analysed in chapter 2, under the current copyright law, these creative works are 
potentially infringing copyright. Barendt argues that: 
―some infringing works should be regarded as an exercise of free speech 
rights because they are integral to the development of its author or because 
they enhance the general public understanding of literature or the arts. This is 
clearly the case with parodies, satire, and appropriation art, all of which may 
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quote or in other ways exploit existing work, and thereby infringe copyright. 
Indeed, their effectiveness as a parody or appropriation art depends on 
reproduction or adaptation of significant parts of the earlier work.‖
431
 
Those works are, by nature, appropriative; it is impossible to create works such as 
fan fiction or parody without incorporating some fragments from an original work. 
Copying in these circumstances is therefore unavoidable. But the consequence is that a 
creator of this genre of works is being treated as a copyright infringer whose right to 
freedom of expression is inequitably ignored as demonstrated in chapter 2.  
Moreover, copyright potentially increases the cost of speech by requiring licensing 
fee payment
432
 and due to the difficulties in obtaining permission from the copyright 
owner
433
. This chills expression of those (and most) subsequent creators who are amateur 
with limited financial resources. These creators may decide to alter their expression or 
cease to produce their expressive creation altogether.
434
 Apparently, the impact of 
copyright law upon free speech reaches its peak in situations where a person cannot 
express his idea using prior expression of another person. 
Apart from the right to freedom of speech, another human right which is relevant 
to copyright and online re-creation is the right to participate in cultural life. Article 27(1) 
of the UDHR states that ―[e]veryone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life 
of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits.‖ Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR also recognises the right of everyone to take 
part in cultural life. Interestingly, the texts of the right to participate in cultural life co-
exist within the same provisions as the right of creators including copyright.
435
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In 1976, UNESCO issued a Recommendation on Participation by the People at 
Large in Cultural Life which delineated the concept of culture to include ―all forms of 
creativity and expression of groups or individuals, both in their ways of life and in their 
artistic activities‖.
436
 In 2009, the CESCR also viewed that the concept of culture ―must be 
seen not as a series of isolated manifestations or hermetic compartments, but as an 
interactive process whereby individuals and communities, while preserving their 
specificities and purposes, give expression to the culture of humanity.‖
437
 In relation to 
Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR which is the human rights to participate in the cultural life, 
the CESCR considered that:  
―[culture] encompasses, inter alia, ways of life, language, oral and written 
literature, music and song, non-verbal communication, religion or belief 
systems, rites and ceremonies, sport and games, methods of production or 
technology, natural and man-made environments, food, clothing and shelter 
and the arts, customs and traditions through which individuals, groups of 
individuals and communities express their humanity and the meaning they 
give to their existence, and build their world view representing their 
encounter with the external forces affecting their lives. Culture shapes and 
mirrors the values of well-being and the economic, social and political life of 
individuals, groups of individuals and communities.‖
438
 





law has made a barricade around the online re-creation culture and outlawed subsequent 
creators who participate in the culture. Therefore, such deterrence also implicates the 
human rights to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to 
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share in scientific advancement and its benefits as safeguarded by Article 27(1) of the 
UDHR and Article 15(1)(a) and (b) of the ICESCR.
440
 
It is a natural human activity to ―participate in culture through building on what 
[we] find in culture and innovating with it, modifying it, and turning it to [our] 
purpose‖.
441
 Freedom of expression protects such ability of individuals and promotes the 
development of a culture that is more participatory. However, copyright expansion has 
prevented people from building upon other‘s expression in creating their own.  
―Our speech does not arise from a tabula rasa. Rather, we are born into an 
expressive universe brimming with texts, songs, and images that others have 
created. We cannot make sense of our world, find our own voice, 
communicate to others, or seek to affect others‘ perceptions and 
understandings without appropriating, recoding, referring to, and imparting 
the expressive works that constitute our common language.‖
442
 
Indeed, a reconciliation between the interests of the copyright holders and the right 
to free speech as well as the right to participate in cultural life of online re-creators is still 
in need. To achieve a proper balance in a conflicting circumstance, the fact that copyright 






Copyright can collide with freedom of speech particularly when it prohibits 
utilisation of an existing work in making a new expression. In the internet age, people 
communicate with one another and participate in the online culture of their choice by 
digital speech including creative re-creations that contain political, artistic and/or 
communicative value. Free speech challenges to copyright enforcement ought to be 
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sustained ―when copyright law is used to suppress the dissemination of information of real 
importance to the public or to stifle artistic creativity, parody, or satire, and moreover, 
when the legislation itself does not provide adequate safeguards for that freedom.‖
444
 In 
the analysis of the copyright effects on freedom of an individual to expression, the public 
interest is often related and led to a crucial discussion. Therefore, not only that an 
individual‘s free speech is a crucial issue for creative expression in the online re-creation 
culture, the interest of the public on this matter is also important and needed to be 
discussed in the following part of this chapter. 
 
3.3 The Public Interest 
"Ultimately the most important factor determining the theoretical shape of 
copyright is the public interest.”
445
 
Copyright is considered to be in the public interest because it encourages creation 
and dissemination of new works. This chapter will study the public interest in relation to 
copyright and online creative re-uses. It will first discuss the notion of the public interest 
and then analyse the interplay between copyright, the public interest and the re-creation 
practice in the digital age. 
 
3.3.1 The Discourse of the Public Interest 
 The public interest is a term that is used in many areas of law such as in freedom 
of information, media law, public law, patent law and copyright law. For instance, in 
freedom of information the public interest plays an important role in allowing public 
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access to information held by a public authority.
446
 Carter and Bouris comment that ―[t]he 
‗public interest‘ is an amorphous concept, which is typically not defined in access to 
information legislation. This flexibility is intentional. Legislators and policy makers 




In the area of media law, Morrison and Svennevig state that ―[t]he broad concept 
of ‗the public interest‘ is familiar to large proportions of the public, and it is considered a 
suitable defence for media intrusion of privacy under appropriate circumstances. 
However, there did not seem to be any one firm definition of the term.‖
448
 Although the 
public interest is recognised in all jurisdictions
449
, a formal definition of the term cannot 
be found. Some suggest that ―it was in the media‘s interest not to have a clear definition of 
public interest, since such a loose definition could be brought into play to justify 
practices‖ in order to balance the public interest with the media and privacy.
450
 
The UK Editors‘ Code of Practice (―Code‖) sets the benchmark for ethical 
standards and protects both the rights of the individual and the public‘s right to know. It 
comprises clauses imposing duties on the members of the press including accuracy, 
privacy, the protection of children and vulnerable groups, and so on. The Code also 
includes the public interest exceptions to some of the clauses that might normally breach 
the Code in order to allow publication of material that would be in the wider public 
interest. Though the public interest has not been defined, the Code provides guidelines 
about what can be considered as in the public interest: 
―1. The public interest includes, but is not confined to: 
  i) Detecting or exposing crime or serious impropriety. 
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  ii) Protecting public health and safety. 
  iii) Preventing the public from being misled by an action or statement  
of an individual or organisation. 
2. There is a public interest in freedom of expression itself.‖ 
But what does the ―public interest‖ mean when it comes to creativity? 
Defining the ―public interest‖ is not an easy task.
451
There is no conformed 
definition of public interest. For the purpose of this discussion, I will attempt to develop a 
definition of public interest in relation to law and copyright by beginning with dictionary 
definitions and then narrowing down the concept by examining the discourse of public 
interest in other areas of law. 
In a general meaning for common usage, according to the Random House 
dictionary, the public interest means: ―the welfare or well-being of the general public; 
commonwealth‖, and ―appeal or relevance to the general populace‖.
452
 
The Oxford English dictionary
453
 defines ‗the public‘ as ―ordinary people in 
general; the community‖. It provides five different meanings of the word ‗interest‘ as 
followed;  
1) the feeling of wanting to know or learn about something or someone;  
2) money paid regularly at a particular rate for the use of money lent, or for 
delaying the repayment of a debt;  
3) the advantage or benefit of a person or group;  
4) a stake or involvement in an undertaking, especially a financial one;  
5) a group or organization having a common concern, especially in politics or 
business. 
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In a general definition for legal purposes, Black‘s Law Dictionary defines public 
interest as: ―[s]omething in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary 
interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not 
mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or as the interests of the particular localities, 
which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by citizens generally in 
affairs of local, state or national government‖.
454
 
In summary, from the above dictionaries‘ definitions, the term ―interest‖ is not 
limited to monetary or economic benefits but also involves the well-being, welfare, public 
order and fulfilment as well as legal rights and liabilities. Certainly, the meaning of 
interest which referring to the money paid for the use of money lent, or for delaying of 
debt payment is not relevant to the discourse of the public interest. Its concept for legal 
purposes, as supported by Black's Law Dictionary, is not so trivial that it refers to the 
matters that people think interesting to know. Clearly, as stated by Morrison and 
Svennevig in ‗The Public Interest, the Media and Privacy‘, the concept of public interest 
―involves matters that are held to affect a considerable number of people. It cannot, in 
general, be something that people are merely interested in knowing about‖.
455
 
As for the term ―public‖, it can refer to a substantial number of people, a 
community, the society at large, and the general public. Nevertheless, the media scholars, 
Morrison and Svennevig, comment that ―[w]here something might affect a single 
individual, it can be in the public interest if that effect involves some general principle 
that, in turn, has impact upon a wider population‖.
456
 Besides, the size and shape of the 
public may vary from society to society;
457
 it may also depend on the nature of the subject 
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 As Dreier points out: 
―[W]hile the term ―public interest‖ is often cited, there is a certain vagueness inherent in it. 
Who is, or who represents, the ―public‖? In some instances, the reference is to the ―general‖ 
public, i.e. to society as a whole. In other instances, the reference is to the interest of a certain 
subgroups of society: for example, end-users, who are viewed as in opposition to the interests 
of the rightholders. Furthermore, the label ―public‖ is sometimes used to mask private—often 








The general concept of public interest is ―wide-ranging and expansive‖
459
. It is 
possible that different publics or communities have dissimilar interests.
460
 The public 
interest has different meanings in different contexts, different societies; and it changes 
over time. From the public law perspective, there is the public interest in life, health, and 
freedom
461
. There is also the public interest in disclosing essential data that are important 
for public life (right to information), the public interest in freedom of speech and 
discovering truth (media law) and the interest in public health (patent law aspect).  
For the objective of this research, the notion of public interest is specifically 
explored within the scope of copyright law, which therefore disregards unrelated elements 
such as physical safety of members of the public. My starting point is that the public 
interest in the copyright context can be defined as something in which the public, society 
as a whole or a certain subgroup of society has some monetary interest, or some interest 
involving their well-being, advancement and legal rights or liabilities. The interests of the 
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public in the copyright system are crucially related to creativity and freedom of speech as 
discussed in chapters 3.1 and 3.2.  
The public interest has shaped the contour of copyright since the eighteenth 
century and will continue to do so. The link between the public interest and copyright has 
since been a subject of debate namely how to balance the two.  The correlation between 
copyright and the public interest is discussed in the following part. 
 
3.3.2 Copyright and the Public Interest 
  
3.3.2.1 The Correlation 
 As a fundamental rule, copyright grants exclusive rights in various types of 
original works
462
 such as literary and artistic works
463
. The granted rights
464
 encourage 
authors or artists in creation of useful works, creativity and knowledge to benefit the 
society as a whole.
465
 The copyright protection (at least for the economic rights) lasts for a 
limited term.
466
 With the lapse of protection terms, copyright works enter the public 
domain and become a common good which people can freely use. The distribution and 
stimulation of creativity as well as works in the public domain constitute the public 
interest. This is a significant and fundamental balance between the rights of the copyright 
holders and the public interests in dissemination of works and access to protected works. 
The public interests in relation to copyright are therefore as follows: 
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(i) Creativity and learning 
As criticised in chapter 3.1, creativity is indispensible for the enrichment of 
society. Copyright is widely believed to be a mechanism for the stimulation of creativity 
and useful knowledge for the benefit of the public.
467
 It also fosters ―the growth of 
learning and culture by encouraging creators to produce works for the public welfare‖
468
. 
Nevertheless, although copyright fulfils some significant function in encouraging new 
creations by providing economic interests, it does not play a single and direct factor to 
generate creative incentives (see below in part 3.3.3.1). To encourage creativity and 
cumulative knowledge, copyright should allow creative re-uses of protected works instead 
of deterring it.  
 
(ii) Freedom of speech 
Copyright can also be considered as an engine of free expression
469
 by providing 
economic incentives, encourages authors and artists to express their ideas and in that 
process, create a new work.
470
  In this view, copyright co-operates with freedom of speech 
in the stimulation of creative expression for the fulfilment of individuals and society as 
well as the promulgation of opinion and truth. These benefits of copyright are crucial to 
the interest of the public. Nevertheless, freedom of speech requires ability to access and 
use the existing works during the term of protection. Particularly in the internet age, 
people communicate with one another by digital speech including creative re-creations 
that contain political, artistic and/or communicative value. Thus, copyright can collide 
with freedom of speech when it prohibits utilisation of an existing work in making a new 
expression (see chapter 3.2). 
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(iii) Dissemination of works and access to protected works 
The exclusive rights under copyright law are granted to encourage authors in 
creation of useful works and widespread dissemination of works benefits the public. ―If 
the ideas and experiences of creators can be shared by a wide public within a short space 
of time they contribute to the advance of society.‖
471
 This is coherent to the natural 
process of creativity analysed in chapter 3.1.1.2 that creative works are built on works of 
former creators, influenced by the environmental and social conditions of the external 
world, and required communication between people in the society.  
The preceding public interests related to creativity and free speech require access 
and use of existing works during the term of copyright protection. After the lapse of 
copyright terms, the protected works will enter into the public domain and become the 
common good which other people can freely exploit. This is the interests of society in 
access to protected works and in stimulus of further creativity. The existence of a public 
domain can be considered as a crucial part of the public interest served by copyright 
law.
472
 However, an extension of copyright duration delays works entering the public 
domain and the rise of the cost in creating new works due to an intensive copyright 
protection may paradoxically lower the number of works created
473
. This causes an 
imbalance between copyright, the rights of the users and the public interest. Copyright 
strives to provide a better balance by embodying restricted limitations and exceptions on 
the exclusive rights.  Nevertheless the existing copyright exemptions are insufficient to 
achieve a proper reconciliation between the competing interests particularly in the digital 
age. These issues are discussed further below in the following parts and in chapter 4.  
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3.3.2.2 Public Interest Debates on Extension of Copyright 
Technology has long shaped the contour of copyright, but digital technologies 
have particularly accelerated the expansion of copyright protection i.e. the breadth of 
copyright subject matter
474
, the scope of protection
475
 and the length of protection. This 
has significantly enlarged the monopoly power of right holders. Broader copyright 
protection activated by entertainment industries causes an adverse effect on the benefits of 
the public. Any expansion of copyright to more kinds of works, stronger rights and for a 
longer length of time results in  fewer opportunities to use protected works and the 
reduction of the number of works in the public domain; this significantly affects the public 
interest in access and use of the works.  
The following demonstrates the public interest discussions regarding the extension 
of copyright duration, for example, in the UK and the US, and the expansion of the scope 
of protection on an international level. 
 
(i) Extension of copyright term 
United Kingdom 
 The English Statute of Anne was passed in 1709. Its purposes were for the 
encouragement of learning and encouragement of learned men to compose and write 
useful books and for preventing piracy. Under the Statute of Anne, there was an overlap 
between authors‘ interests, trade interests, and public interests.
476
 It recognised the interest 
of authors and their assigns to have the sole right to print books for a limited period of 14 
years from the date of publication. It also provided for the public interest in access to 
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protected work; by imposing that nine copies of a book had to be deposited to certain 
libraries throughout the country; and by providing that any person could make a complaint 
if a book‘s price was ―high and unreasonable‖ to ensure that people can have access to 
cheap books. 
The Statute planted the seeds of the underlying principles which became the 
foundation of modern copyright in the Western world.
477
 The underlying principles of the 
modern international copyright system are that: the author has the exclusive rights as the 
results of his labour in creating the work; the author is therefore entitled to just economic 
rewards; the reasonable reward provides a stimulus to intellectual creativity; and there is a 
social requirement in the public interest to encourage authors to create and disseminate 
their works to the public at large
478
. 
After the Statute of Anne, subsequent English Copyright Acts granted copyright 
protection for other works and extended the term of protection. This inevitably provoked a 
controversy on the balance of copyright and the public interest. 
To illustrate, on the revision of the 1842 Copyright Act, there was a debate on the 
extension of the protection period beyond the death of the author.
479
 The issue was on the 
rights of the author and the public interest. Talfourd proposed that life plus sixty years 
would increase the rewards available to authors and achieve a fair balance of public and 
private interests.
480
 He believed that the copyright duration at that time was much too short 
for the achievement of that justice which society owed to authors, especially to those 
whose reputation was of slow growth and enduring character.
481
 The opponents were 
anxious that books would become very scarce and expensive; the rise in costs would 
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hinder public education to access knowledge by cheap books.
482
 The copyright monopoly 
ought not to last longer than is necessary for securing remuneration to authors for 
supplying good books to society.
483
 Macaulay opposed that such extension would ―inflict 
grievous injury on the public, without conferring any compensating advantage on men of 
letters‖
484
 He feared that that ―many valuable works will be either totally suppressed or 
grievously mutilated‖.
485
 The debate ended with a compromise. The proposal of copyright 
term continuing after the death of the author was accepted. However, a period of 7 years 




At the turn of the twentieth century, the public interest issue arose again when the 
new term of protection of life plus 50 years p.m.a. was required by the Berlin Act of 
1908
487
. A new Committee was appointed to consider whether the amendments according 
to the Berlin Act should be adopted in the UK Copyright Act.
488
 The Committee 
concluded that it would not be prejudicial to the public interests to adopt the proposed 
term; it would rather assist the development and progress of literature and art.
489
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The study on the duration of copyright prepared for a Congressional Committee in 
1961
491
 pointed out that: 
―The term should be long enough to provide an incentive for the author, … 
Further, it is to the author‘s advantage and to the advantage of the public, to 
provide an adequate term of protection to make it commercially feasible for 
publishers and other distributors to aid him in exploiting his work. The period 
of protection should be sufficient to provide an adequate economic return to 
all of these interests, if it is true, as seems to be assumed in the Constitution, 




 A similar situation to the UK appeared when there was a proposal for copyright 
term extension in the US law; it raised the public interest controversy.  To bring the 
US into conformity with the international standard under the Berne Convention, the term 
was set at 50 years p.m.a. in the 1976 Act. The argument for the amendment is found in 
the House Committee Report in 1976. The Committee concluded that ―[t]he advantages of 
a basic term of copyright enduring for the life of the author and for 50 years after the 
author‘s death outweigh any possible disadvantages.‖
493
 
The term was then lengthened to life plus 70 years in the Sonny Bono Act of 
1998
494
. The primary rationale for the extension was to bring the US law into line with the 
standard of the European Union. It was argued that 20 years less protection than the 
European countries would be unfair to the authors and harmful to the commercial interest 
of the US. The proposal was therefore supported for economic reasons. Opponents argued 
that such extension would benefit business sectors rather than individual authors and the 
public, and would threaten access to works that would otherwise enter into the public 
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domain as well as impose substantial costs on the general public.
495
 Brown and Miller also 
contested that the extension would harm ―other creators who are inspired by the great 
creative works of the past‖
496
 and that ―[t]he public should have access to that work as a 
means of providing incentive to new creators, disseminating these works to more students, 
historians, writers, and other Americans, and generally improving the public arts.‖
497
 
Despite the intense debate, the term was eventually extended.   
 
(ii) Extension of scope of copyright 
Not only the duration of copyright, the scope of protection has also been expanded 
to encompass more types of works and greater protection; for example, copyright 




The WIPO treaties, the WCT (regarding literary
499
 and artistic works), and the 
WPPT (regarding performances and phonograms), cover the new copyright protections in 
the challenge of digital technology particularly the internet.
500
 The Preamble to the WCT 
recognised ―the need to maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger 
public interest, particularly education, research and access to information, as reflected in 
the Berne Convention.‖ The WCT can be seen as ―a happy result‖
501
 of the attempt to 
strike a balance between copyright and the public interest by providing desirable new 
protections in the digital technology and taking account of the need to disseminate 
information for ―furthering the advance of culture, learning and democratic 
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. It is indeed crucial to safeguard the rights of the copyright owners in the 
interactive networks. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the WCT has a sufficient 
consideration on the interest of the public in access and use of copyright protected works.  
The most important right designed to deal with the advances of technologies is 
possibly the right to communication to the public.
503
Article 8 of the WCT provides that 
―authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorising any 
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the 
making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public 
may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.‖ Though 
the rights relating to communication to the public have been in the Berne Convention 
since 1925, they were originally designed to cover radio and television broadcasts and 
other traditional media.
504
 The right to communicate works to the public is inextricably 
tied up with the public interest in the wide dissemination and enjoyment of copyright 




In the balance, there are the interests of the copyright owners and the public 
interest in copyright in providing incentives for authors to produce intellectual works on 
the one hand, and the interest of the public in dissemination and public access to creative 
works on the other. The human creative process examined in chapter 3.1 is relevant here. 
The dissemination of and access to existing works is essential for the creation of new 
works. Consequently, there is the need for the copyright framework to strike a balance 
between the conflicting interests by allowing some uses of the work without infringing 
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copyright. The crucial attempt to balance copyright with the public interest by providing 
more exceptions and limitations to copyright protection is discussed in the following part. 
 
3.3.2.3 Achieving Balance: Limitations and Exceptions 
The monopoly of copyright is not absolute; it has been restricted such as by the 
limited terms of protection, the idea/expression dichotomy and by limitations and 
exceptions to give the author sufficient incentive to produce works for the public and to 
ensure that the creative works are available for new works to be built upon.
506
 The need to 
impose some copyright limitations was recognised by the framers of the Berne 
Convention. Numa Droz, the Swiss president of the first Diplomatic Conference in 1884, 
reminded the delegates that ―limitations on absolute protection are dictated, rightly in my 
opinion, by the public interest. The ever-growing need for mass instruction could never be 
met if there were no reservation of certain reproduction facilities, which at the same time 
should not degenerate into abuses.‖
507
 This consideration led to the establishment of the 




The copyright statutory limitations and exceptions include for example the uses of 
copyright works for the purpose of education and for the purpose of news reporting, which 
result from an attempt to balance the interest of copyright owner with the interest of the 
public in knowledge and in discovering the truth respectively. For instance, in the UK, the 
most important statutory defences for copyright infringement are fair dealing provisions 
for the purposes of private use, parody, research or private study, criticism, review and 
news reporting.
509
 The Government‘s Green Paper in 1981 recognises that the right of 
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reproduction is essential but copyright exceptions
510
 are also needed because ―the public 
interest demands that not every unauthorised reproduction of copyright meterial should 
constitute an infringement of copyright‖.
511
According to the Paper: ―[t]hese exceptions are 
of obvious importance in that they seek to establish a proper balance between the 
legitimate interests of copyright owners and the legitimate desires of users of copyright 
material.‖
512
 In the US, the fair use defence
513
 is crucial for balancing copyright with the 
interest of the public at large.
514
 Because copyright potentially restrains speech, the fair 
use doctrine helps reconcile the contradictory rights, free speech and copyright, by 
allowing the use of protected material in criticism, comment, parody, news reporting and 
similar uses in the public interest. The fair use doctrine ―preserves proprietary rights in 
creative works while accommodating the public interest in open dialogue, deliberation, 
and the advance of knowledge.‖
515
 The fair use exception is an outcome of the need for 
balancing of interests with the public interest in reasonable access outweighing the 
statutory privilege of a copyright proprietor.
516
 
 Although the statutory exceptions are the result of balancing copyright with the 
interest of the public, it is doubtful whether they provide a reasonable and sufficient 
balance particularly in the age of the internet. Chapter 4 below will analyse the pertinent 
copyright exceptions in the US, EU, UK, Germany and Canada. It will then conclude that 
the existing exceptions are inadequate to achieve a proper reconciliation.    
 
                                                          
 
510
 The Green Paper refers to the limited exceptions as included in the 1956 Copyright Act. Fair dealing is 
found in Section 6 of the 1956 Act. 
511
 Department of Trade, Reform of the Law Relating to Copyright, Designs and Performers‟ Protection 
(Cmnd. 8302, 1981) ch 13. 
512
 Ibid para 1-2. 
513
 See chapter 4.1. 
514
 ―Once it is accepted, as it is in the United States, that the ultimate aim of the grant of copyright is to 
stimulate creativity for the public good, the fair use or fair dealing exceptions are to be seen as a recognition 
of the legitimate public interest which balances the protection given to the owners of copyright works.‖ 
(Anthony Mason, ‗Developments in the law of copyright and public access to information‘ (1997) 19(11) 
E.I.P.R. 636, 637). 
515
 Dan Burk and Julie Cohen, ‗Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems‘ (2001) 15 Harv. J. 
L. Tech 41, 43. 
516





In summary, the public interests in copyright are basically the interest in 
dissemination of works and the interest in access and use of works by the public 
significantly for the purposes of creativity, free speech, education and useful information. 
The debates over the extensions of term and scope of copyright are related to the public 
interest in access and use of works. To achieve a proper balance between the protection of 
copyright and the wider public interest, some limitations and exceptions are implemented 
within the body of copyright law. However, these exemptions are insufficient (see chapter 
4). 
 
3.3.3 Copyright, the Public Interest and Online Re-creations 
In order to provide a better balance between copyright and the public interest, the 
notion of the public interest concerning re-creation in the digital age is therefore analysed 
in this part. 
As Scassa noticed, ―[i]n contemporary times, the line between the creation of a 
new work and the use of the work of another has blurred significantly.‖
517
 The digital 
technologies and the internet have made the line between creators and users even more 
indistinct where users are engaged in transformative behaviour. ―Creators are also users of 
works. The ability to actually access and use other works may be central to their creative 
activity.‖
518
 Re-creators are therefore users of existing works, and at the same time, are 
creators of new works. Creative re-creations provide some benefits for the public which 
are similar to those generated by copyright. The public interests in online re-creations as 
the digital media are as follows: 
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3.3.3.1 Non-copyright incentives 
It is widely believed that authors of works are incentivised by the economic rights 
granted by copyright.
519
 However, copyright benefits may not be the single and direct 
incentive for works to be created. This happens in many instances such as where copyright 
in works created in the course of employment, where academics write for tenure or 
promotion rather than for royalties, and other situations where creators are not the owners 
of copyright. In these circumstances, ―salary and benefits are both the incentive and 
reward for creation. Although it can be argued that copyright protection provides the basis 
for the company‘s ability to continue to pay its employees, and thus encourages the 
creation and dissemination of work, this link is far from direct.‖
520
 There are also other 
motives for creation including the desire for fame and recognition.
521
 Besides, some 
authors even pay money to have their works distributed.
522
  
Long before the coming of copyright, people created and re-created works 
naturally for personal fulfilment and engagement in cultural community.
523
 Some 
commentators propose that intrinsic and non-monetary motivations are much more 
important to encourage creation of new works than extrinsic factors as financial 
rewards.
524
 Davies suggests that ―the expectation of financial reward is not the only reason 
for authors and other artists to create. They are not necessarily motivated primarily by 
monetary interests; many are impelled to create as part of their personality, creation being 
in their nature.‖
525
 In this regard, Plant observes that ―[t]here is … an important group of 
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authors who desire simply free publication; they may welcome, but they certainly do not 
live in expectation of, direct monetary reward.‖
526
 Online re-creators are such group of 
authors.
527
 By the nature of online re-creations such as fan fiction and parody, the primary 
motivation for re-creation is typically not from copyright. Fan authors are encouraged to 
write their stories by their own creative minds with a will to express their imagination. 
Parodists create works by their desire to comment upon something and express their 
opinions. These re-creators want to create and communicate their works to the public for 
free. Moreover, re-creators that are motivated by non-commercial factors tend to provide a 
broader array of creative content than creators that are incentivised solely by monetary 
rewards for mainstream markets.
528
 Indeed, an original author would not normally create a 
parody or fanvid of his work, and surely do not write a fan fiction of his own story. The 
dissemination of those creative re-creations contributes to the advanced society.  
In summary, the economic incentive provided by copyright partially, but not 
completely, attributes to the stimulation of creative works. In fact, inner and non-
commercial reasons are more important drives to create a work. This argument is 
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3.3.3.2 Creativity and future creativity 
Creative re-use is a matter of strong public interest. It is a natural behaviour of 
human to use existing materials to produce new matters.
530
 Besides, people are usually 
motivated to re-create by their internal non-monetary drives, not by financial factors.
531
  
This generates new creativity crucial for individuals and the enrichment of society. 
Creative re-creations are creativity which might be endorsed and transformed by the 
further development of technologies. Reasonably allowing the practice of re-creations 
would therefore pave the way for new forms of creativity in the future.
532
 However, the 
public interest in creative re-creations is ignored in the current balance. As demonstrated, 
copyright and online re-creations are both important for the public and thus should be 
encouraged. Nonetheless, the two subjects clash against each other since intensive 
copyright monopoly stifles the process of creativity by obstructing useful re-creations. For 
the online re-creations to properly exist and benefit society without unreasonable prejudice 
to copyright, it is therefore necessary to re-balance the competing rights and interests: the 
rights of copyright holders and the public interests in copyright on the one hand, and the 
rights of re-creators such as the human rights to free speech and to participate in cultural 
life as well as the interests of the public from the creative culture on the other. 
 
3.3.3.3 Freedom of speech and self-fulfilment 
As discussed in chapters 3.1.1.1 and 3.2, personal fulfilment is part of the nature of 
human creative activities and fulfilment can be achieved by communicative expression. 
As human beings, we are cognitive and communicative by nature. The ability to express 
our thoughts is also valuable in self-determination and autonomy. 
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The right to free speech is recognised as a fundamental human right which is 
important for the general interest of the public. Individual identity and self-fulfilment are 
constructed through expressive, communicative activity. Online re-creation is a new form 
of expression which involves artistic and/or political speech.
533
 Particularly within the 
online communication culture, people not only make speech and expression about politics, 
but also exchange views on other topics such as fashion, music, art and popular culture. 
This exchange makes their lives more valuable. The digital speech can foster criticism, 
debate, and discussion valuable for individuals and for society. 
To conclude, freedom to re-create is an aspect of autonomy and self-fulfilment 
which benefits individual personality and its growth.
534
 The exercise of the freedom can 
lead to the development of more mature individuals and consequently benefiting society 
as a whole. Re-creators of creative expression have the human rights to freedom of speech 
and to participate in cultural life. Nevertheless, the current copyright law limits those 
rights when it restricts utilisation of an existing work in making a new expression. 
 
3.3.3.4 Societal and cultural benefits from participation in culture 
Because of technological changes, there is a shift from merely viewing or 
consuming culture towards actively participating in it.
535
 As Lessig explains, people now 
―add to the culture they read by creating and re-creating the culture around them‖.
536
 
People can easily take part in the online culture and become re-creators. The significant 
advantage of cyberspace is its potential for enhancing wide participation of individuals in 
social communication; people should therefore be able to participate actively in online 
creative culture
537
 and enjoy the right to participate in cultural life which is also a 
                                                          
 
533
 See chapter 3.2.1.2. 
534
As observed in chapter 3.3.1, an individual‘s interest can amount to a large number of people with the 
same interest.  
535
 Lawrence Lessig, Remix (Penguin Press 2008) ch 1. 
536
 Ibid, 28. 
537
 Niva Elkin-Koren, ‗Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in 






 The right to participate in culture is endorsed by freedom of 
expression. As Tushnet notes: 
 ―[w]hen most creative output is controlled by large corporations, freedom to 
modify and elaborate on existing characters is necessary to preserve a 
participatory element in popular culture. Copyright‘s purpose, after all, is to 





3.3.3.5 Learning and education  
Learning and education provide numerous benefits for individuals and society at 
large, including fulfilment of life, enjoyment of literature and culture, improvement of 
skills, being more informed and socially involved citizens, and consequently creating a 
well-being of the society to live in.
540
 
In the modern world, online re-creation culture is a new way of communication 
and interaction. Online re-creations are expressions categorised as a form of participatory 
culture.
541
 A participatory culture can be described as ―a culture with relatively low 
barriers to artistic expression and civic engagement, strong support for creating and 
sharing creations, and some type of informal mentorship whereby experienced participants 
pass along knowledge to novices.‖
542
 The digital culture has become a pervasive part of 
the everyday lives for many people especially young generations.
543
 Youth now are born 
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 ―Basic access to technology, the ability to navigate online information, and the ability to communicate 
with others online are increasingly central to our everyday participation in public life.‖ (Mizuko Ito, et al., 




and grow up utilising computers and internet skills to engage in their culture. Online 
media is part of their lives and how they learn.
544
 
The benefits from the culture include ―opportunities for peer-to-peer learning, a 
changed attitude toward intellectual property, the diversification of cultural expression, the 
development of skills valued in the modern workplace, and a more empowered conception 
of citizenship.‖
545
 The core advantage to mention here is learning which contributes to the 
development of skills and social capabilities. 
The large scale ethnographic study of contemporary participatory cultures by the 
Digital Youth Project
546
 demonstrates that young people in the US are engaging in digital 
media and online communications
547
 and in turn learning and benefiting from them. 
Although the study focuses on American youth, due to the borderless cyberspace the study 
is applicable to a large number of teenagers all over the world not only in a certain 
country. 
From the research, there are three genres of online participation prevalent among 
young people. First, many teenagers ―hang out‖
548
 with friends they already know from 
schools and their neighbourhoods through online networks. This demonstrates that apart 
from face-to-face meeting, they also use the media to virtually communicate with one 
another and maintain social relationships. Second, the digital technologies enable them to 
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Century (MIT Press 2009) xii. 
546
 The project by Digital Youth Research in 2008, ‗the Kids‘ Informal Learning with Digital Media: An 
Ethnographic Investigation of Innovative Knowledge Cultures‘, is summarised in the book, Mizuko Ito, et 
al., Hanging Out, Messing Around, and Geeking Out: Kids Living and Learning with New Media (MIT Press 
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 Digital media and online communication do not encompass only the online re-creation culture but also 
include communication through social network sites, online games and gadgets such as iPods and mobile 
phones. 
548
 ―[H]anging out is a genre of participation that corresponds largely with friendship-driven practices in 
which engagement with new media is motivated by the desire to maintain connections with friends‖ 
(Mizuko Ito, et al., Hanging Out, Messing Around, and Geeking Out: Kids Living and Learning with New 






 on the internet and ―mess around‖
550
 with tools, programs, and platforms. 
The term, ―messing around‖, refers to a way of learning about the way a particular 
medium works, particularly through the processes of trial and error which is a more 
intense engagement with new media and technology. 
The third mode of participation is termed as ―geeking out‖ which primarily refers 
to ―an intense commitment or engagement with media or technology, often one particular 
media property, genre, or a type of technology.‖
551
 The young generations may ―geek out‖ 
as fans, bloggers, gamers and media producers devoting to an area of strong interest to 
them and share their passions and creations with others.
552
 ―Geeking out‖ is an illustration 
of continued, intensive, and sophisticated interaction and use of new media.  
The Digital Youth Research suggests that participation in online activities provides 
important models of learning and participation that are evolving with changes in 
technology.
553
 It recognises ―the growth of digital media production as a form of everyday 
expression and the circulation of media and communication in a context of networked 
publics enabled by the Internet.‖
554
 
Online re-creation culture is a new way of learning of young generations. This 
informal education or peer-based learning
555
 is a process of participation in public life that 
includes social, recreational and civic engagement. Young re-creators are mastering core 
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social and cultural skills and engaging with esoteric and niche knowledge communities.
556
  
From an observation of geeking out groups, ―youth engage in the specialized elite 
vocabularies of gaming and esoteric fan knowledge and develop new experimental genres 
that make use of the authoring and editing capabilities of digital media. These include 
personal and amateur media that are being circulated online, such as photos, video blogs, 
web comics, and podcasts, as well as derivative works such as fan fiction, fan art, mods, 
mashups, remixes, and fansubbing‖.
557
 
These expression and digital production are shaping forms of new media 
literacies.
558
 The so-called new media literacies are a set of social skills and cultural 
competencies.
559
 The new skills include:  
―Appropriation - The ability to meaningfully sample and remix media 
content. 
Multitasking - The ability to scan the environment and shift focus onto 
salient details. 
Distributed cognition - The ability to interact meaningfully with tools that 
expand mental capacities. 
Collective intelligence - The ability to pool knowledge and compare notes 
with others toward a common goal. 
Judgment - The ability to evaluate the reliability and credibility of different 
information sources. 
Transmedia navigation - The ability to follow the flow of stories and 
information across multiple modalities. 
Networking - The ability to search for, synthesize, and disseminate 
information. 
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Negotiation - The ability to travel across diverse communities, discerning 




Re-creators are also developing technical competencies and media skills by 
involving with multiple technical or creative communities.
561
 These skills are essential in 




This chapter proposes that re-creations and their online culture are beneficial to 
individuals and the society at large due to the three principles: creativity, freedom of 
speech and the public interest. 
The public interest and copyright are interrelated since the 18
th
 century. The 
interests of the public in copyright are basically the interest in dissemination of works to 
the public and the interest in access and use of works by the public which contribute to the 
advancement of society. In the 21
st
 century, copyright and the public interest are becoming 
increasingly unbalanced. This is due to several significant factors. Firstly, the internet and 
technologies have caused a rapid societal and cultural change. Due to the digital 
environment, the scope and term of copyright protection has been expanded. It has also 
been extended by strengthening the exclusive rights and enforcement mechanisms (such as 
notice and take down regime) which have an adverse effect on the online creative 
activities, free speech and the public interest in access to protected works. Moreover, 
online re-creations are new forms of creative expression with strong social values. The 
public interests in the creative culture are similar to those in copyright; they are the 
interests in creativity, free expression, learning and self-development, and societal and 





 Mizuko Ito, et al., Hanging Out, Messing Around, and Geeking Out: Kids Living and Learning with New 




cultural benefits. Though copyright and online re-creations are both beneficial to society, 
copyright stifles creative re-uses of protected works.  
It is vital to balance the conflicting interests; mainly the interests of copyright 
owners, the public interest in dissemination of works and the public interest in access and 
use of copyright works. The need to balance these interests was recognised and led to the 
implementation of limitations and exceptions to copyright protection. Nevertheless, from 
the above analysis, the benefits of the online re-creation culture are significantly ignored 
in the current balance. In the next chapter, this thesis will provide a critical analysis of the 
existing copyright exceptions which are most pertinent to the practice of re-creation. It 
will then conclude that the exceptions are insufficient to safeguard the rights of the re-
creators and the public interest in the digital environment, and therefore fail to achieve a 















CHAPTER 4 - Insufficient Copyright Exceptions and 
Limitations  
 In the 21
st
 century, copyright strives to keep pace with the change of technology 
and society by significantly expanding its power. The strong copyright protection creates 
severe constraints on creative re-creations. Since re-creations fundamentally involve 
copying the original content and the re-creators tend to share works on internet platforms, 
these online activities potentially infringe the exclusive rights of the original owners 
particularly the rights to reproduction and communication. Copyright enforcing tools such 
as the notice and takedown mechanism have an immediate impact on re-creations.
562
 
Copyright law that should encourage new creativity and endorse the right to free speech 
has now restrained creative re-uses of existing works. The exclusive rights of copyright 




In an attempt to balance copyright with the public interest, there are certain 
defences to copyright infringement to allow limited use of protected work without 
authorisation of the right holder. Exemptions to the reproduction right are permitted by 
Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention and Article 13 of the TRIPS agreement. The so-
called ―three-step test‖ permits copyright limitations and exceptions
564
 ―in certain special 
cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.‖
565
 A 
significant copyright exception is for private use allowing a copy of protected works for 
individual‘s personal use. Private use exceptions are important; however, re-creations are 
usually communicated online to reach the widest audience; in such situation, online re-
creators cannot avail themselves of private copying limitations. Among permitted uses of 
copyright works, this chapter will specifically study some copyright exceptions pertinent 
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to online creative re-uses in the main jurisdictions studied, i.e., the US fair use doctrine, 
the UK fair dealing, the German concept of free use, the UGC exception in Canada and 
parody exceptions in different national laws. It will critically analyse whether the relevant 
statutory exceptions to copyright have accomplished a proper balance. 
 
4.1 Fair Use Doctrine of the US 
“The fair use model is not a panacea for solving difficult problems resulting from 
digitization and the internet.”
566
 
 The US fair use doctrine
567
 aims to allow the use of copyright protected works that 
is fair.
568
 It was originally articulated in judicial decisions
569
 before being codified into 
Section 107 of the US Copyright Act which guarantees ―that new ideas, or new 
expressions of old ideas, would be accessible to the public‖.
570
 
 Section 107 of the US Copyright Act reads as follows: 
―Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of 
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
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infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work 
in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use 
if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.‖ 
 
4.1.1 Fair use problem of uncertainty 
 The first part of the fair use statute illustrates the purposes of the use, though not 
limitative
571
; the second sentence contains the four criteria which must be interpreted 
together.
572
 The four factors are not exclusive
573
; they will be evaluated and ―weighed 
together, in light of the purposes of copyright‖.
574
 
 The US Congress explicitly gave a very broad statutory explanation of the 
doctrine, thus leaving courts free to adapt the fair use principle to particular situations on a 
case-by-case basis.
575
 Also, due to the lack of judicial consensus on the underlying 
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principles, fair use decisions are notoriously difficult to predict.
576
 Madison criticises that 
fair use is merely ―a lottery argument‖;
577
 while Lessig marks fair use as ―the right to hire 
a lawyer‖
578
 to defend one‘s right to create. Lessig is also concerned that a fair use claim 
―costs too much, it delivers too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection to 
the justice underlying the claim.‖
579
 Netanel comments that ―[g]iven the doctrine‘s open-
ended, case-specific cast and inconsistent application, it is exceedingly difficult to predict 
whether a given use in a given case will qualify as the sort of transformative self-
expression that enjoys the [fair use] privilege‖.
580
 Though some scholars suggest that fair 
use is predictable and coherent by an analysis of fair use case law
581
, the complex factors 
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involved and the influence of the obscure notion of transformativeness still cause 
uncertainty about what uses are fair and what are not
582
. 
 Apart from the vagueness of fair use law, the absence of case law concerning 
online re-creations especially fan works leaves a high uncertainty in this area.
583
 Due to 
this legal indeterminacy, re-creators may not be assured that they will succeed in claiming 
that their use of an original work is fair. As analysed in chapter 2, online re-creations can 
easily be taken down by the DMCA mechanism; due to the risk of litigation, online re-
creators would give up on their re-creations and avoid using protected materials in a way 




4.1.2 Obscure nature of „transformativeness‟ 
 In determining the first fair use factor, ‗the purpose and character of the use‘, 
courts take into consideration whether the challenged use was commercial and whether the 
use was transformative. A use of the original work is less likely to be fair when it has a 
commercial character. However, the transformative nature of the subsequent work 
overrides the other factors. The more transformative the work is, the less important the 
other factors including the commercial nature become. From a number of cases, it can be 
summarised that if the alleged work has a high transformative value, then such work can 
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Prince does not seem to care much about possible copyright infringement from making and selling the 
works. Most interestingly, general people and the owners of the original photos are perplexed whether 
Prince‘s use of those pictures are fair under the US fair use law. The issue on the US fair use uncertainty 
particularly in regard to commercial parody is discussed further below in chapter 4.4.2. 
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be a fair use regardless of any commercial objective.
585
 The judge-made phrase 
‗transformative use‘
586
 has therefore become a fundamental and significant constituent of 
the fair use analysis.
587
  
 There is no clear definition of what constitutes transformative use.
588
 The 
―transformative purpose‖ approach creates even more confusion in an already 
indeterminate fair use law.
589
 Some guideline of what transformative use is can be found 
in judicial decisions. From the Supreme Court decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music
590
, a new creation is ‗transformative‘ if it does not merely ―supersede the 
objects‖
591
 of the original work but instead ―adds something new, with a further purpose 
or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message‖.
592
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 For instance, the parody version of the song Oh, Pretty Woman was decided to be transformative and 
therefore was found to be fair use in spite of its commercial character. (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994)). See also Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998), 
Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001), Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F. 
3d 894 (9
th
 Cir. 2002), Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp.2d 315 (2002), Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 
811 (9th Cir. 2003), Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F. 3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003), Blanch v 
Koons, 467 F.2d 206 (2nd Cir, 2006), Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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 The term ‗transformative‘ was introduced in a commentary, „Toward a Fair Use Standard‟ 1990, by 
Judge Pierre Leval and was subsequently applied and cited for determining a landmark fair use case in 1994. 
See Pierre Leval, ‗Toward a fair use standard‘ (1989) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
587
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Justice Story. Fair and bona fide abridgment of an original work is not a piracy provided that there is ―real, 
substantial condensation of the materials and intellectual labor and judgment‖, not merely an extracts or 
different arrangement of original works. (Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 
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confines of copyright‖. (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (citing Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984)). 
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 Defining the meaning of transformative use is problematic. (Thomas Cotter, ‗Transformative Use and 
Cognizable Harm‘ (2010) 12 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 701, Part II). 
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 ―[I]nconsistent application of the transformative use test produces conflicting judicial opinions and 
uncertainty for future litigants.‖ (Tracey Gonzalez, ‗Distinguishing the Derivative from the Transformative: 
Expanding Market-Based Inquiries in Fair Use Adjudications‘ (2003) 21 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 229, 
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170. 
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 Justice Story‘s words in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) which 
were cited by Judge Pierre Leval and recited in the Campbell case. 
592




 In conventional sense, for a work to be transformative, new elements of some form 
of intellectual expression should be inserted into the new work. At first sight, this looks 
like a requirement for creativity. However, the meaning of the word ‗transformative‘ has 
been stretched
593
, beyond creative alteration of the content of an earlier work, to permit 
some uses despite their non-creative reproduction of the original content.
594
 Nevertheless, 
notwithstanding its broad boundary, transformativeness is insufficient to permit online re-
creations. The concept of transformativeness does not concentrate on the creativity of the 
new work. Instead it rather focuses on the ‗purpose‘ of the new work; whether the new 
work performs a different function or purpose from the original work regardless of the 
alterations of the content of the original material.
595
  
  A subsequent work absent creative reworking of the original work can be 
qualified as transformative if only it has a function or purpose different from the original. 
For example, in Nunez v. Caribbean International News Corp, a use of an entire set of 
modeling photos on a newspaper without permission of the copyright holders of the 
photos was found to be fair.
596
 The Appeal Court ruled that such use was transformative 
giving a reason that ―what is important here is that plaintiffs‘ photographs were originally 
intended to appear in modeling portfolios, not in the newspaper…‖
597
 The court also 
disposed of the third fair use factor, amount and substantiality of the use, disregarding the 
use of the photos in their entirety.
598
 Also, in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corporation
599
 and 
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Fordham L. Rev. 2537, 2555-2556. 
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Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com
600
, the use of thumbnail images, copies of copyrighted images 
which were modified only by being reduced in both size and resolution by an automated 
process to facilitate the operation of an image search engine, was considered to be highly 
transformative. The court found that such use provided ―social benefit‖
601
 by enhancing 
internet searching techniques. It had illustrative or artistic purposes and did ―not supplant 
the need for the originals‖
602
. In these two cases, a search engine did not transform or 
modify the content of the copyrighted work; however, ―even making an exact copy of a 
work may be transformative so long as the copy serves a different function than the 
original work‖
603
. Thus, in an analysis of transformativeness, courts tend to focus on the 
transformative purpose of the challenged work rather than on whether the defendant has 
transformed the actual content of the original work.
604
 
 The notion of transformativeness is therefore so broad that it may cover a verbatim 
reproduction of copyright protected work involving none or minimal creativity. In 
contrast, some works with high level of creativity on the part of the re-creator might not be 
qualified as a fair use. A subsequent work which involves new creative elements but 
whose purpose of re-creation does not concern the original underlying work may not be 
considered as transformative.
605
 In Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books, the 
defendants‘ book, The Cat NOT in the Hat!, was written and illustrated based on the style 
of the children‘s book by Dr. Seuss, The Cat in the Hat, to criticise the O.J. Simpson 
murder trial, not the underlying work. Despite the transformation of content, the 
defendant‘s use was not ―transformative‖ because the work was a satire (rather than a 
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 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
601
 Ibid (citing Campbell). 
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 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).  
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 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007). 
604
 From an analysis of 31 fair use cases, Reese concludes that courts decided that ―the transformativeness 
inquiry weighed in favor of fair use, regardless of whether the court viewed the defendant as having 
transformed the actual content of the plaintiffs work in any way‖ (R. Anthony Reese, ‗Transformativeness 
and the Derivative Work Right‘ (2008) 31 Colum. J. L. & Arts 467, 485). 
605
 Although, comparing to parody, satire usually weighs against fair use, the court may find a satire use fair 
because of some other reasons such as the aim of copyright right law in promoting the useful arts that 
original and separate expression in the satire work should be encouraged. (See e.g. Blanch v Koons, 467 






, a critique of the original work).
607
 The distinction between satire and parody for 
the fair use analysis is discussed further in chapter 4.4. 
 Comparing the thumbnail image cases with the Dr. Seuss case, in terms of 
creativity level of the new works, the almost exact copy of the original works like 
thumbnail images were found to be transformative; while satire tends not to be considered 
as transformative despite its creativity. This demonstrates that a fair use analysis is not 
required to concentrate on creative re-creation of the new work. Moreover, courts, at their 
discretion, can take into account additional non-statutory considerations upon a policy 
concern for a particular situation which could weigh against or in favour of fair use.
608
 
This once again renders fair use complicated to predict. 
 
4.1.3 Online re-creations and fair uses 
Under the fair use exception, parody is regularly held to amount to fair use
609
, and 
thus parodic re-creations are likely considered as fair. However, other types of online re-
creations are problematic. Since there are various types of online re-creations, each re-
creation must be decided on its own facts for a fair use enquiry.  
 To illustrate, applying the first fair use factors, transformative and commercial 
nature of the use, an online re-creation is most likely to be transformative if it constitutes a 
criticism of and comments upon the underlying work by adding new meaning to the 
original work and conveying  new messages.
610
 The re-creator may input his originality 
                                                          
 
606
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copyright law.‖ (Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
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and creativity into the borrowed characters and universe with elaboration and devotion. A 
transformative re-creation can be a written fan fiction using original fictional characters 
and/or settings (for example, Harry Potter and Hermione at Hogwarts School) in a new 
adventure distinct from the original story. It can also be a video mash-up of two movies to 
illustrate a fighting scene between the characters from the two different stories with a 
unique storyline such as a battle in which Lord Voldemort was defeated by a Jedi. Unlike 
fan fiction and mash-up, fansubbing and scanlation typically involve little or no creative 
input and do not convey new messages or meaning different from the incorporated work; 
thus, they may not be transformative. Regarding commercialism, if an online re-creation 
has a commercial purpose, this could weigh against fair use. Fan works are primarily non-
commercial and not-for-profit.
611
 However, if the re-creation is found to be highly 
transformative, it can still be fair use regardless of its commercial nature.
612
 With the 
absence of judicial decisions concerning these re-creations, it is not an easy task to 
speculate or determine whether a use of an existing work for online re-creation weighs 
against or in favour of the first fair use factor. 
 Under the second factor, the nature of copyrighted work, fictional sources have 
stronger protection than factual works and published stories get more protection than the 
unpublished.
613
 Since online re-creations (particularly fan works
614
 and parody) are almost 
always created based on popular culture which are published fictional works, the second 
factor therefore may not be advantages for a re-creation in the fair use enquiry.  
 As for the third factor, courts should consider the amount and substantiality of 
original elements that have been used whether the subsequent work copied too much of 
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the original quantitatively and qualitatively.
615
 This factor is problematic for most online 
re-creations. While fan fiction may borrow merely fictional characters (whose status under 
copyright is controversial
616
) and/or original plots and settings from a popular work 
without verbatim copying, fanvids and mash-ups usually include literal copying of some 
scenes from a movie with an entirety of a sound track. Without taking some elements from 
the original, the works would not be a fan fiction or fanvid
617
 and these re-creations would 
not exist in the cultural and intellectual domains for the benefits of the individuals and 
society. Besides, drawing a clear bright line of permissible amount of copyrighted work 
that can be used would never be possible. This factor is therefore very difficult to 
determine and can be disadvantageous to a plenty of creative re-creations. 
 Regarding the fourth factor, the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work, many people think that an online re-creation can yield a 
positive effect on the market of the original work e.g. it can act as an advertisement for the 
original work and boost the sale of the original work.
618
 Fan fiction, for instance, can be 
seen as free advertisement and promotion or an enhancement of the market of the official 
products yielding a positive effect rather than harm.
619
 However, there are some concerns 
that altering the original content e.g. fictional character in such a way that it involves 
offensive materials and explicit sexual relationship could possibly lower the value of the 
protected work.
 620
 This depends on the case in question whether an adverse effect upon 
the original work occurs. 
 In summary, the second fair use factor would always be disadvantageous for 
creative re-uses. Apart from parody, fan fiction
621
 seems more likely to be fair than other 
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types of re-creations as it usually incorporates non-literal fragments of an original work, 
involves new story with one‘s own writing skills that could be in favour of the first and 
third factors. Typically, video re-creations like fanvid and mash-up include verbatim copy 
of audio/visual components of original works weighing against the third factor of fair use. 
Once again, it should always be noted that a fair use application is subject to a 
specific-fact case. Although, the US fair use exception aims to allow some uses of 
copyright protected works for the interest of the public, it has the giant problem of 
uncertainty of its application
622
 and does not sufficiently safeguard free expression of 
online re-creators in using existing materials to produce new creative works.  
 
4.2 Exceptions and Limitations under the EU law 
Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive allows the EU member states to introduce 
copyright exceptions for limited purposes including private copying of copyright content 
in return for a fair compensation to the right holders623 and use for the purpose of 
caricature, parody or pastiche624. This part of the chapter will study the national laws of 
two EU member states, the UK and Germany, to provide a critical analysis of the 
copyright exceptions and limitations pertinent to online re-creation practice in the 
common law and civil law system.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
should therefore clarify that these fan uses are fair by adding ―non-commercial and transformative use‖ to 
the preamble of the fair use statute.  (Patrick McKay, ‗Culture of the Future‘ (2011) 24 Regent U.L. Rev. 
117). 
622
 ―Depending on one‘s viewpoint, … fan works are protected by fair use if they are transformative enough 
– or if they do not affect the marketplace. But because each fan work requires an individualized 
determination through the fair use factors, uncertainty persists. And especially now, whether a work is 
parody versus satire) or of high quality matters more than ever before.‖ (Raizel Liebler, ‗Copyright and 
ownership of fan created works: fanfiction and beyond‘ in Matthew David and Debora Halbert (eds), The 
SAGE Handbook of Intellectual Property (Sage 2015) 396). 
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4.2.1 UK fair dealing 
Under the UK copyright law, fair dealing doctrine provides exceptions or 
limitations upon the copyright owner‘s exclusive rights. Fair dealing was first developed 
by English courts and consequently codified in the UK Copyright Act 1911 providing fair 
dealing for the purposes of ―private study, research, criticism, review, or newspaper 
summary‖.
625
 The Commonwealth countries also adopted the fair dealing model into their 
copyright laws.
626
 While many of those countries evolved fair dealing provisions over the 
past century
627
, the subsequent UK legislations retained fair dealing without significant 
amendments until 2014. The UK fair dealing provisions remained antecedent but outdated 
in the digital age.  
In December 2006, the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property
628
 recommended 
that the UK should create copyright exceptions for the purposes of private copying and 
caricature, parody
629
 or pastiche. The proposed amendments would be in compliance with 
the EU legislation, Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive, which allows the EU member states 
to provide for exceptions and limitations in relation to the use of copyright materials for 
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the purposes of private use
630
 and for caricature, parody or pastiche.
631
 The UK 
Government accepted the Gowers‘ recommendations
632
 but did not succeed to adapt them 
into the copyright framework. Later in May 2011, following the Gowers‘ Review, the 
Hargreaves Report states that the UK exceptions failed to keep up with the change of 
technology and society and there was the need for copyright exceptions for private 
copying and parody.
633
 In regard to limits to copyright, Hargreaves recommended that: 
―[The UK] Government should firmly resist over-regulation of activities 
which do not prejudice the central objective of copyright, namely the 
provision of incentives to creators. Government should deliver copyright 
exceptions at national level to realise all the opportunities within the EU 




 In the attempt to render the UK‘s copyright framework conform to the digital 









 and fair 
dealing for the purposes of caricature, parody or pastiche
639
. The parody exception in the 
UK is discussed in detail below in chapter 4.4. However, following a judicial review in 
June 2015, the High Court quashed the regulations
640
 introducing the private copying 
                                                          
 
630
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(Article 5(2)(b), InfoSoc Directive).  
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exception due to the lack of fair compensation to rights holders rendering the new 
provision incompatible with the requirement under the EU InfoSoc Directive, Article 
5(2)(b).
641
  As a result, acts of private copying still constitute infringements under the UK 
law.
642
 Regarding online re-creations, even if the private copying exception was viable, it 
would only legitimise private re-creations but does not allow distribution of that re-
creation on the internet. 
 Apart from parody (and private use), the UK does not recognise the importance to 
legalise other forms of re-creations. In his independent review of UK intellectual property, 
Gowers has proposed that it is important to enable creators to rework existing materials 
for transformative use by making it an exemption.
643
 Since it is not one of the exceptions 
and limitations permitted in the InfoSoc Directive, Gowers recommended that the UK 
government should take steps to create an exception of copyright for transformative 
work
644
 by seeking to amend the EU InfoSoc Directive to allow such an exception to be 
adopted in the UK.
645
 Nevertheless, the UK Government and Hargreaves had ignored the 
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 The UK Government failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence that permitted use would be de minimis 
harm to rightholders thus compensation is not required. (British Academy of Songwriters and others v 
Secretary of State for Business, innovation and skills [2015] EWHC 1723; [2015] EWHC 2041 by Mr 
Justice Green.) 
642
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‗Quashing of private copying exception‘ (Gov.uk, 20 July 2015) 
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645
 Andrew Gowers, Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (HM Treasury, December 2006) 
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The EU and UK approach for user-generated content 
In 2008, the European Commission issued a Green Paper, ‗Copyright in the 
Knowledge Economy‘
647
, opened floor for discussion and debate on copyright exceptions 
in the context of best dissemination of knowledge in the online environment. The Green 
Paper explored whether a specific exception for user-created content
648
 should be added to 
the EU InfoSoc Directive. The 2008 Green Paper was followed by a consultation in 2013 
on the review of the EU copyright regime in the digital environment including a possible 
exception on user-generated content.
649
 
In response to the consultation paper, the UK Government rejected the proposed 
change for a possible user-generated content exception.
650
 It expressed a concern that 
―such an exception might allow others to use works in a way that the existing rights 
holders do not approve of and the impact that exceptions in this area might have on 
remuneration.‖ It further suggested that improving licensing of copyright material by right 
holders and creators to enable use of such works online may provide solutions as some 
success had been shown in negotiating such agreements for example Creative Commons 
licence for YouTube users. Lastly, it stated that ―[i]n considering any possible exceptions 
in this area it is important to consider carefully the potential impact on existing rights 
holders, in terms of both commercial and non-commercial [user-generated content].‖ The 
UK standpoint on this issue is obviously a right holder-centric view. The UK Government 
gave much weigh on the protection of the exclusive rights of copyright owners while 
disregarding the interest and expectations of the users and the interest of general public in 
accessing existing materials and making new creative works.  
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Besides, leaving the companies and right holders to manage licensing to people to 
use their works does not convincingly provide a fair solution on the matter. There are 
practical problems on the current licensing regime as criticised in chapters 2.2 and 
empirically evidenced in chapter 5.2.2. Predictably only a small number of copyright 
owners and corporates would agree to such licence as it ultimately depends on their free 
will. Moreover, the copyright holder party will have a dominant power as the owner of 
content while users have no negotiating power. Normally, online re-creators cannot afford 
to pay high royalty fees and transaction costs may make mass-market low value licensing 
ineffective. As a result, user-generated content remains potentially infringing. Hence the 
conflict between the exclusive right of use of protected materials and access to such works 
will not be solved only by the right holders on their own; the public sector and policy 
makers need to step in.  
In 2012, the European Commission communicates its concern on user-generated 
content that:  
―The Commission‘s objective is to foster transparency and ensure that end-
users have greater clarity on legitimate and non-legitimate uses of protected 
material, and easier access to legitimate solutions. Content generated by users 
themselves is often covered by some form of licensing by rights holders, in 
partnership with certain platforms. However the scale and coverage of such 
licences is not transparent to the end user. Furthermore, such arrangements 
create rights and obligations for the contractual partners, but do not 
necessarily provide legal certainty to the end-users.‖
651
 
It recognised the importance to ―identify the extent to which user-generated 
content is licensed to relevant platforms, and identify how to ensure that end-users are 
informed about what is legal and illicit use on the internet‖
652
 but does not consider 
whether a specific copyright exception should be implemented. 
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Later in 2013, the EU commission has launched a specific Working Group on the 
issue of user-generated content in the framework of the ‗Licences for Europe‘ stakeholder 
dialogue. Concerning user-generated content discussion, there was no consensus among 
participating stakeholders. While one suggested that a new exception for UGC is 




As a result of the Working Group discussion, European associations declared that 
press publishers across Europe are committed to ―engaging with readers and improving 
the user experience, including via the uptake of User Generated Content (UGC) in their 
online publications and services, giving a voice to users as well as enhancing their 
professional content offering.‖
654
 They also declare the importance of improving the user 
experience and involvement and of improving information about both what users can do 
with press publishers‘ content and what press publishers can do with users‘ content. The 
declaration seems to lead to a good practice for the interest of both copyright holders and 
users; however, this would rather succeed in a small area of service (i.e. press publishers) 
comparing to the current global practice of user-generated content or re-creations in the 
digital world.  
 In summary, the UK attempted to amend its copyright law to keep pace with the 
change in the digital age. It has successfully added some copyright exceptions into its 
legislation for the benefits of users and society in accessing to protected works for 
example by implementing a parody exception. Nevertheless, it rejected the possibility to 
include an exception of copyright concerning other types of online re-creations. The UK 
standpoint on this matter is passive. The existing copyright exception under the UK law is 
insufficient to balance the conflicting rights and interests. In regard to the parody 
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exemption, the meaning of parody within the EU and subsequently UK law is too 
restrictive. This issue is critically analysed below in chapter 4.4. 
 
4.2.2 Free use doctrine in Germany 
German copyright law
655
 provides exceptions to authors‘ economic rights in 









 and free utilisation or free use
660
. In 
regard to re-creations distributed online, this thesis will specifically examine the free use 
exception.  
Article 24 of the German Copyright Law (Urheberrechtsgesetz) labelled ―free 
use‖
661
 (freie Benutzung) provides that ―[a]n independent work created by free use of the 
work of another person may be published and exploited without the consent of the author 
of the used work.‖
662
 However, it does not apply to ―the use of a musical work where a 
melody has been recognisably borrowed from the work and used as a basis for a new 
work.‖
663
 The ―free use‖ doctrine may allow the creation and exploitation of an entirely 
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new work inspired by another work, so long as the subsequent work is sufficiently 
distanced from the protected core of the original work.
664
 
 In a leading free use decision, Alcolix case, the plaintiffs claimed that the 
defendant‘s comic, Wrong play with Alcolix: The parody (Falsches Spiel mit Alcolix. Die 
Parodie), was an unlawful adaptation of the Asterix series infringing copyright by 
transforming the main characters of the Asterix series, Asterix and Obelix, into the main 
protagonists of the comic named Alcolix and Obenix. The defendant contended that his 
work was a parody sufficiently distanced from the used work. The German Federal 
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof or ―BGH‖) laid down the principle that, under article 
24 of the German Copyright Act, free use of an earlier work can only be fulfilled where 
the borrowed personal creative features of the previous work have faded in the new work. 
This is generally established where the personal creative features of the pre-existing 
copyrighted work become minimised in the new work to the extent that the personal traits 
merely appeared as a stimulus for a new, independent creative work.
665
 The Federal 
Supreme Court remitted the case to the lower court to examine the question whether an 
infringement of copyright could be established by applying the tests indicated. Since 
Alcolix and Obenix appeared visually as the original characters with minimal differences 
along with numerous details from the Asterix series and the District High Court of Munich 
considered that the pictures and characters from Asterix were not portrayed in a ridiculous 
or satirical way, an infringement of copyright would be found.
666
 
The decisive factor for the free use assessment is therefore the difference or 
distance maintained between the utilised personal features of the work used and the new 
independent work.  The distance can also be achieved by the new work‘s original, creative 
                                                          
 
664
 The German concept of free use is interpreted by the courts in a number of cases discussed below. The 
core of the ―free use‖ provision is that a work can be freely used to create an individual new work without 
infringing economic rights of the original owner under certain criteria, for example, that in the subsequent 
work the characteristic features of the earlier work fade or disappear. 
665
 Alcolix/Asterix case, BGH, 11 March 1993; (1994) GRUR 206; (1994) 25 IIC 605.  
666
 See, e.g., Karl H. Pilny, ‗Germany: copyright: protection of comic strips under Copyright Law – 
―Alcolix‖/ ―Asterix‖ - parodies ‗ (1995) 17(7) EIPR D198; ‗Germany: Copyright Act, Secs. 2, 23, 24 – 
―Alcolix‖‘ (1994) 15(4) IIC 605; Paul Edward Geller, ‗A German Approach to Fair Use: Test Cases for 




content or by personal creative effort of the creator of the new work such that the nature of 
the new work is considered independent, although the specific features of the earlier work 
remains recognisable in the new work. Such ―inner distance‖ (innerer Abstand) can be 
attained where the new work argues with the previous work, for instance, in the case of 
parody. However, the Federal Supreme Court in Alcolix has clarified that, to provide space 
for freedom of artistic expression with regard to article 5(3) of the German Constitution
667
, 
the boundary of free use provision is not limited to satirical or parodic works but can also 
include other forms of artistic discourse. Thus, the article 24 of the free use doctrine would 
not be construed too restrictively.  
In a parallel case, Asterix Parodies
668
, the German Federal Supreme Court 
affirmed the decisive criterion of free use assessment that the borrowed peculiar features 
of the pre-existing copyright work must fade into the background in the new work by 
personal creative content.
669
  The ―fading out‖ requirement was also applied in the case of 
Laras Tochter.  
In Laras Tochter
670
, the novel entitled Laras Tochter (a German translation of 
Lara‟s Child) was an adaptation of the novel Dr Zhivago in the form of a sequel. It 
incorporated a large extent of the fictional world including the characters, storyline, 
settings and decisive events from Dr Zhivago. The Federal Supreme Court held that the 
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literary material in Laras Tochter which appropriated from Dr. Zhivago did not fade in the 
new work; therefore established a copyright infringement. It found that ―[t]he borrowings 
from Dr Zhivago go far beyond mere references to characters and events which would be 
unobjectionable from the copyright viewpoint and are not absorbed in Lara's Child as an 
independent work with an appropriate ―inner distance‖ from its model.‖
 671
 
The Court summarised the free use principle that
672
: 
―The question whether a new independent work has been created by the free 
use of a protected earlier work depends on the distance which the new work 
keeps from the borrowed personal features of the used work. The criterion 
to be applied for this purpose must not be too moderate. Therefore free use 
means that the borrowed personal features of the protected earlier work fade 
away in view of the originality of the new work.
 
In other words, as a rule the 
personal features borrowed from the protected earlier work recede in such a 
way that the new work no longer makes significant use of the earlier, so that 
the latter appears only to have suggested the creation of a new independent 
work.‖ 
―The distances to be kept from the borrowed personal features of the used 
work for the purpose of free use may also be seen, even in the case of clear 
borrowings, in the fact that the new work keeps such a great ―inner 
distance‖ from those features that it must be regarded as independent by 
nature. Even in such a case the borrowed personal features of the earlier 
work fade away, in a wider sense, in the new one: they are ―overlaid‖ by the 
original content of the new work.‖  
 Regarding a use of fictional characters in creating a new independent work, the 
German Federal Supreme Court held that the film, ‗The Man Who Was Sherlock Holmes‘ 
in which Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson acted out different roles in a comic vein was 
not an infringement but a free utilisation.
673
 Though a use of an existing copyright work 
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for parody has a stronger chance to be free under article 24
674
, taking literary characters 
from a novel to write a fan fiction may also constitute free utilisation provided that the 
required conditions are met; for instance, if the characters taken
675
 are merely evoked by 
names in dissimilar stories distanced from the original universe such that the fan fiction is 
an independent creative work. Therefore, a mere retelling of the old stories would not 
constitute a free use.
676
 Whereas in case of fanvid, machinima, mash-up and virtual world 
in which exact original pictures and videos are used, it would be more difficult to 
determine whether the features of the materials used have faded in the new works. An 
inner distance can possibly be identified if the intellectual content of the new work is so 
creative that it diminishes the personal creative features of the original work. 
Nevertheless, the free use statute explicitly stated that the doctrine does not apply to ―the 
use of a musical work where a melody has been recognizably borrowed from the work and 
used as a basis for a new work.‖
677
 This would be problematic for viddings, machinimas 
and other forms of audio-visual re-creations where the re-creators incorporate a song or a 
soundtrack to the videos.  
In conclusion, the German doctrine of free utilisation allows existing copyright 
works to be freely used if the subsequent work is sufficiently distanced from the personal 
features of the original work. Though a parodic work is likely to be found as a free use 
since it argues with the underlying work, the German courts have broadly interpreted the 
doctrine in accordance with the basic right to freedom of expression under its Constitution 
to include other types of works depending on the distance between the two works. 
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However, online re-creations other than parody such as fanvid, machinima, mash-up and 
virtual world may not be qualified as free uses; particularly where the new work 
incorporated a piece of music protected by copyright. 
 
4.3 UGC Exception and User Rights in Canada 
Canadian copyright law is derived from the ―copyright‖ tradition of economic 
rights inherited from English common law and associated with moral rights with a ―droit 
d'auteur” civil law tradition influenced from France.
678
 The Copyright Act of Canada 
therefore reflects both common law and civil law roots. The Act provides fair dealing 
exemptions from copyright infringement for those who deal fairly with copyright 
protected works for the purpose of research, private study, education, parody or satire.
679
 It 
is also fair to deal with original works for the purpose of criticism, review
680
, or news 
reporting
681
 provided that the source and the name of the original author are mentioned 
safeguarding the author‘s moral right of attribution. Though there is no statutory test for 
fairness
682
, some factors can be considered for the assessment of fair dealing: the purpose 
of the dealing; the character of the dealing; the amount of the dealing; alternatives of the 
dealing; the nature of the work; and the effect of the dealing on the work.
683
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4.3.1 Canada‟s exception for non-commercial user-generated content 
The Canadian Copyright Modernization Act or Bill C-11
684
, which came into force 
on 7 November 2012, made some significant changes
685
 to the Copyright Act including 
adding fair dealing provision for the purpose of parody and satire
686
 and granting 







. For the purpose of this thesis, the pertinent new exception is Section 
29.21, a new exception intended to specifically legalise ―non-commercial user-generated 
content‖ (UGC), which provides:   
―Non-commercial User-generated Content 
29.21 (1) It is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to use an 
existing work or other subject-matter or copy of one, which has been 
published or otherwise made available to the public, in the creation of a new 
work or other subject-matter in which copyright subsists and for the 
individual — or, with the individual‘s authorization, a member of their 
household — to use the new work or other subject-matter or to authorize an 
intermediary to disseminate it, if 
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(a) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or other 
subject-matter is done solely for non-commercial purposes; 
(b) the source — and, if given in the source, the name of the author, 
performer, maker or broadcaster — of the existing work or other subject-
matter or copy of it are mentioned, if it is reasonable in the circumstances to 
do so; 
(c) the individual had reasonable grounds to believe that the existing work 
or other subject-matter or copy of it, as the case may be, was not infringing 
copyright; and 
(d) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or other 
subject-matter does not have a substantial adverse effect, financial or 
otherwise, on the exploitation or potential exploitation of the existing work 
or other subject-matter — or copy of it — or on an existing or potential 
market for it, including that the new work or other subject-matter is not a 
substitute for the existing one.‖ 







 exception; however, these terms are inaccurate. These 
exact words are not included in the statutory language. The provision allows individuals, 
under certain requirements, to incorporate existing copyright materials in the creation of 
new works including but not limited to mash-ups or user-generated videos distributed on 
YouTube, nor limited to online or digital uses. Also, though ―user-generated content‖ or 
―UGC‖ is labelled in the sub-heading of the Act, the definition of ―UGC‖ remains 
ambiguous
693
. UGC may cover both pure original works and re-creations which are 
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usually created and posted online by internet users.
694
 In this thesis, to avoid 
misunderstanding and confusion, the Canadian provision will be identified as the ―Section 
29.21‖. 
The scope of the Section 29.21 is not clearly determined; thus needs interpretation 
by the courts. The exception allows a Canadian individual meaning a natural person not a 
corporate entity to use
695
 publicly available subject-matter to make a new copyright work 
without infringing copyright of the underlying work. It also permits dissemination of the 
new work both in offline and online forms. The Canadian Government roughly describes 
that:  
―Examples include making a home video of a friend or family member 
dancing to a popular song and posting it online, or creating a ‗mash-up‘ of 
video clips. This provision would not permit such activities as simply 
adding a few lines to an e-book or a brief introduction to a song and then 
posting the copy for free online, or re-ordering the tracks on an album and 
selling CDs at a flea market.‖
696
  
The Section 29.21 exempts copyright liability of an unauthorised use of existing 
works provided that certain conditions are met: 
a. The original work has been published or otherwise made available to the 
public. 
This can be seen as a requirement to safeguard the right of the original author to 
control first publication of his work. According to the copyright law of Canada, if the 
work is unpublished, the copyright holder has the sole right to publish the work.
697
 Since 
the Canadian copyright law is also influenced by France, this requirement links to the 
author‘s moral right of divulgation right under the French law which provides that ―the 
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author alone shall have the right to divulge his work. He shall determine the method of 
disclosure and shall fix the conditions thereof… ‖
698
  
b. The new work has copyright. 
The use of existing work must be for the creation of a new work in which 
copyright subsists. This demonstrates that the new work must have the degree of 
originality and creative effort required for such protection. To obtain copyright under the 
law of Canada, a work must be an original literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic work.
699
 
For a work to be original, it must be more than a mere copy of another work. It does not 
need to be novel or unique but must represent a sufficient exercise of ―skill and 
judgment‖.
700
 For example, a mash up creator does not merely copy the existing works but 
select, compile, and arrange clips, test different arrangements and choose the combination 
of his discretion. It is therefore entitled to copyright protection. The copyright subsistence 
requirement of the Section 29.21 of Canada is similar to the US fair use doctrine of 
transformativeness as they both consider the originality and creativity contributed to the 
new work. 
c. The use of the new work is solely for non-commercial purposes.  
The meaning of ―non-commercial purpose‖ is not defined in the Copyright Act. 
This leaves much obscure. For example, would it include gaining revenue from 
advertisement and donation? Will the non-commercial purpose be judged when the 
individual first uses the work, or will it be judged each time he uses the work?
701
 This 
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requirement differs from the US fair use which allows commercial transformative use of 
existing works. If a similar situation in the fair use landmark case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, occurs in Canada, the defendants, the makers and sellers of the parody song, Pretty 
Woman, would not be able to avail themselves of the Section 29.21due to the non-
commercial restriction despite the parodic effect of his work.
702
  
Under this exception, an individual can authorise an intermediary
703
 to disseminate 
the new work if it is done solely for non-commercial purposes.
704
 Turnbull and Scassa 
comment that the non-commercial restriction would be interpreted from the perspective of 
the UGC creator rather than the intermediary‘s. This interpretation is based on the 
principle given by the Supreme Court of Canada that copyright exceptions are user‘s 
rights
705
 which are not to be interpreted restrictively in order to maintain the proper 
balance between the rights of a copyright owner and the interest of the users
706
 and the 
exceptions are to be interpreted from the perspective of the user or consumer‘s purpose 
not that of the service providers or distributors.
707
 Turnbull comments that ―[t]his 
interpretation allows disseminators like YouTube to make UGC widely available, even if 
they have a commercial motive. The policy behind this seems to ensure that UGC will 
have platforms to be widely disseminated on. If the exception required non-commercial 
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 However, a commercial parody or satire may still be a fair dealing under Section 29 of the Canadian 
Copyright Act which does not have a non-commercial restriction. 
703
 The provision provides the definition of ―intermediary‖ as ―a person or entity who regularly provides 
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704
 Hebb comments that the boundary of permitting uses under the Section 29.21 might be broader than 
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and the provision does not prohibit the online intermediaries or offline publishers from making money. 
Regarding the issue, Hebb suggests that for-profit intermediary should remunerate copyright holders and, in 
that case, collective societies can be helpful in facilitating payment to the right owners. (Marian Hebb, ‗UGC 
and Fan Fiction: Rethinking Section 29.21‘ (2014) 26 IPJ 237). 
705
 The concept of ―user‘s rights‖ in the Canadian copyright law will be further explained in the following 
part. 
706
 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 13, para 48. 
707
 Hence, using previews of musical works by an online service provider for commercial purposes was 
found to be fair dealing for the (non-commercial) research purposes of the consumers. The Supreme Court 
of Canada decided that ―the predominant perspective in this case is that of the ultimate users of the previews, 
and their purpose in using previews was to help them research and identify musical works for online 
purchase.  While the service providers sell musical downloads, the purpose of providing previews is 
primarily to facilitate the research purposes of the consumers.‖ (Society of Composers, Authors and Music 




purposes from major UGC disseminators, the exception would be largely toothless.‖
708
 In 
this regard, Scassa states that ―[s]ince advertising is a part of the business model for sites 
that aggregate and disseminate UGC, this commercial dimension may be tolerated as a 
necessary evil in order to achieve broad dissemination.‖
709
 
d. The source of the original work and the name of the author, performer, maker 
or broadcaster (if given in the source) are mentioned, if reasonable to include in 
the new work. 
This requirement again reflects the French influence of moral rights. The Canadian 
Copyright Act explicitly grants the moral right to be recognised as the author of the 
work
710
 or the attribution right, where reasonable in the circumstances. The Canadian 
copyright law also imposes this requirement for some copyright exceptions such as fair 
dealing for the purpose of criticism or review
711
 and for the purpose of news reporting
712
. 
Interestingly, Section 29 of the Copyright Act allowing fair dealing for the 
purposes of ―research, private study, education, parody or satire‖ does not require a 
mention of the source or the name of the author. As a result, an individual does not need to 
cite the source of the existing work to claim for a fair dealing but need to do so if he wants 
to use the Section 29.21 as a shield against infringement. 
e. The individual had reasonable grounds to believe that the original work is not 
itself infringing copyright. 
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 Section 14.1 of the Canadian Copyright Act. 
711
 Section 29.1 of the Canadian Copyright Act. 
712




f. The use of the new work has no substantial adverse effect, financial or 
otherwise on the current and future exploitation of, or market for, the original 
work. 
Not merely existing market of the original work, the new work must not cause a 
substantial adverse effect upon the ‗potential market‘ of the original. There is a need for 
the definition and contour of the terminology ‗potential market‘ as well as an explanation 
of what the law means by ‗substantial adverse effect‘. 
g. The new work is not a substitute for the original one. 
The condition that the new work must not be a substitute for the original might be 
developed from an analysis of ‗transformativeness‘ under the US fair use doctrine. 
According to the US law, the market harm under the fourth factor of fair use occurs when 
the second work substitutes or supersedes the use of the original.
713
 In the example of a 
parody work, since the original work and parody of the work normally serve different 
market functions, it is less likely that the new work will be a substitute of the market or 
will impair the sales of the original.
714
 Similarly, fan fictions are unlikely to serve as a 
market substitute for the original stories they are based on.
715
 For example, fan fiction for 
Harry Potter series cannot replace the original Harry Potter novels; reading a Harry 
Potter fan fiction will not decrease the demands for the original the same way that an 
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714
 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) and Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin 
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Lexicon cannot serve as a substitute for reading the original novels; they are enjoyed for different purposes‖. 




Applying all the above criteria, the Canadian provision would likely render lawful 
most non-commercial online re-creations such as mash-ups, fan fiction, machinima, 
fanvids music sampling and remix. An analysis of the Section 29.21 would be helpful to 
specify what need to be considered when examining other alternative solutions as well as 
to form guidance for the most appropriate approach to the problem. The requirements set 
out in the exception are reasonable; however some issues need to be addressed and 
relevant terminologies need to be defined. 
Many scholars express concerns that the Section 29.21 may not be in conformity 
with Canada‘s international obligations
717
 particularly of the three-step test under the 
Berne Convention
718
 which requires any copyright exception to be restricted to ―certain 
special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation 
of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.‖
719
 
The exception for UGC is doubtfully a limited ―special case‖ since it encompasses a wide 
range of content generated by users. Besides, the ―legitimate interests of the author‖ 
include both economic interests and moral rights.
720
 As described above, the exception 
sufficiently and explicitly safeguard the author‘s moral right of attribution. However, there 
is a concern that, under the Section 29.21, the interests of authors might not be sufficiently 
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protected by their moral right of integrity
721
 when a modification of the existing work can 




4.3.2 User‟s rights in Canada 
In Théberge (2002), the Supreme Court of Canada described copyright as ―a 
balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of 
works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator‖.
723
 It further 
stated that the proper balance ―lies not only in recognizing the creator‘s rights but in 
giving due weight to their limited nature‖.
724
 Two years later, in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. 
Law Society of Upper Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal
725
 and the Supreme Court 
rejected the trial judge‘s decision that the fair dealing exception should be strictly 
construed. The Supreme Court of Canada in CCH characterised statutory exceptions to 
copyright infringement as ―user‘s rights‖ which must not be interpreted restrictively in 
order to maintain a proper balance of rights between copyright owners and users.
726
 The 
Court referred to Vaver‘s statement that ―[u]ser rights are not just loopholes.  Both owner 
rights and user rights should therefore be given the fair and balanced reading that befits 
remedial legislation.‖
727
 Amongst academics, CCH has been regarded as a landmark case 
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recognising a balance between the interests of users and rights of copyright owners and 
reframing the conception of copyright exceptions.
728
  
On 12 July 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada issued decisions on five cases in 
one day, unequivocally reaffirmed Théberge and CCH that copyright exceptions such as 
fair dealing are to be treated as users‘ rights and are to be interpreted broadly from the 
perspective of the user, not copyright holders.
729
 The Supreme Court recognised that 
―users‘ rights are an essential part of furthering the public interest objectives of the 
Copyright Act.‖
730
 These cases involve such issues as royalties for music previews on 
services such as iTunes
731





photocopying textbook for instructional purposes
734
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Canada (SOCAN), 2012 SCC 34. 
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The rulings in the five cases prove that the language ―user rights‖
736
 is not a mere 
metaphor used by the court.
737
 The court confirmed that this approach is ―a move away 
from an earlier, author-centric view which focused on the exclusive right of authors and 
copyright owners to control how their works were used in the marketplace.‖
738
 As a result 
of the fair balancing of rights, the court has rightly rejected
739
 the idea that restricted acts 
of users are just exceptions to the rights of copyright holders.
740
  
This Canadian approach contrasts with the standpoint of other jurisdictions. In the 
UK, the permitted acts under the CDPA are specified as exceptions to copyright 
infringement, not rights.
741
 The French courts in Mulholland Drive
742
 and Warner 
Music
743
 had ruled that a copyright exception to authors‘ rights particularly private 
copying in these cases is not a right but a mere statutory exception which cannot constitute 
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the basis of a legal claim. The same in Belgium, the court in Test Achats stated that the 
exception for private copying does not establish an enforceable right.
744
 Also, the 
European Commission clearly states in its preliminary report on the application of the 




In conclusion, Canada is apparently the first and only country that recognises 
copyright exceptions as user rights. Nevertheless, the scope and nature of the user rights 
are ambiguous.
746
 The role and effect of the user rights framework remains to be seen. It 
would need a declaratory judgment on such as whether an exception would give rise to a 
legal claim and whether it is mandatory or can be exempted with respect to standard end-
user agreements.  
 
4.4 Parody Exceptions 
Many countries all over the world have allowed the use of existing protected 
materials for making parodies. Copyright tends to give more protection for parodies than 
for other types of online re-creations. This is not surprising as parody is often viewed as a 
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While in some jurisdictions there are statutory exceptions concerning the use of 
copyright work specifically for the purpose of parody
748
; there are no such statutory 
exceptions in some others
749
. Although copyright exceptions for parody are often parts of 
other provisions such as the US fair use, the Canadian exception for non-commercial user-
generated content and the German doctrine of free use as discussed the previous parts, 
copyright exceptions related to parody is separately analysed in this section. Many 
countries are aware of the importance of allowing a use of an old work for parody and 
similar works i.e. pastiche, caricature and satire. However most of their implemented 
exceptions are insufficient to safeguard the rights of the users or re-creators and the 
general interest of the public; while some legislation unduly affects the rights of the 
copyright holders. Having the same objective of balancing copyright with competing 
rights (particularly freedom of expression) by legalising parody works, their approaches 
are similar in some countries and different in the others. As a result, these exceptions of 
various national laws could yield similar or different outcomes under the same 
circumstance. The existing parody exceptions therefore deserve a separate discussion for a 
critical comparative analysis as to identify the problems of these provisions and their 
interpretation. 
From an analysis of relevant provisions for parody in the main jurisdictions, i.e., 
the US, the UK, Canada and Germany, most of the existing parody related exceptions are 
inadequate to protect the rights of the re-creators and some of them would be unfair for 
copyright owners of the original work used as criticised below.   
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4.4.1 Limited scope of parody exceptions  
 
4.4.1.1 The distinction of parody and satire in the US 
The US courts make a distinction between parody and satire
750
 for the fair use 
analysis. Under the US copyright law, parody is a subsequent work that mocks the style 
and expression of the underlying work and ―must be able to ‗conjure up‘ at least enough 
of that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable‖
751
; whereas satire 
borrows an existing work to criticise or ridicule someone or something that does not 
concern the borrowed work
752
, a far weaker justification to use the original.
753
 Although 
both parody and satire are new creative works with a free speech element in the valued 
forms of criticism
754
 and they are highly potential to be transformative use, parody is more 
likely to avail a fair use defence than a satire is.
755
 
As discussed above, the crucial factor for the US fair use scrutiny is whether the 
subsequent work is transformative. Parody serves as the type of criticism or comment that 
traditionally has had a claim to fair use protection as transformative work.
756
 Parody is 
most likely to be found as a fair use. The landmark fair use decision is a parody case. In 
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Campbell v Acuff-Rose, the defendants composed a parody song, Pretty Woman based on 
Roy Orbison‘s song, Oh, Pretty Woman. The court held that such a parodic purpose of the 
use has an obvious claim to transformative value
757
 and represents humorous form of 
criticism which ―can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in 
the process, creating a new one.‖
758
 The parody version of the classic song was found 




Parody under the US fair use does not need to be amusing.
760
 Besides, parody 
needs to copy sufficient amount of the original work to be able to place the parodied work 
into the mind of the audience. However, a parodist cannot take more of the original work 
than is necessary to ―recall or conjure up‖ the object of his critique.
761
 
  Comparing to parody, satire which borrows the original underlying work to 
comment on or ridicule an object other than the original work is more difficult to be 
considered as transformative. As illustrated above, the book, The Cat NOT in the Hat!, 
using the elements from the Dr. Seuss‘ book, The Cat in the Hat, to create a satirical story 
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about a murder trial, was a satire not a parody. As a result, the court found that the satirical 
book was not transformative; as a result, not a fair use.
 762
 
In another satire case, a sculpture called String of Puppies was created based on 
Roger‘s black-and-white photograph of a man and a woman with arms full of puppies.
763
 
Jeff Koons, the artist of the sculpture claimed that his work was a satire or parody of 
society at large but not specifically criticising Rogers‘s work. The Court of Appeal 
recognised that ―parody and satire are valued forms of criticism, encouraged because this 
sort of criticism itself fosters the creativity protected by the copyright law.‖
764
 Agreeing 
with the district court, it found that the sculpture was not a parody of the original work
765
 
because ―the copied work must be, at least in part, an object of the parody, otherwise there 
would be no need to conjure up the original work.‖
766
 
Although, comparing to parody, satire usually weighs against fair use, the court 
may find a satire use fair due to other reasons such as the aim of copyright law in 
promoting the useful arts, and thus find that original and separate expression in the satire 
work should be encouraged. In 2006, Jeff Koons the same artist in the aforementioned 
case incorporated some fragmentary images into a collage painting named Niagara with 
the background of Niagara Falls.
767
 Niagara depicted four pairs of women‘s feet and 
lower legs including a picture of a pair of legs appropriated from Blanch‘s photograph 
called Silk Sandals. Koons‘ painting was intended to comment on the social and aesthetic 
consequences of mass media. His work was characterised as satire because its message 
aimed at the genre of which Silk Sandals was typical, rather than the appropriated 
photograph itself. In this case, the court proposed that the Campbell principle was not 
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limited to parody. The court found that Koons merely copied the part of the picture that 
was necessary and reasonable to provoke a certain style of mass communication to 
achieve the purpose of the work.
768
 Applying Campbell, the use of Silk Sandals 
communicating an entirely different purpose and meaning was held to be transformative. 
The court considered that the copyright law‘s goal of ―promoting the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts‖
769
 would be better served by allowing such use than by preventing it and 
eventually concluded that Koons‘ use of  Silk Sandals was fair.
 770
  
This case demonstrates that a satire work can also be considered as a fair use when 
taking into account the aim of copyright law that original and separate expression should 
be encouraged. However, the fair use defence under the US copyright law would not 
normally allow satire as for example in Dr. Seuss case notwithstanding the creative 
elements in the satirical work. Satire is also a valuable form of criticism and discussion. 
To produce a successful critique, commenting upon the targeted object merely by using 
fragments of such object would restrict people‘s freedom of speech and freedom of choice 
in choosing materials of their discretion to make creative expression. The parody and 
satire distinction would narrow permissible use of existing works. The distinction is not 
necessary; instead there are other factors that should be taken in account when balancing 
the rights of the original creator and re-creators and the interest of the public such as the 
creative levels in the new work and non-profit nature of the work. Liebler comments that 
the parody and satire distinction under the US copyright law is problematic for fan works:  
―This definition [of fair use‘s parody and satire] seems very straightforward, 
but real world examples show how difficult it is to work within the 
distinction between parody and satire. For example, with many mash-up 
videos created by fans, there can be two or more fandoms and original 
works at issue. What happens to the analysis when a fan work is a parody of 
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one work, a satire of two more, using elements from a couple more, and 




4.4.1.2 Narrow definition of “parody” in the UK and EU 
In 2014, the UK government amended the CDPA by adding some copyright 
exceptions including a fair dealing provision for the purposes of caricature, parody or 
pastiche.
772
 The new fair dealing exception is provided in Section 30A of the UK CDPA 
in order to ―allow people to make some limited, reasonable use of creative content 
protected by copyright, for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche, without having to 
obtain the permission of the rights holder.‖
773
  
The parody provision has been implemented as a ‗fair dealing‘ exception. Whether 
certain use constitutes fair dealing under the UK copyright law will be determined by 
various factors such as the quantity and quality of the work that has been taken
774
, 
objective of the dealing
775
, the nature of the use in question
776
 and the commercial 
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competition upon the market of the original work
777
. Therefore, for a subsequent work to 
be allowed by the parody exception, such work must be satisfied as fair dealing.  
From an independent report commissioned by the UK IPO of an empirical study 
concerning parody video creation and its potential impact on the market for original works 
by collecting a significant amount of data about parody audiences and creators on the 
YouTube video-sharing platform, the researchers concluded that parody is a highly 
significant consumer activity.
778
 The majority of the samples are ‗target parody‘ (works 
directed at the original artist or work) and ‗weapon parody‘ (a critique of a third party 
issue rather than the original work). The researchers also found other types of parody 
namely ‗self-parody‘ (a critique focusing on the parodists themselves rather than the 
original work or a third party) and other amateur parodies called ‗mislabelled (such as 
―karaoke, choreography, remix, mashup or machinima‖).
779
  
 The empirical study also demonstrates that there is no evidence that parody causes 
economic harm from substitution and the scope of reputational harm caused by negative 
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 The traditional categories of ‗target parody‘ accounted for 35% of the total sample while ‗weapon 
parody‘ made up of 31%. The minority are ‗self-parody‘ with approximately 21% of the total sample and 
mislabelled accounted for about 13%. (Kris Erickson, Martin Kretschmer and Dinusha Mendis, ‗Copyright 
and the Economic Effects of Parody: An Empirical Study of Music Videos on the YouTube Platform and an 






treatment of an original work is limited.
780
 The researcher furthered observed that there is 




Figure 2 - ―New creative elements added by parodist‖
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 ―The majority of music video parodists on YouTube (77%) copied the original sound recording in their 
work; however, some 50% of the sample added new original lyrics to the parody, while 86% of creators 
added a new original video recording. … In 78% of all cases, the parodist appeared on camera, which 
highlights the presence of creative labour while also diminishing the possibility of confusion in the minds of 
viewers between parody content and original works.‖ (Kris Erickson, Martin Kretschmer and Dinusha 
Mendis, ‗Copyright and the Economic Effects of Parody: An Empirical Study of Music Videos on the 
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Despite its consideration of the above report, the UK IPO commented that ―videos 
consisting of an entirely unchanged soundtrack (i.e. unchanged lyrics and music) 
accompanying a replacement video‖ would fall outside the scope of the new fair dealing 
exception since such parody videos could act as a substitute for the original work, in turn, 
harm the commercial exploitation of the original work.
783
 It considered that a ‗fair 
dealing‘ limitation would ensure that the exception is not misused and that the permitted 
uses do not unfairly affect the legitimate interests of the copyright holder. This would still 
outlaw numerous parodies on YouTube and other video-sharing platforms which involve 
creative content in the part of visual works but incorporate original audio works without 
any modification, for example, the parodies of many popular music videos in which re-
creators make their own video clips to criticise or ridicule the original music videos but 
need to use the entire original music as necessary to succeed their parodic objective.
784
 
Therefore adhering to the requirement that parody use of an existing work be ‗fair dealing‘ 
would unduly restrict creative expression of the public.  
The terms ―caricature, parody and pastiche‖ are not defined by the new UK 
exception
785
 nor by the InfoSoc Directive. The UK IPO explained that: 
―The words ‗caricature, parody or pastiche‘ have their usual meaning in 
everyday language, but also take account of the context and purpose of the 
copyright exceptions. In broad terms: parody imitates a work for humorous 
or satirical effect. It evokes an existing work while being noticeably 
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different from it. Pastiche is musical or other composition made up of 
selections from various sources or one that imitates the style of another 
artist or period. A caricature portrays its subject in a simplified or 
exaggerated way, which may be insulting or complimentary and may serve a 
political purpose or be solely for entertainment.‖
786
 
Just before the UK exception came into force, the CJEU decision in Deckmyn has 
clarified that the notion of parody must be regarded as ―an autonomous concept of EU law 
and interpreted uniformly throughout the EU‖.
787
 The CJEU elaborated that the essential 
characteristics of parody are ―to evoke an existing work while being noticeably different 
from it‖ and ―to constitute an expression of humour or mockery‖.
788
 It further explained 
that the parody should display an original character of its own and could reasonably be 




 Both the UK IPO and the CJEU interpreted the meaning of parody as an 
expression of humour or mockery. The requirement that parody imitates a work for 
humorous effect would significantly restrict the scope of parody works. Indeed a parody 
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should not need to be funny but what important is the critical elements in it. Besides, a 
humorous effect is very difficult to define and a sense of humour is certainly different 
from people to people and from one society to another. Such restriction would affect the 
rights and interests of the re-creators and the general public. 
 
4.4.1.3 Restricted by the law in Germany 
 Germany has not implemented a particular statutory defence for parody, pastiche 
and caricature as permitted by the article 5(3)(k) of the EU InfoSoc Directive. However, a 
parody of an existing work is most likely considered as a legal free use under the German 
copyright law. As delineated above in chapter 4.2.2, according to article 24 of the 
Copyright Act, a parody (and other use) of pre-existing copyright work would not be an 
infringement but a free use provided that there is a transformative inner distance (innerer 
Abstand) between the original and the parody work. An inner distance can be found where 
the appropriated features of the work used have faded in comparison with the individual 




Regarding parody and free use, the Disney-Parodie case in 1971
791
 invoked a 
question of ‗necessity of copying‘, deciding that a parody would only be considered free 
use if the materials taken from the original work were necessary to achieve a successful 
parody. The Federal Supreme Court in that case construed that only this could prevent a 
misuse of the provision of free use. The case involved a satirical cartoon in which Walt 
Disney was shown to create angels and biblical figures in heaven. The comic had been 
published some months after the death of Walt Disney, the creator of cartoon characters 
Mickey Mouse, Goofy and Donald Duck. Later in 2000, the Federal Supreme Court 
elaborated that ‗necessity‘ is not the prerequisite for free use recognising that such a 
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requirement would not serve the artistic discourse.
792
 The decisive criterion is that the 
work used should only serve as inspiration for new individual creativity where the 
borrowed characteristics of the earlier work must pale by comparison with the new work‘s 
individuality.
793
 A free utilisation need not be a parody in which the critique is directed 
towards the underlying work
794
 but it can be directed elsewhere, for instance, to the 
thematic context (thematisches Umfeld).
795
 The German courts have increasingly 
construed an appropriate scope of free use to be in accordance with the freedom of 
expression and freedom of the arts, science and education
796
 under the German 
Constitution or the German Basic Law
797
; free use can therefore be new independent 
works not limited to ‗target parodies‘ but also included other types of creative and 
transformative works such as ‗weapon parodies‘ and caricature. For example, in 2003, 
there was a free use case concerning a political caricature of the figure of an eagle, the so-
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called Gies-Adler (‗Gies-Eagle‘), which is the German national symbol created by the 
artist Gies in the 1950s.
798
 The defendant published a photograph of a similar eagle on the 
cover of a magazine with features criticising national policy on taxation. The Federal 
Supreme Court found no infringement on the ground that, in spite of the external 
connection between the two works, the caricature expressed a clear ‗inner distance‘ 
generally through an ‗anti-thematic‘ treatment (antithematische Behandlung). The Court 
not merely allowed a parody and caricature only if the original work itself is targeted, but 
also if its topic and surrounding is criticised. In this case, the Court interpreted the law in 
the light of constitutional protection of freedom of expression
799
 weighing up interests 
between the freedom of the press and the property interest of the copyright owner. 
Nevertheless, for a parody (and other new works) to be satisfied as a free use it 
must not involve a musical work where a melody has been recognisably borrowed from 
the work and used as the basis for a new work.
800
 As a result, a significant number of 
music parodies and video parodies would not be categorised as free uses notwithstanding 
the alteration of the lyrics in the underlying audio and the combined creative visual clips. 
Take the Campbell case as an example, the parody song, Pretty Woman, was found 
transformative and considered fair under the US fair use law. However, if the Campbell 
case was brought up before the German court, the parody music would not be found as 
free use, regardless of the transformative lyrics, because it incorporated the music of the 
original song as a basis of the new work. 
In conclusion, the free use doctrine, as interpreted in conformity with the freedom 
of expression norms of the German Constitution (article 5) by the Federal Supreme Court, 
is not limited to parody with critical features directed at the appropriated work but also 
includes caricature not attributed to the older work. Despite the broad interpretation of the 
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free use doctrine, the German free use provision, article 24(2) of the Copyright Act, deters 
use of a musical work which in effect restricts the scope of free use. 
 
4.4.1.4 Conclusion 
The notion of parody in the US fair use is too narrow by excluding satire (or 
‗weapon parodies‘ as categorised in some other jurisdictions) and the US courts give more 
protection for parody but not much leeway for satire. Lots of critiques not attributing to 
the original works would therefore have a weaker case for being fair use. As for the 
concept of parody in the EU and UK, though parodies include ‗target parody‘ and 
‗weapon parody‘, the requirement that a parody must be an expression of humour 
significantly restricts critical re-creations. Besides, a sense of humour surely differs from 
one person to another even in the same culture and society. Furthermore, under the UK 
parody exception, a video parody would not be considered as fair dealing if it consists of 
an entirely unchanged audio track. Regarding this, the German free use law also does not 
allow a use of a musical work in a re-creation despite its new creativity. This again limits 
possible application of the exception for video parodies. These existing parody exceptions 
are therefore insufficient to protect the rights of the parodists and other re-creators and the 
interests of the public. 
 
4.4.2 Commercialising parody 
Under the UK fair dealing, some criteria can be considered for the assessment of 
fair dealing including the purpose and the character of the dealing
801
; it is likely that a 
commercial use of the original would not be considered as fair.
802
 Similarly, under the 
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Canadian fair dealing exceptions
803
, a dealing of an existing work for commercial 
purposes may be less fair than a dealing done for charitable purposes.
804
 While the fair 
dealing provisions might not allow parodists to commercially benefit for making a parody 
of an existing work, the US fair use doctrine permits transformative use to be made for 
sale.  
In Campbell, the US court held that the parody song, Pretty Woman, was a fair use 
albeit nearly a quarter of a million copies of the recording had been sold.
805
 The Supreme 
Court in this case rejected the Court of Appeal‘s decision that the commercial nature of 
the parody song rendered it presumptively unfair. The Court found that the alleged work 
had a parodic purpose by commenting on and criticising the original. It consequently 
disregarded the commercial nature of the parody and concluded that the use of the original 
romantic song was fair. The fair use doctrine also allows commercial use for satirical work 
as seen in Blanch v Koons.
806
 The defendant in this case, Jeff Koons, is known for making 
sculptures based on an existing work and incorporating materials from popular media and 
consumer advertising into his artwork objects and images. Koons made a substantial profit 
from selling the collage painting named Niagara in which a picture of a pair of legs 
appropriated from Blanch‘s photograph Silk Sandals. The Court again ignored the 
commercial exploitation of the original picture and decided that Koons‘ work is not an 
infringement under the fair use defence. 
In 2013, there was a US landmark court decision concerning fair use and 
appropriation art, Cariou v. Prince
807
. In this case, Richard Prince a well-known 
appropriation artist incorporated and altered Patrick Cariou‘s Yes Rasta, a series of 
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Rastafarians‘ portraits and landscape photographs, into his paintings and collages named 
Canal Zone. The Court of Appeal held that ―the law does not require that a secondary use 
comment on the original artist or work, or popular culture‖
808
 but the law requires it to add 
something new and have a character different from the original. The court decided that 
twenty-five of Canal Zone artworks were not infringing because they sufficiently differ 
from Cariou‘s photographs.
809
 However, it was uncertain whether the remaining five 
artworks of Prince with minimal alterations of the Cariou‘s original works present a ―new 
expression, meaning, or message‖.
810
 This may seem to be a sensible decision. However, 
the Appeal Court overlooked the fact that Prince‘s artworks are commercially successful 
with the sales of more than two million dollars.  
Allowing a commercial use of someone else‘s work without the original owner‘s 
permission would create an unfair situation for the right holders. A person may see this 
fair use commercial loophole as an opportunity to make a new work by using someone 
else‘s work without authorisation and sell it without remuneration. From the previous 
Koons‘ cases
811
 and Prince‘s case, one can learn that, to make an artwork, the appropriated 
work should be modified (even minimally) by criticising the underlying work (or less 
preferably commenting on other objects) such that the new work would be considered 
transformative and fair; then he can legally benefit from the sale of such work.  
 In 2015, Richard Prince again produced a more controversial art collection known 
as New Portraits primarily consists of pictures of women in various poses.
812
 Prince took 
a series of Instagram photos by screenshots without warning or permission from the right 
owners of those pictures. He added some peculiar comments on each photo from the 
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account ‗richardprince1234‘, jet-printed on six-foot canvas and displayed them as a part of 
the Frieze Art Fair in New York. Nearly every picture was sold for $90,000 each.
813
 
Prince‘s works were screenshots not paintings; they are verbatim copies of the original 
work with cryptic remarks added to the comment threads under each photo. Having been 
successfully claimed for fair use in similar artworks, Prince does not seem to care much 
about possible copyright infringement from making and selling the works. In addition, the 
original owners of the pictures used are not interested in bringing the case to court.
814
 One 
reason for that might be because they are individuals not a company with lawyers or legal 
counsel resources. In the mind of general people this might not be as ―fair‖ as the court (at 
least according to the previous cases) may think.
815
 One of the problems is that the 
concept of ‗transformative‘ is essential but confusing. Furthermore, the fair use system 
opens door for commercial use of copyright work without sharing the profit with 
copyright owners.  
In summary, the fair use doctrine should not be seen as an opportunity for free-
riding. It seems unfair to allow someone to use someone else‘s original expression without 
their permission for sale and without compensation for possible commercial licence.
816
 An 
unauthorised use of an existing work is reasonably acceptable so long as some criteria are 
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 From the empirical data analysis in chapter 5, all stakeholders consider that re-creators should not gain 





satisfied including that the re-creator does not commercially profit from a copyright 
protected work. 
 
4.5 Drawbacks of copyright exceptions 
In an attempt to balance copyright with the public interest including creativity and 
free speech, there are certain defences to copyright infringement. However, as analysed 
above, some of the existing copyright exceptions are too limited and inadequate to 
safeguard the rights of the re-creators and the interest of the public in accessing and 
reworking from copyright protected works while an uncertain and broad exception could 
be unfair for the owners of the original works used. More importantly, none of the 
copyright limitations provide a clear guideline for ordinary citizens to understand whether 
their use of existing works are infringing or not. Due to the uncertainty, online re-creators 
would be reluctant to avail themselves of the provided exceptions and thus risk being 
sued. 
This situation is made worse by the unbalanced regime of copyright which grants 
the right holder a strong position to control his exclusive rights, while an online re-creator 
merely has an excuse provided by the copyright law itself carving out from the rights of 
the copyright owners. To claim for non-infringement, the re-creator has the burden of 
proof that the alleged re-creation is not an infringement but falls within the scope of a 
copyright exemption. Copyright holders therefore have the dominant power, while re-
creators are often viewed as not having a positive right but certain exceptions or permitted 
acts granted by the law of copyright. In such a lower position, most of the online re-
creators tend to respond to cease and desist letters with obeisance.
817
 They would comply 
with the copyright holders‘ requests by deleting and removing their online re-creations 
without objection. The uncertainty of copyright exceptions and the unbalanced positions 
give a chilling effect that creative re-use of existing works would be suppressed and 
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treated as illegal activity despite its advantages for society and the prejudice against the 
interests of the re-creators.  
To solve this, we first need to move away from an author-centric view towards a 
more re-creator-centric view. Online re-creators should be granted a positive right to use 
protected works without infringing copyright provided that certain conditions are satisfied. 
The proposed right in chapter 6 would provide a better balance between the two sides: 
copyright owners would be more careful to claim an infringement where there is a 
stronger and clearer defence for creative reworking of existing works and online re-
creators would be more encouraged to challenge a copyright claim. The significance and 
rationale behind the conditions of the proposed positive right are supported by the 
perspectives of the stakeholders i.e. original authors of works and online re-creators. The 
empirical research on the norms was undertaken in 2014-2015 and the analyses of the 














CHAPTER 5 - Analysing the Empirical Research Findings: 
Social Norms of Online Re-creations 
 
5.1 Introduction 
An original qualitative research was conducted to evaluate perspectives of the 
stakeholders towards online re-creations. This chapter analyses the empirical data 
collected from the interviews undertaken between October 2014 and September 2015. The 
analysis of the empirical research findings contributes to the support of the proposal in 
chapter 6. 
 
5.1.1 The purposes of the empirical study 
 The interview was designed to discover the normative expectations concerning 
online re-creations and relevant activities from the perspectives of the participated original 
creators of works and online re-creators.  
The questions asked in the interviews aimed to fundamentally evaluate four issues. 
Firstly, general attitude towards the attribution right of original creator to be named as the 
creator of their work. Secondly, opinions of whether an online re-creator should ask 
permission from an original creator before using the original work. Thirdly, what the 
participants think about commercial online re-creations. And fourthly, their perspective 
towards payment or compensation to the original creator or copyright holder of the work 
used in re-creation. The few remaining questions for interviewing original creators 
differed from those for interviewing online re-creators as necessary and relevant to this 
thesis. The analysis of data obtained from the fieldwork will contribute to the proposal to 
achieve a just and reasonable reconciliation between the rights of copyright holders, the 





5.1.2 The overview of the empirical study 
The qualitative data were collected between October 2014 and August 2015. As 
introduced above, interview was chosen as a means of data-gathering specifically for 
original creators of works and online re-creators for their views on activities relevant to 
online re-creation.  
The majority of the empirical data were collected at popular culture conventions. I 
attended three popular culture conventions in London and one convention in Washington, 
the US: London Film and Comic Con 2014 and MCM London Comic Con 2014 in 
October 2014, MCM London Comic Con 2015 in May 2015 and the World Science 
Fiction Convention 2015 in August 2015.  
A total of fourteen participants from the original creators‘ side were interviewed. 
They consisted of two literary agents of an original author who produced a well-known 
series of fantasy novel and  twelve original writers and/or producers. Roughly, more than 
half of them are science fiction and fantasy writers who make a living by producing 
literary works. Two participants were interviewed in person at their office in London 
while one interview was conducted on the phone and another undertaken by written 
questionnaire; the other ten participants were interviewed face-to-face at the world science 
fiction convention in the US in 2015.  
From the online re-creators‘ side, nine participants identified as online re-creators 
were interviewed:  there were six fan fiction writers, one filker and parodist, one AMVs 
maker and one scanlationer. Most of them are students who re-create works as a hobby. 
All interviews with the re-creators were conducted face-to-face. The online re-creators 
were recruited at the popular culture conventions in the UK and the US in 2014 and 2015.  
The interview participants were all anonymised. All participants in this empirical 
study were over eighteen years of age. There was no selection for gender and ethnical 





5.1.3 Limits of the empirical study 
 It is noteworthy that many interviews were conducted at the popular culture 
conventions in London in which most of the participants were from the UK and other 
countries in Europe and at the World Science Fiction Convention 2015 in the US in which 
the majority of participants were from the US. Consequently the studied participants do 
not represent the whole population in the global society. Nevertheless, since empirical 
work on the subject matter is sadly lacking in the legal academy, the research findings are 
genuinely original and ground-breaking and will contribute to useful analyses on social 
expectations of online re-creation. 
 
 
5.2 Evaluating the empirical research data 
The empirical data obtained from the interviews are assessed below. An analysis of 
the empirical research findings is set out in the following issues.  
 
 
5.2.1 Overall culture of online re-creations 
 
Concerning the incentives of re-creators
824
, the interviewed online re-creators 
produced their re-creations in various forms ranging from written (fan fiction), visual 
(scanlation), musical (filk) to audio-visual works (AMVs). Their primary incentives of re-
creations are enjoyment and fun. All interviewees state that they make and share re-
creations online because they enjoy doing it and think that it is a fun thing to do. One 
interviewee said, ―I love writing and enjoy doing it, also, I love the original books so 
much so combining the two things makes me and my readers who like [a particular 
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popular work] happy.‖ Another said, ―the works that I borrowed are the ones that inspired 
me.‖ An interviewee commented that ―when people do [re-creations], they are not trying 
to make money… they‘re doing it because they love the stuff‖ and that ―people spend a lot 
of time and money on these [online re-creations] and they are not looking to get 
reimbursed.‖ Regarding financial gain, two online re-creators participated in the interview 
gained small money from distributing their re-creations; one of them gained money 
merely sufficient for maintaining the website. One noted that ―I would do more to gain 
money if I was more worried about the money.‖ 
 
 
 5.2.2 Asking for permission  
In the interviews, from the perspective of the original authors, online re-creators 
should ask for their permission and original authors should maintain control over the use 
of their works. Many original creators would consider approving online re-creations on a 
case by case basis and grant permission with some conditions; for example, some of the 
original writers would allow online fan fiction of his original characters if it is not 
involving money. Another original creator viewed that there is no need to ask permission 
for writing something out of his story and have it at home or show it to friends but if 
someone wants to publish it online or sell it, they would need permission with agreement 
of profit share if it is done for commercial. 
However, some writers raised the point that it would be difficult in practice when a 
lot of people, sometimes, thousands or millions of people, contact the original creator 
asking for permission to use the work for re-creations. In that case, it is difficult to deal 
with ―a flood of emails‖. Thus it is better to draw a clear boundary of what can be done 
and what cannot be by articulating rules or a code of action so that the majority of people 
can enjoy that freedom but if they want to cross the boundary then they need to get 
permission.  
One original author participated in the interview commented that he would prefer 




on his book rather than to an amateur fan film. Another interviewed original writer stated 
that if an original creator asks for his permission to re-create his works, he said he would 
legally have to decline the request in order the shield himself from possible problems. It is 
therefore better not to ask, he said: ―if they don‘t ask, then I don‘t know about it.‖  
 
Similarly, from the interviews, most online re-creators think that online re-creators 
should ask permission from an original creator before using the original work. However, 
in practice, none of the sample re-creators has ever asked permission noted that they could 
not easily communicate with original creators and some of the interviewees claimed that 
their fan fictions were allowed by a blanket statement provided by the original authors. 
One online re-creator commented that licensing scheme would not allow him to alter the 
original content even for parody purpose. Another online re-creator remarked that if the 
re-creation is transformative (such as parody and fan fiction) and it is not for money there 
is no need to ask for permission to do such work. Nevertheless, all re-creators participated 
in the interview agree that they would take down their re-creations if the original creator 
requests them to delete or stop sharing their re-creations due to a copyright claim saying 
for example: 
- ―I‘ll stop because they‘re the original creators.‖ 
- ―I would talk to them about it. If I could not convince them, I would stop.‖ 
 
 
5.2.3 Giving the name of the original creator 
Most online re-creators who participated in the interviews think that an original 
creator should be acknowledged by name when his or her work is used for online re-
creations. Some online re-creators think that a disclaimer that the appropriated work 
belongs to the original author not their own helps protect them from copyright liability. 
Only one online re-creator commented that recognising the name of the original creator is 





The attitude of the interviewed original creators toward this matter is consistent. 
They all think that the name of the original creator of the work used for online re-creation 
should be acknowledged. Some commented that the name of the original work should also 
be advertised. Some of them agree that re-creators should always name the original 
creators for the elements taken from them and it should be very clear that it is not an 
authorised product or in any way associated with the original creators or copyright holders 
in order to protect the original authors. Moreover, it is not only being polite to recognise 
the names of the original work and author but it also shows the intent of the online re-
creator and helps promoting the original product and its creator despite the fact that 




5.2.4 Gaining money from online re-creation 
 The specific empirical questions in the interviews strive to discover what the 
stakeholders think if online re-creators gain money from their online re-creations in two 
means: directly by selling the work and indirectly by donation and advertising.  
 
5.2.4.1 Gaining money from selling online re-creation 
 In the interviews, the original authors think that without their permission and 
benefit sharing, online re-creator must not make money by selling their re-creations. From 
their perspective, commercial re-creation is not acceptable and it is a violation of right. 
One original author thinks that online re-creation is fine ―as long as there is no money 
involved‖ while another original creator commented: ―If a person wants to pay homage to 
the work, without trying monetize it, great. But they should not ever be allowed to make 
money off another‘s hard work and originality without a proper license and permission.‖ 




should not gain money by selling the work if the original creator does not give permission 
to do so. One re-creator has an opinion that selling online re-creation is acceptable if it is 
only a small gain.  
 
5.2.4.2 Gaining money from donation 
From the interviews, the attitude of the original creators concerning ―commercial‖ 
re-creation is relatively strong. Most of the sample original creators viewed that gaining 
money from donations is within the meaning of being ―commercial‖ or being paid because 
it is a means of accepting money for making and/or sharing online re-creations. They all 
do not think it is acceptable that re-creators gain money from donation even though it is 
not for profit without their permission. The interviewed original creators remarked that: 
- ―… that‘s not differentiate between them simply offering it for sale [or] raising 
money to do it. They‘re raising money; at that point they ought to have my 
permission.‖ 
- ―I‘m not very happy with that. I don‘t think that they should be making money out 
of it even if it‘s for their expenses – and what if they get a million dollars of the 
donation? They‘re actually making money out of my work…‖ 
- ―If they don‘t ask for permission, and they don‘t pay the original creator, then they 
are really making money off someone else‘s work.‖ 
- ―They are still stealing the author‘s or artist‘s original creation and trying to 
capitalize on it. Those characters/worlds belong to the creator, not the copycat.‖ 
Not surprisingly, the perspective of the interviewed re-creators toward this issue is 
more lenient. Most of the online re-creators think that donations to support re-creation are 
acceptable. Some of them have an opinion that this activity of raising fund should be for a 
small amount of money. In the interviews, one online re-creator noted that ―a lot of these 
things would not be possible without getting help for the crowd‖, while another said ―I 






5.2.4.3 Gaining money from advertising 
In the interviews, most online re-creators think that gaining advertising revenue 
from online re-creation is acceptable if the amount of money is trivial. On the contrary, 
from the eyes of the interviewed original creators, gaining advertising revenue is not 
acceptable because it is a way of financially benefiting from the incorporated original 
content. Interestingly, from the interview, only one original author thinks that he would 
not object the activity saying: 
- ―Well, I guess I wouldn‘t sue them for doing it… I personally would not make 
them take down the advertisements because they are not gonna make pretty much 
money out of it anyway. I like to encourage the fandom and the excitement and 
everything so I don‘t wanna make it look like I‘m, ah, like, a real jerk and then 
they turn around and decide to stop reading my books. It‘s the balance.‖ 
Some original creators noted that the activity of posting online re-creation on a 
website and gain advertising revenue generated from that content lies within the meaning 
of being ―commercial‖ which should not be done without permission of the right holder. 
Hence, it can be concluded that from the original creators‘ point of view, it is not 
acceptable if online re-creators gain money from their re-creations by any means either 
directly by selling the re-creations or indirectly by donations or advertising. An original 
creator commented that it becomes unacceptable as soon as the online re-creator starts 
earning money based on the original materials they post. 
 
5.2.5 Payment to original creator 
This part assesses the opinions of the participants whether they think that an online 
re-creator should pay for using parts of someone else‘s work in two different scenarios: by 
copying it directly in an online re-creation and by using it as inspiration without copying 
parts directly. This is to evaluate the attitude of the stakeholders concerning the issue of 
payment and compensation to the original creator or copyright holder taking into account 
the nature of re-creations which is roughly divided into two broad categories: those re-





In the interviews, the participated online re-creators primarily think that an online 
re-creator should not pay for using parts of original work if the re-creation is not made for 
money especially when the original material is not directly taken. Interestingly, when 
considering this question, original authors participated in the interviews give much weight 
to the commerciality of the re-creation rather than the nature of the work. As to the 
different kind of work, they consider fan fiction to be more acceptable than other types of 
re-creations provided that it is not made for money. In conclusion, original creators think 
that online re-creator who benefits financially from using parts of their works either 
directly or indirectly need to ask for their permission and negotiate licensing fee. The 
opinions of the interviewed original creators are for example: 
- ―Actually yes, they should pay for it because they are using someone else‘s 
material which has copyright in it. But then again, the intent of the re-creator is 
important - whether they are doing it for commercial or just for fun. I don‘t 
want to be harsh on someone who loves my works. But yes, if they are for 
money, then they have to pay.‖ 
- ―For writing fan fiction, no - commercial use, yes.‖ 
- ―If they are not selling it – then I don‘t care [about payment]‖ 
-  ―If somebody wants to set a story in my universe, I would be fine with that 
again as long as it‘s not commercial.‖  
- ―For fanfiction, I would say no, I would say – go ahead. I just felt that it kind 
of builds up a community it can get people more interested in your work – so 
there is like a benefit there that they don‘t necessarily have to pay...‖ 
- ―When it comes to getting money, yes, they would have to pay for it.‖ 
 
 
5.2.6 The effect of online re-creations 
 Even though the effect of online re-creations upon the original work is not easily 
anticipated, the interview question asked participant to state their opinions on this issue to 
discover their attitude towards online re-creations.  
In the interviews, some original creators recognise the benefits of online re-




works and prefer to have a friendly relationship with their fans and re-creators of their 
works: 
- ―… personally for me I like to encourage the fans because they‘re the ones that 
keep the interest in the series alive.‖ 
- ―Original creators surely want to have fans and if they are enjoy it that‘s positive – 
so if they re-create things creatively and appropriately - that‘s great.‖ 
-  ―It‘s wonderful to express a love of a particular work. Expressing joy and 
enthusiasm in [an original work] is good - for personal use and pleasure is totally 
fine. Personally I don‘t have an issue with sharing so long as it‘s for free, no sense 
of commercial business.‖ 
Nonetheless most original creators express their concerns about online re-
creations.  
One of their major concerns is the content of online re-creations. Many original 
creators disapprove alteration of their original content e.g. fictional characters in such a 
way that it involved offensive materials and sexual relationship especially between 
characters of the same sex or the so-called ―slash‖
845
 fiction. An original writer 
participated in the interview remarked that: 
- ―I love the enthusiasm displayed by fans who want to dive deeper into someone‘s 
world, but I am uncomfortable when people try to appropriate the characters and 
turn them into something they‘re not, like making [a main character] gay or 
something. The least you can do, if you really like the characters so much, is to be 
true to them in your own imaginings.‖ 
Harmful contents that they are worried about are for example pornography, erotica 
or something bad for children if the audience of the original work are children because: 
(i) They do not want their readers to be exposed to the kind of content they 
disapprove of. Some original authors would like to control the use of their 
work such that their works would not involve materials they dislike. 
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(ii) One original creator said: ―It should not be inappropriate for children.‖ Many 
creators are concerned that sometimes most readers or consumers of their 
works are children who are not ready to be exposed to adult materials.  
(iii) it could harm the reputation of the original work and creator, and 
(iv) people may confuse the association of online re-creation with their official 
products and brands. 
Another concern is the effect on the potential markets of the original work. 
Most original creators think that a written fan fiction is more acceptable than other 
types of work provided that some conditions are met: e.g. the fan fiction is transformative 
and does not involved earning money. When it comes to a type of re-creation for which 
original creators might license the right to a commercial entity to produce an official work, 
the original creators are reluctant to allow a fan or re-creator to make such work. This is 
due to the following reasons. First, they are afraid that having granted a licence to 
someone else would affect their ability to license for potential markets. They are 
concerned that licensing or allowing a person for free to make use of their work such as 
making a film (e.g. fan film) will affect the right to sell such right to another to produce 
the work officially especially when the re-creation is of professional quality even if it is 
non-commercial. They think that it would discourage either publishers or film makers to 
buy the rights from them, particularly the right to make a movie based on their original 
story. Besides, they also want to protect the integrity of the brand they create and the 
reputation of the work. An original writer said ―when you write a fan fiction… it‘s clearly 
a fan story… it‘s not the way I write or speak but when you put out a film that has my 
book‘s name on it and my characters, you don‘t know my level of involvement with the 
film but you have to assume that I said yes.‖ Many original creators also want to remain in 
control of the use of their work and prefer professional film makers to make a movie of 
their works. Also, they think that a professional quality re-creation may compete with the 
future official products, again especially if the online re-creation is professionally made 






 Original creators significantly consider commercial nature of online re-creation to 
be an important issue in answering a lot of questions. They also think that any kind of 
earning money accounted for being commercial which is not acceptable. Whereas, 
regarding this commercial issue, online re-creators tend to think that indirect money 
gained from re-creations are acceptable so long as the original creators do not lose any 
profit and the online re-creator arrange a profit sharing with the original creator of the 
work used to re-create 
 From the analysis in this chapter, some critical factors need to be considered in 
order to be able to determine whether an online re-creation is reasonable and acceptable. 
From the empirical research findings, the important factors that need to be taken into 
account are as follows: 
- The character of the re-creation: whether the online re-creation is transformative 
and provides value of any kind;  
- Attribution of the work: whether the name of the original creator and work used in 
re-creation have been acknowledged;  
- Commerciality: whether the online re-creator gains any money from their re-
creation; and 
- The effect of the re-creation: whether the online re-creation causes a negative 
effect on the original work and/or creator.  
These factors and the evaluation of the findings are crucial and therefore will 










CHAPTER 6 - Proposal and Conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction  
  
It all starts with the internet and technologies. 
The internet and digital technologies make it possible for anyone to easily re-create 
a new work by copying, editing and remixing existing works. These earlier works are 
usually under copyright protection.
846
 The new works created based on copyright 
materials are termed as ―online re-creations‖
847
. While various forms of online re-
creations have widely been created and distributed on the internet and become part of the 
culture of the 21
st
 century, copyright law strives to keep pace with the rapid technological 
and societal change by expanding copyright protection i.e. the breadth of copyright subject 




Existing copyright law makes it very difficult for a re-creation to be produced 
lawfully.  
Copyright law of the digital age affects online re-creations in several ways.
849
 
First, copyright limits and prohibits most of the activities involved in making and sharing 
online re-creations.
850
 An online re-creation potentially infringes copyright when it 
incorporates protected elements of a work without authorisation of the copyright owner. 
However, it is usually extremely difficult to obtain permission from copyright holders 
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 Moreover, the current copyright law does not provide 
limitations and exceptions which are designed for creative reworking of existing work, 
and existing exceptions are narrow.
852
 Lastly, copyright and its enforcing tools especially 
notice and take-down procedures create a threat of litigation and enforcement even where 
a use of an existing work might be lawful under certain copyright exception.
853
 The 
current copyright law therefore makes it difficult for online re-creations to be made and 
shared lawfully. 
Expansion of copyright invokes debates over the conflict of the interests: interests 
of copyright owners, the public interest in dissemination of works and the public interest 
in access and use of copyright works.
854
 The need to balance these interests was 
recognised and led to the implementation of limitations and exceptions to copyright 
protection. Nevertheless, existing copyright exceptions are not sufficient. In many cases, 
they do not permit re-creation. While in some cases exceptions are available for some re-




In chapter 4, this thesis has provided a critical analysis of some pertinent existing 
copyright exceptions, i.e., the US doctrine of fair use
856
, the fair dealing exception under 
the UK law
857
, the free use doctrine in Germany
858
, the Section 29.21 or the UGC 
exception in Canada
859
 and parody exceptions in different jurisdictions
860
. The scrutinised 
copyright exceptions are inadequate to provide a proper balance between the conflicting 
rights and interests.  Some of the existing copyright exceptions are too limited and 
insufficient to protect the rights of the re-creators and the interest of the public in 
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accessing and reworking from copyright protected works while an uncertain and broad 
exception could be unfair for the right holders of the borrowed works. More importantly, 
none of the copyright limitations provide a clear guideline for ordinary citizens to 
understand whether their uses of existing works are infringing or not. Due to the obscurity 
and uncertainty, creative re-users would be reluctant to avail themselves of the provided 
exceptions and thus risk being sued. 
This situation is made worse by the unbalanced regime of copyright which grants 
the right owner a strong position to control his exclusive rights, while an online re-creator 
merely has an excuse carving out from the rights of the copyright owners which is 
provided by the copyright law itself.
 
Thus the re-creator has the burden of proof that the 
alleged re-creation is not an infringement but falls within the scope of a copyright 
exception. Copyright holders therefore have the dominant power while re-creators are 
often viewed as not having a positive right but certain exceptions or permitted acts granted 
by the law of copyright. In such a lower position, most of the online re-creators tend to 
obediently comply with cease and desist letters by deleting and removing their online re-
creations without objection.
861
 The uncertainty of copyright exemptions and the 
unbalanced positions give a chilling effect that creative remakes of existing works would 
be suppressed and treated as illegal activity despite its advantages for society and the 
prejudice to the interests of the creative re-users. 
 
Traditional copyright licensing regime is incompetent. 
Under the current copyright law, the traditional licensing regime is prohibitive for 
online re-creations because obtaining a licence to make a re-creation is practically 
impossible. Without permission from the right holder of the original work used in re-
creation, problems concerning copyright infringement typically arise. From the empirical 
research findings in chapter 5, the majority of the interviewees believe that an online re-
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creator should ask for permission from an original creator before using the original 
work.
862
 However, the traditional model of obtaining permission or copyright licence from 
the right holders to use a certain protected work for online re-creation is ineffective. As 
discussed in chapter 2 and chapter 5, it is almost impossible for an online re-creator to 
obtain permission from the right owner to incorporate the copyright work into an online 
re-creation.
863
 This is because: 
(i) It is difficult to address the right holders of a work. 
First, it can be difficult to identify and locate the proper owners of copyright 
especially when copyright interests in a work (such as sound recording and musical 
composition) can be split between multiple parties. It is a tremendous hurdle to obtain 
licences from a number of copyright holders. 
(ii) Existing collective licensing schemes do not normally cover re-creations. 
Copyright owners prefer to grant their licence to professional users, but do not 
easily give authorisation to individual amateur re-creators.
864
 Normal licensing schemes 
are designed for transactions between professionals or companies, not amateur 
individuals. Besides, most licensing fee is based on revenue sharing: right holders have 
little economic incentive to license online re-creations since they do not normally produce 
revenue to share. Moreover, collective administration, a system that enables licensing 
from numerous owners to multiple users, is for non-altering uses rather than for re-
creation of works or derivative works.
865
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(iii) Individual negotiation is not practicable. 
There is no guarantee that the right owners will grant licences for use of re-
creation. Although some right holders might consider granting permission to re-create, it 
is more likely that copyright owners will refuse to authorise re-creation of their works. As 
criticised above, original owners of works tend to be less interested in licensing amateur 
re-users who could yield them trivial or no revenue. Hence, there is no economic incentive 
for copyright owners to grant rights for non-commercial use. Besides, there is an 
uncertainty on the part of rights owners about risks in granting a licence. From a 
perspective of one original creator interviewed, he comments that he would legally have to 
decline the request in order the shield himself from possible problems.
866
 
Furthermore, it is not practical to get or give permission for re-using a popular 
work because of the volume of online re-creations it generates, thus it is not practical for 
an owner of such original work to individually grant permission to each re-creation.
 867
 It 
is therefore better to contemplate a clear boundary of what can be done and what cannot 
be by articulating rules so that the majority of people can enjoy that freedom but if they 
want to go beyond such boundary then they need to get permission. 
From the perspective of the interviewed original creators analysed in chapter 5.2.2, 
online re-creators should ask for their permission before using their works in re-creation 
and original creators should maintain control over the use of their works. Even when the 
permission is given, original creators of works want to retain their right to stop the re-
creation and dissemination of their works if they do not approve of the new work. From 
empirical data findings in chapter 5, many original creators interviewed would consider 
approving online re-creations on a case by case basis and grant permission with some 
conditions, for instance, about the alteration and content of re-creation, re-presentation of 
their work and reputation management; some of them even prefer to have full control over 
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any re-creation of their work. Nevertheless, allowing re-creation but maintaining much 
control leaves too narrow scope of permitted activities; as a result, suppressing freedom of 
expression of creative re-users. Negotiating a deal to authorise a use of their works for re-
creations would therefore be extremely difficult.  
Lastly, high licensing fees is another obstacle.
868
 Even if the right holders are 
identifiable and agreeable to permit re-creation, licensing fees for a use of their content 
can potentially be cost-prohibitive.
869
 The re-creators typically do not have sufficient fund 
to pay for licensing fee like professional companies could invest because they normally 
disseminate re-creations without charge. This is inextricably linked to the valuable asset 
approach of right holders. 
Due to the above reasons, online re-creations are usually created without 
permission and consequently often infringe. However, copyright licensing system 
dissuades online re-creations.
870
 To always need to ask for permission
871
 is therefore not 
efficient and not sufficient to safeguard the rights and interests of the creative re-user of 
existing works and the members of the public in general. In conclusion, licensing regime 
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It causes the conflict of rights and interests. 
As stated above, the existing copyright law makes re-creations unlawful; but there 
is a public interest in the making of re-creations. In theory existing copyright law 
acknowledges that interest.
872
 However, the current creator-centred approach demonstrates 
that in fact the interest is ignored. 
Copyright and the culture of online re-creation both provide benefits to society.
873
 
Copyright encourages new creative works and endorse the right to free speech.
874
 The 
public interests in copyright are basically the interest in dissemination of works to the 
public and the interest in access and use of works by the public which contribute to the 
advancement of society.
875
  The public interests in the online re-creation culture are 
similar to those in copyright; they are interests in dissemination of works to the public, 
creativity, freedom of speech, societal and cultural benefits and learning.
876
 Online re-
creators are also entitled to the fundamental human rights to freedom of speech and to 
participate in cultural life. Though copyright and online re-creations are both beneficial to 
society, copyright suppresses the freedom of the people to re-use protected materials to 
make unauthorised creations to communicate with one another in the age of the internet.  
In the digital era, copyright and the public interest are becoming unbalanced due to 
the changes of technologies and society as well as forms of speech and public interest, 
expansion of copyright and the emergence of online re-creation culture. Hence, it is vital 
to balance the conflicting interests; between the exclusive rights of the copyright owners 
and the public interest in copyright on the one hand, and the rights of re-creators and the 
public interest in online re-creation culture on the other.  
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We need to find a proper and sensible balance. 
Therefore, there is a need to change the current copyright law regime to cope with 
this defect. To seek a better balance, we need to move away from an author-centric view 
towards a view which recognises the interests of the re-creator. Online re-creators should 
be granted a positive right to use protected works without infringing copyright provided 
that certain conditions are satisfied. By the proposed right, copyright owners would be less 
likely to claim an infringement when there is a stronger and clearer justification for 
creative re-use of existing works and online re-creators would be more encouraged to 
resist a copyright claim. Certainly reasonable conditions must be applied to provide 
sensible solutions. The significance and rationale behind the conditions of the proposed 
positive right are supported by the perspectives of the stakeholders i.e. original authors of 
works and online re-creators which are analysed in chapter 5. The social norm findings 
together with the analyses in previous chapters contribute to the proposed solutions in this 
final chapter. 
 
6.2 The Proposal 
The current copyright law regime takes a copyright owner centric view rather than 
a user‘s point of view. To provide a better balance, the copyright rules should include 
more user-centred view by considering problems from both sides.
877
 The approach that 
this thesis proposes derives the critical analyses in all previous chapters: the status quo and 
copyright issues in chapters 1 and 2, the benefits of both copyright and online re-creation 
culture in chapter 3, analyses of pertinent copyright exceptions in chapter 4 and the social 
norm from empirical data findings in chapter 5.  
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6.2.1 The Proposal: Right to Re-create 
This thesis proposes that, for a fair and reasonable balance between the conflicting 
interests, everyone should have a right to use existing works in making a creative re-use of 
such works. Such re-use therefore would not infringe copyright. The positive right, the 
―right to re-create‖, should be granted to an online re-creator whose re-creation meets all 
specified criteria. All requirements must be satisfied in order to avail of the right.  The 
new positive right is not a limitation of copyright within the body of copyright law but the 
right to re-create is only available to qualified re-creations, and the re-creator‘s right to 
exploit those re-creations is limited: the entitled re-creator attains limited rights of 
utilisation in relation to his re-creation.  
To qualify for the right to make lawful re-creation, the re-creation must (1) have 
creativity input and (2) the existing materials used in re-creation must be legally acquired. 
Once the re-creator has the right to make the re-creation, he can exploit the new work 
under three conditions: (A) the source and the name of the originator of the existing work 
are reasonably acknowledged; (B) the new work must not harm the market of the original 
work; and (C) the exploitation of such work is not for direct financial gain. The 
acquisition and scope of the positive right are delineated below.  
The copyright problems of the online re-creation culture are global. The approach 
of implementing the new right is not particularly designed for a specific jurisdiction. This 
proposal should act as a universal recommendation of the best approach to achieve a fair 
balance between the interests of the copyright owners and/or original creators, the interests 
of the re-creators, and the public interest. Any country can adopt and adapt this proposal 
for the best of its jurisdiction as applicable to their own national laws. Hence, the concept, 






6.2.2 Acquirement of the right to re-create 
The criteria to obtain the right
878
 aim at a reasonable reconciliation between the 
rights and interests of all stakeholders, developed by the critical analysis of copyright 
exceptions in chapter 4 and contributed by the social norm in regard to online re-creation 
culture analysed in chapter 5. This proposed positive right would also provide a clear 
scope of what an eligible re-creator can do and cannot do. The criteria and scope of the 
right are discussed in detail below. 
To qualify for the right to re-create, an online re-creation must satisfy two 
conditions: first, the re-creation has creativity input; and second, the materials used in re-
creation are legally acquired. 
 
6.2.2.1 Creativity input 
The online re-creation must be a new work which involves creativity on the part of 
the re-creator. The new work must be different in content and convey different message or 
meaning such that the new work does not supersede the original work. This creativity 
requirement would exclude pure copying of an original work without creative element. 
Examples of mere copies of original works in whole or in part that do not involve new 
objectives and creative alteration or addition are a copy of a part of a movie or a 
reproduction of a picture without meaningful alteration or addition.  
Human creative process involves building a new work on cumulative creativity: 
new works always imitate some aspects of pre-existing creations either by taking them as 
inspiration or including parts of them in a new creation.
879
 As discussed in chapter 3, 
creativity is beneficial to individuals and society as a whole.
880
 New creative works, even 
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those involving parts of someone else‘s materials, should reasonably be protected and 
should not be suppressed by copyright. This requirement does not only protect human 
creativity but also safeguards the right to free speech of individuals for the interest of the 
public.
881
 Many creative or artistic expressions are valuable for individuals and for 
society. Freedom of expression is an aspect of autonomy and self-fulfilment. As human 
beings, we are cognitive and communicative by nature. The ability to formulate and 
express our thoughts is valuable in self-determination and autonomy. The constraints on 
such ability adversely affect our individual personality and its growth. Digital speech in 
online re-creation also triggers debates and discussion for societal benefits.  
This factor of creativity input is therefore designed to protect creativity and free 
speech for the benefits of individuals and society; at the same time, prevent pure copies 
for the interest of copyright owners of original works.  
 
The concept of creativity input 
 Under copyright law, a minimum degree of creativity is required for a work to be 
protected.
882
 In many jurisdictions, it requires merely that the work must be originated 
from its author: this standard adopts a very low threshold of originality to obtain copyright 
protection.
883
 Since the right to re-create aims to protect beneficial but unauthorised re-use 
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of pre-existing works, the level of creativity for this right should be higher than those 
required under copyright law in some countries.
884
 
To obtain a right to re-create, a re-creator must insert a minimum level of creativity 
in making the new work. The standard of the creativity level for this new right is that:  
(a) the original materials used must be ‗substantially transformed‘885. The meaning 
and the content of the original work must be transformed which could be done 
by adding something new (e.g. new expression or some creative elements) to 
the original work 
(b) in a way that the re-creation is perceived by a reasonable person that it is a new 
work and different from the original work so that the new work does not 
substitute
886
 for the original work.887 
Different countries could construe the notion of ‗substantial transformation‘ and 
the meaning of ‗new and different work‘ differently.
888
 For instance, Germany might 
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adopt an approach built from its free use doctrine concerning the sufficient distance from 
the original work used while the US might look at its transformativeness concept in the 
fair use defence. 
It is noteworthy that the concept of creativity input for the right to re-create is not 
analogous to the notion of transformative nature under the fair use doctrine. The term 
‗transformative use‘ is a fundamental and significant constituent of fair use analysis.
889
 As 
discussed in chapter 4.1, to determine the first factor of the US fair use provision, ‗the 
purpose and character of the use‘, courts take into consideration whether the challenged 
use was commercial and whether the use was transformative. A use of the original work is 
highly likely to be fair when it has a transformative character.
890
 If the subsequent work 




 Despite the lack of a clear definition, it can be concluded from judicial decisions 
that a new work is transformative if it does not merely ―supersede the objects‖
892
 of the 
original work but instead ―adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message‖.
893
 The notion of 
‗transformative‘ may, however, permit some uses despite their non-creative reproduction 
of the original content.
894
 It does not concentrate on the creativity of the new work; instead 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
by decisions of other countries, which is likely to lead to a convergence of understanding over time. (I am 
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it rather focuses on the ‗purpose‘ of the new work
895
; whether the new work performs a 
different function or purpose from the original work regardless of the alterations of the 
content of the original material. As a result, a subsequent work absent creative reworking 
of the original work can be qualified as transformative only if it has a function or purpose 
different from the original. In conclusion, ―even making an exact copy of a work may be 
transformative so long as the copy serves a different function than the original work‖
896
. 
Thus, in an analysis of transformativeness, courts tend to focus on the 
transformative purpose of the challenged work rather than on whether the defendant has 
transformed the actual content of the original work.
897
 The notion of transformativeness is 
therefore so broad that it may cover a verbatim reproduction of copyright work involving 
none or minimal creativity; while some works with high level of creativity on the part of 
the re-creator might not be qualified as a fair use. To illustrate, the almost exact copy of 
the original works like thumbnail images were found to be transformative
898
; while satire 
tends not to be considered as transformative despite its creativity.
899
 This demonstrates 
that a fair use analysis is not required to concentrate on creative re-creation of the new 
work.  
The requirement of ‗substantial transformation‘ therefore differs from the concept 
of ‗transformative‘ under the US fair use. Concerning the creativity input of the right to 
re-create, the re-creator must creatively modify the original content or add something to 
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the original materials in such a way that it would change the object, meaning or message 
of the original work; merely transforming the purpose of the use would not be sufficient to 
pass this first factor and obtain the re-create right. In conclusion, this creativity criterion is 
narrower than the fair use transformativeness as the concept of ‗transformative purpose‘ in 
the US law does not ‗strictly‘ require ‗alteration of the content‘. For instance, with regard 
to the creativity requirement, adding subtitles or dubbing a scene of a movie with new 
storylines or messages different from the underlying work in order to criticise the 
underlying movie or other objects may have sufficient creative input even though part of 
the movie is verbatim incorporated.
900
 
With respect to the quantity of the work used, the amount of work that has been 
taken does not play an important role here
901
; instead, the court should rather focus on the 
level of creativity as delineated above. This would justify a number of creative selections 
of movie scenes in making a video displaying a distinctive underlying story and creative 
AMVs, mashups and fanvids involving an entirety of a song.
902
 Many re-creators do not 
merely copy the existing works but select, compile, and arrange clips, test different 
arrangements and choose the combination of his discretion in order to make new and 
different works with creativity input. 
 To illustrate, a written fan fiction based on some protected elements (e.g., using the 
names of the characters such as Doctor Who and Harry Potter and original fictional 
planets like Tatooine and Jakku from Star Wars) can pass this creativity criterion if the fan 
fiction retells a unique adventure in such a way that it differs from the original story. As 
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discussed in chapter 4.1 the third fair use factor assesses the amount and substantiality of 
original elements that have been used, and whether the subsequent work copied too much 
of the original quantitatively and qualitatively. While fan fiction may borrow merely 
fictional characters (whose status under copyright is controversial
903
) and/or original plots 
and settings from a popular work without verbatim copying, fanvids and mash-ups usually 
include literal copying of some scenes from a movie usually with an entirety of a sound 
track. However, without taking some elements from the original, the works would not be a 
fan fiction or fanvid and these re-creations would not exist in the cultural and intellectual 
domains for the benefits of the individuals and society.
904
 Besides, drawing a clear bright 
line of permissible amount of copyright work that can be used would never be possible. 
The permissible amount of the original work that has been taken is therefore very difficult 
to determine and a quantitative test might disqualify many creative re-creations. Thus, it is 
reasonable to discard the consideration of the amount of the work incorporated in the re-
creation but take into account the amount of the creative elements contributed in the new 
creation. 
 Regarding parody, fanvids, and mashup videos, the re-creations normally provide 
new storylines distinct from the incorporated copyright protected work: a parody uses the 
underlying work for critical purposes, a fanvid involves selection and rearrangement of 
some audio and/or visual scenes to retell an aspect or a different aspect of the original 
movie/anime, and a mashup combines one or two popular works to display a unique story. 
Hence these re-creations are likely to be creative and qualified for this factor.  
 Applying the requirement of creativity input, fansub and fandub which typically 
involve reproducing the entirety of the original comics or anime are not likely to pass the 
creative criterion. This is not because of the amount of the original work that has been 
taken, but due to the absence of the creativity elements in the new work in such a way that 
the content of the original work is substantially transformed and the subsequent creation 
provides new meaning or messages. Typically, fansub and fandub involve automatic 
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and/or digital translation of the story of the protected work without meaningful alteration 
of the content of the original work. As a result, fansub and fandub are not ‗substantially 
transformed‘ and would not constitute a ‗new and different work‘, and consequently do 
not pass the creativity input factor. Also, these re-creations would probably supplant or 
substitute for the original in those countries which use the language involved. 
Regarding the quality of the re-creation, whether the new work is of professional 
creation or just an amateur creatively engaged with the original materials and technology 
is not relevant to the re-creation right acquirement.
905
 What matters for this discussion is 
the creative elements in the new work by altering the content and meaning of the original 
work, but not the quality. In short, amateur speech is as important as professional speech.  
In summary, creativity, for the purposes of the new right, means that the original 
work used in re-creation is substantially transformed in such a way that the re-creation is a 
new and different work distinct from the original work so that the new work does not 
substitute for the original work. Certainly, this criterion is not sufficient on its own; we 
need to take into account other factors which are discussed below. 
 
6.2.2.2 The existing work is legally acquired. 
 The second factor is that the existing work used in re-creation must be acquired 
lawfully. This requirement is designed to protect the economic interest of copyright 
owner. It is derived from a factor of the Canadian exception, Section 29.21 (1)(c), which 
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imposes that the subsequent creator must have ―reasonable grounds to believe that the 
existing work or other subject-matter or copy of it, as the case may be, was not infringing 
copyright‖. The burden of proof regarding this factor should be on the re-creator as he 
must be able to show that the existing works used in his re-creation are acquired without 
infringing copyright and it would also be difficult for the original owner to prove 
otherwise. 
 To illustrate, re-creators of mash-ups or parody videos must legally obtain the pre-
existing works, for instance, by buying an official DVD of the movies, not an infringing 
copy. Then, they can make interim copies of the movies by ripping it onto their computers 
(digitally shifting format of the original materials) so that they can produce the re-
creations. That ripping is legal in some countries under private copying or private uses 
exceptions but is an infringement of copyright in some others. Fundamentally, making 
copies of existing materials in order to produce a re-creation should be lawful under 
copyright law, as long as the starting material is legally acquired, otherwise re-creations 
would always be infringing. 
 
 
6.2.3 The limits of the exploitation of the right to re-create 
Once a re-creation satisfies the two factors delineated above, the re-creator will 
have the right to re-create without infringing copyright of the underlying original works. 
The right granted is limited in scope. The re-creator will have the right to re-create and 
exploit his new work without infringing copyright of the underlying work provided that 
three conditions are met: (i) the source and the name of the originator of the existing work 
are reasonably acknowledged; (ii) the exploitation does not harm the market of the 





6.2.3.1 The source and the name of the originator of the existing work are 
reasonably acknowledged. 
The source (i.e. the name of the existing work used for re-creation) and the name 
of the originator (i.e. the author, performer, maker, broadcaster or copyright owner
906
) of 
the work used are mentioned where reasonable in the circumstances.
907
 For example, if a 
re-creation is made based on a book, the title and the author of the book must be 
acknowledged. However, if the re-creation used protected materials from a film and there 
are multiple creators of the film, copyright owner of the film must be recognised. Where 
the incorporated film involves multiple authors with complex copyright ownership 
structures, the re-creator should be able to identify and acknowledge the name of a 
producer, publisher, or broadcaster of the film. 
This requirement safeguards the author‘s moral right to attribution, the right to be 
named as the original creator of the work.
908
 It also prevents confusion as to who the 
creator of the original work is and who re-creates the work. This factor helps the audience 
of the re-creation to be able to distinguish an online re-creation from an original work and 
recognise that the subsequent work does not associate with the original owner and/or 
original products.
909
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This factor is coherent with the social norm found in the previous chapter. As seen 
in chapter 5.2.3, most of the original authors and online re-creators participated in the 
interviews think that an original creator should be acknowledged by name when his or her 
work is used for online re-creations. Some participants gave their views that, not only 
crediting the original creator, online re-creator should also help advertise the original work 
e.g. by recognising the name of the original work or putting reference or link to the 
original product. It should also be very clear that the re-creation is an unauthorised product 
or is not associated with the original creator or copyright holder in order to protect the 
original creator. Lastly, acknowledging the name of the original author also shows the 
intent of the online re-creator that they are not trying to pass off the original product as 
their own.  
It is reasonable to protect the attribution right. This requirement would be 
consistent with national law of some countries where protection for moral rights is crucial 
such as Germany and France, while it might not be as important in another such as in the 
US. In that case, that country may opt to discard this requirement. However, it is 
recommended that any jurisdiction adopts this factor since it does not merely protect the 
moral right but also prevent confusion as to the source of the re-creation and help 
advertise the original work. 
 
6.2.3.2 The exploitation of the re-creation does not harm the market of the 
original work. 
 The second condition of the exploitation of the right is that the new creation must 
not be exploited in a way that it causes an adverse economic impact on the antecedent 
work.  This requirement significantly protects the economic interest of the copyright 
owner. It is also reasonable to allow an unauthorised use of a protected work if the 
subsequent work does not harm the market of the antecedent work. 
 To restrict copyright power, the interests of the copyright owner need to be 




of copyright holders in the balance of the conflicting rights and interests. It is therefore 
important to examine some important legal concepts with respect to the protection of the 
interests of copyright holders specifically economic interests: the three-step test provision 
of the TRIPS agreement and the fourth factor of the US fair use defence. 
 To prevent unreasonable harm on the market of the original work, it is useful to 
study the so-called three-step test
912
 under the international standard: Berne Convention, 
TRIPS Agreement, WCT and WPPT Treaties. Under the international obligation, 
limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights must be in accordance with the so-called 
three-step test that ―[m]embers shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights 
to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder‖
913
.  
 Relating to the protection of an original work, the second requirement of the three-
step test states that a limitation or an exception must ―not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work‖. The WTO dispute settlement panel has held that a use of a work 
conflicts with a normal exploitation of that original work if uses of the work pursuant to 
the limitation or exception ―enter into economic competition with the ways that right 
holders normally extract economic value from that right … and thereby deprive them of 
significant or tangible commercial gains.‖
914
 This implies that ‗normal exploitation of the 
work‘ may arise from actual or present market and potential or future market if the right 
holder may normally license the work and make significant commercially gains from it. 
 With respect to another condition that limitations or exceptions must not 
―unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder‖, the WTO panel did 
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not clearly define its scope. From the WTO decision, the notion of the term ‗interests‘ 
covers economic and non-economic advantage or detriment.
915
 Furthermore, the panel 
provides that ―prejudice to the legitimate interests of right holders reaches an unreasonable 
level if an exception or limitation causes or has the potential to cause an unreasonable loss 
of income to the copyright owner.‖
916
 
 Another pertinent concept of law protecting the interests of copyright holders is the 
fourth factor under the US fair use doctrine, ―the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work‖
917
. This fair use factor
918
 seems to be in 
accordance with the above mentioned conditions of the three-step test.  
 According to the US law, the market harm under the fourth factor of fair use 
occurs when the second work substitutes or supersedes the use of the original.
919
  For this 
statutory factor of the US, courts must consider ―not only the primary market for the 
copyrighted work, but [also] the current and potential market for derivative works‖
920
. If 
the subsequent use causes substantially adverse impact on potential market for the original 
work, the fair use test, the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work, would weighed against such use.
921
 The ‗potential market‘
922
 
considered for this fair use factor must be the market that a reasonable copyright holder 
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would normally enter or develop for licensing their original work.
923
 Importantly, the fact 
that the re-creator has not paid royalty fee should not be considered a significant economic 
effect; otherwise it would hinder the utilisation of the fair use defence and this factor 
would always be in favour of the copyright holder.
924
 For instance, in the Harry Potter 
Lexicon case
925
, the defendants attempted to publish a reference guide to the Harry Potter 
fictional universe called the Harry Potter Lexicon. The Lexicon involved a number of 
portions of the original Harry Potter‘s books written by JK Rowling which were not 
consistently transformative. Consequently, the court found that that the Lexicon was 
infringing and its publication was deterred. Nevertheless, the court commented that the 
Lexicon was unlikely to serve as a market substitute and therefore not likely to impair 
sales of the Harry Potter series because ―reading the Lexicon cannot serve as a substitute 
for reading the original novels; they are enjoyed for different purposes‖.
926
 
 In 2013, there was a fair use case concerning copyright infringement and 
appropriation art, Cariou v. Prince
927
. The plaintiff, Patrick Cariou claimed that a well-
known appropriation artist, Richard Prince, infringed his copyrights in a series of 
Rastafarians‘ portraits and landscape photographs named ―Yes Rasta‖. Prince made a 
series of paintings and collages, known as ―Canal Zone‖ which incorporated and altered 
Cariou‘s photographs. Prince argued that his use of Carious‘s Yes Rasta was 
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transformative and entitled to fair use defence. The Appeal Court reached a conclusion 
that most of Prince‘s artworks were not infringing.
928
 For the fair use analysis, the 
economic impact of Prince‘s artworks on Cariou‘s photographs is interestingly analysed 
by the Appeal Court. The court decided that Prince‘s artworks do not ―usurp‖
929
 the 
market of Cariou‘s photographs because ―Prince‘s audience is very different from 
Cariou‘s, and there is no evidence that Prince‘s work ever touched – much less usurped – 
either the primary or derivative market for Cariou‘s work.‖ The fact that the subsequent 
works were economically successful with the sales of more than two million dollars was 
irrelevant to the market harm analysis. The court concluded that there is a lack of evidence 
demonstrating that anyone will not purchase Cariou‘s original works after Prince‘s 
artworks entered the market. Hence, the Prince‘s Canal Zone artworks did not cause harm 
to the potential market of Cariou‘s works. Notably, the more creative the new work is, the 
less likelihood that it substitutes the original and thus usurps the market of the original. 
 
The concept of ‗market harm‘ for the right to re-create 
From the above analysis and to achieve the balance for the purpose of this thesis, 
the harmful impact upon the economic interests of the copyright holders can be 
conceptualised that the new work must not enter into economic competition with the 
original work in the market that the original owner normally extract economic value and 
as a result deprive them of significant financial gains or cause an unreasonable loss of 
income. The ‗normal market‘ means current and potential market in which the right holder 
may normally license the work and significantly commercially benefits from it. 
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The interpretation and consideration of the impact on the economic interests of the 
copyright owners should take into account the balance between the conflicting parties – 
not concentrating on the copyright side. For instance, as previously stated, the fact that the 
right holder does not gain royalties from the re-creator should not be considered as a 
significant or unreasonable economic loss; otherwise, this second factor of the right to re-
create would make the right worthless as it would always be in favour of the copyright 
holder. 
An online re-creation should not be prohibited if there is no harm or competition to 
the normal market of the original work.
930
 This market harm condition is crucially related 
to the first factor to qualify for the right to re-create, creativity input. If the re-creation in 
dispute is creative and different from the original work such that it does not substitute or 
supersede the original work, it is less likely that the subsequent work will compete in the 
market of the original.  
  
Market harm: Parody and creative fan works 
 In the example of a parody and satirical work, these works of criticism doubtfully 
supplants or supersedes the original and harm the potential market for the original if they 
differ in content and purpose from the incorporated materials; besides, the market of the 
re-creations are not the same as the original products.
931
 However, an original author 
might claim that some parody or negative criticism may diminish the market value of the 
original work or cause loss of income to the right holder. Even if such criticism is well-
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founded, this type of market harm should not be considered as an obstruction to the right 
to re-create.
932
 Regarding this matter, it is worth noting that: 
―‗Destructive‘ parodies play an important role in social and literary criticism 
and thus merit protection even though they may discourage or discredit an 
original author. By contrast, alleged ‗parodies‘ that merely displace the 
market for original works create economic disincentives that frustrate the 
purpose of copyright law.‖
933
 
In a parody case, the US court in Fisher v Dees stated that: 
―[T]he economic effect of a parody… is not its potential to destroy or 
diminish the market for the original — any bad review can have that effect 
— but rather whether it fulfills the demand for the original. Biting criticism 
suppresses demand; copyright infringement usurps it. Thus, infringement 
occurs when a parody supplants the original in markets the original is aimed 




In summary, the normal market of the original should only be considered to be 
impaired when the exploitation of the re-creation substitutes or supersedes the original 
use. Any concerns of the original creators that alterations to original work could damage 
their reputation would be dealt separately by moral right protection. This issue is 
explained below in part 6.2.4. 
Similar to parody, fan fictions are unlikely to serve as a market substitute for the 
original stories they are based on.
935
 For example, Harry Potter fan fiction cannot replace 
the original Harry Potter novels and reading a fan fiction story involving Harry Potter 
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universe will not decrease the demands for the original products the same way that an 
encyclopaedia of a popular work will not be a substitute for the original work.
936
  
In this regard, Reynolds commented that: 
―It is likely… that very few transformative works will compete, at all, 
with the market for the original work. Individuals looking to buy one of 
the games in the Halo series to play will not, instead, purchase DVDs of 
machinima set in the Halo world. Someone who wants to read the 
original Harry Potter books will not be satisfied with one of the myriad 
Harry Potter fan fiction creations.‖
937
 
With respect to fan-based creation and market harm, Leibler nicely puts that: 
―By using multiple properties, the fan creator is more and more likely to 
have at least one of the copyright owners object, but the multitude of 
different influences is more likely to make the work transformative and 




Besides, as stated above, a fan author must make clear that his re-creation (e.g. fan 
fiction, fanvid and fan film) is not made by the original author but is a fan-made version 
such that the audience of the original work and the fan work would not be confused as to 
who produced the subsequent work. Nevertheless, the re-creator cannot exploit his re-
creation if (a) the original owners of the work used can prove that the subsequent work 
acts as a substitute of the original product: for example, if the original creator can prove 
that the fan version becomes so popular that the audience prefers it, and due to that, does 
not purchase the one produced by the original writer; or (b) if the original owner can also 
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prove that the re-creation deprives him of significant monetary gains or cause 
unreasonable loss of income. 
 
Market harm: Fansubs, fandubs and scanlation 
Fansubbs, fandubs and scanlation typically involve copying or reproducing a 
whole episode of an anime or manga or an entire movie with an absence of a meaningful 
creative input. These re-creations are likely to replace the original work and consequently 
cause a negative impact on the normal market of the earlier work. Even if the original 
product has not been introduced in that certain country but the market of that product 
already exists and these re-creations could impair the sales of the original work. To 
illustrate, a person who has already read a scanlation version of a manga may be less 
interested in buying the official production once come to the market in that country, a 
scanlation version of a manga or a fansub of an anime could be seen as a replica or 
counterfeiting product, not a creative re-creation that should be protected for free speech 
and for the benefits of society.  
 
Possible market endorsement, not harm 
In some cases, instead of harm to the market, a creative re-creation may cause 
positive economic effect on the market of the underlying original work.
939
 Some original 
creators interviewed recognise the benefits of online re-creations particularly for building 
fan community to support the consumer base of their works. In addition, most original 
creators think that written fan fictions are acceptable provided that some conditions are 
met: e.g. those fan fictions are transformative and do not involve financial gains.   
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 Some scholars find that some re-creations could cause a positive effect upon the 
market of the original creation. Fan fiction and other fan works are good examples of 
endorsement, not detriment to the original work.  
Regarding doujinshi or Japanese fan-made comics
941
, Foster suggests that: 
―[D]oujinshi do not necessarily steal profits from the original, but enhance 
the market for the original by causing customers and fans that enjoy the 
parodies to seek out the original. It is perhaps for this reason that 




Liebler recognises that: 
―As stewards of texts, fans see their interests as sometimes superseding 
the interests of authors and owners to keep works alive. Authors and 
owners do decide to permanently or temporarily end works, usually for 
reasons of commercial viability; fan works help to keep interest going for 




Similarly, as Tushnet puts it: 
 ―Fan fiction keeps its consumers excited about the official shows, 
receptive to other merchandise, and loyal to their beloved characters.‖
944
 
However, even if an online re-creation is not actually causing harm to the market 
of the original work, some companies are actively prohibiting creative re-use of their 
materials.
945
 This second factor would therefore also provide a reasonable protection for 
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re-creations that are not harmful to the economic interests of the copyright holder. 
Together with other criteria, non-harmful re-creations should be encouraged.  
In conclusion, to achieve a fair balance, this factor of economic impact is essential. 
To obtain the right to re-create, the re-creation in question must not enter into economic 
competition with the original work in the normal market where the original owner 
normally gain financial interests, and consequently, the new work must not deprive the 
copyright holder of significant monetary gains or cause unreasonable loss of income. This 
economic impact factor closely links to the first factor of sufficient creative input; the 
more creative the re-creation is, the less likelihood that it supplants the original and the 
less harm on the normal market of the original work becomes. 
 
6.2.3.3 Exploitation of the re-creation is not for direct financial gain.
946
 
From the social norm analysed in chapter 5.2.4, the original authors and online re-
creators participated in the interviews think that an online re-creator should not gain 
money by selling his re-creation without permission from the owner of the original work 
and benefit sharing or royalty payment. However, if a direct money gain from a re-
creation is allowed under condition that any profit must be shared with the original author, 
this does not seem fair for the original owner as he would lose his control over an 
economic exploitation of his intellectual work and it could cause a loophole for free riders 
to financially benefit from someone else‘s work particularly when the original creator 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
―If fan fiction has no measurable adverse market effect, and may strengthen fan 
commitments, why would a corporation seek to restrict its production? Corporations that 
attack fan fiction may have confused copyright law with trademark law. These 
corporations mistakenly fear that failure to contest any use of their creations would 
weaken their claims against possible commercial appropriation. Although others may 
believe fan fiction causes economic harm, the most likely reason corporations have 
attacked fan fiction is almost certainly a desire to control how their characters are 
portrayed.‖ (Rebecca Tushnet, ‗Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New 
Common Law‘ (1997) 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 651, 674 (citations omitted)). 
946
 This requirement is not a prerequisite to obtain the right because the commercial character of an online 
re-creation can be changed: for example, when a re-creation is first made it may not be made for sale, but 




does not have sufficient resources to claim for a profit sharing. Therefore, it seems fair and 
reasonable to allow creative re-working of existing materials if the copyright owner does 
not lose anything substantially and the re-creator does not directly gain from the copyright 
work financially.  
The re-creator has the right to re-create against any person and against the 
copyright owners of the incorporated original works, and so making the new work does 
not infringe. However, any exploitation which involves making direct financial gain will 
constitute a copyright infringement. In other words, a re-creator does not have the right to 
make money directly from the re-creation unless he asks for permission or obtains a 
licence from the copyright owner through the normal licensing scheme.  
 In a brief summary, since the re-creation involves someone else‘s materials 
without permission and compensation, the re-creator should not be granted a right to gain 
financial benefits directly from his re-creation.  
 
Financial gain 
Some countries adopt copyright exceptions to allow fair utilisation of protected 
works imposing that such use should not or must not be commercial in nature.
947
 
Nevertheless, the terms ‗commercial use‘ and ‗non-commercial use‘ are not clearly 
defined especially in the online context.
948
 Creative Commons attempted to explore 
understandings of the two terms among internet users when used in the context of online 
content.
949
 However, the Creative Commons‘ study could not find a consensus of what 
constitutes ‗non-commercial use‘
950
: both online creators and users tend to consider uses 
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 The study report concludes that ―…perceptions of the many use cases measured in this study suggests 
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that gain money or involve online advertising to be commercial, while uses for charitable 
purposes are less commercial but not decidedly non-commercial.
951
 Since people tend to 
perceive the concept of ‗commercial‘/‗non-commercial‘ differently, the empirical 
questions designed for this thesis (as seen in chapter 5) therefore avoid using those terms.  
From the study in chapter 5, most interview participants do not think it is 
acceptable for an online re-creator to make money directly by selling their re-creation 
without asking for permission and/or benefits sharing. Direct income from a re-creation in 
exchange of allowing someone to consume the re-creation by selling the re-creation can 
easily be considered as making gain from the incorporated materials. This is not 
acceptable according to the social norm as previously stated. This right therefore does not 
allow such monetary gain in order to prevent free-riding and for-profit exploitation of 
others‘ works without permission and fair compensation.  
The case of making money from selling the work is rather straightforward. Indirect 
financial gains from re-creations such as by donation and advertising, on the other hand, 
are more complicated. Most of the original creators viewed that earning money from 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
the meaning of ‗noncommercial use.‘ As such it is best seen as a jumping off point for further research 
rather than the end of the inquiry.‖ (Creative Commons, ‗Defining ―Noncommercial‖: A Study of How the 
Online Population Understands ―Noncommercial Use‖‘ (14 September 2009) 
<http://mirrors.creativecommons.org/defining-noncommercial/Defining_Noncommercial_fullreport.pdf>.  
951
 Interestingly, the study finds that: 
―More than a three-quarter majority of [online creators and users] agrees that it is 
‗definitely‘ a commercial use if money is made from the use of a work in some way, 
including directly from the sale of a copy of a work, or from online advertising around or 
in connection with the work, where the user makes money from the ads. Further, 6 in 10 
of all respondents evaluate uses in connection with online advertising as ‗definitely‘ 
commercial, even if only enough money would be made to cover the cost of website 
hosting. More than 6 in 10 creators and users also consider use by a not-for-profit 
organization ‗definitely‘ commercial. 
… 
Creators and users also tend to agree that use for a charitable purpose or to promote a 
social or public good is noncommercial, unless the use is by a for profit organization. 
However, of all the specific use scenarios measured in this study, both creators and users 
demonstrate the least amount of agreement on this one. Not even charitable use by a not-
for-profit organization is rated ―definitely‖ noncommercial by a majority of either 
group.‖ (Creative Commons, ‗Defining ―Noncommercial‖: A Study of How the Online 






donations and from advertising are not acceptable because they are means of gaining 
financial benefit from the incorporated original content. The perspectives of the online re-
creators toward indirect gain are more lenient than those of the original authors. Most of 
the re-creators think that an online re-creator can gain money from donations to support 
re-creation. Their points of view seem to be that earning money from donation is more 
acceptable than financial gain from advertising: gaining advertising revenue from online 
re-creations should involve remuneration to the original owner of existing work. 
This finding suggests that the right to re-create should allow limited indirect 
financial gain (e.g. donation and advertising). How much to allow is more difficult to 
assess. 
An online re-creation does not need a monetary incentive.
952
 Generally people re-
create due to their inner drives not for financial interests. Thus paying or reimbursing for 
re-creators‘ time investment is not necessary. However, in the re-creation process, re-
creators may need money to finance the cost of re-creations. Since the culture of online re-
creation is beneficial and should be reasonably supported and protected
953
, the law should 
permit indirect financial gains from re-creation. This is to allow some re-creators to raise a 
reasonable amount of funding so that they can be able to make creative new works such as 
virtual worlds and fan films which usually require monetary investment. Besides, online 
advertising has become today‘s normal internet marketing. It is also predictable that this 
practice of online marketing will be developed in the future. Prohibiting re-creations for 
such indirect income will outlaw most creative re-creations distributed online. Moreover, 
the limit of the exploitation of the re-creation right that the new work must not adversely 
affect the market of the original work sufficiently safeguards the economic interests of the 
copyright owner. Deterring others from using an existing work without any harmful 
interest is not fair. It is therefore reasonable if online re-creators gain money by donation 
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or advertising from their re-creation to certain extent provided that it does not exceed the 
costs of making the re-creation.
954
 
Therefore, for the interest of society and re-creators, indirect gain from re-creations 
should therefore be allowed if the gain is less than the cost of re-creation. Where indirect 
financial gain such as by donation and advertising revenue exceeds that amount, the re-
creator should share its gains or make payment to the copyright owner of the original by 
asking for permission or through normal licensing scheme, or should cease accepting 
donations or advertising. 
 
6.2.4 Moral right concern: protection of the original author‟s reputation 
One major concern raised by the original authors in the empirical research in 
chapter 5 is the content of re-creations. Many original creators disapprove of any 
alteration of their original content e.g. using their fictional characters in a way that 
involves offensive materials, for example sexual content or something unpleasant for 
children if the audience of the original work are children. Many of them also are 
concerned about ‗slash‘ fictions which can be in any forms of materials including written 
works, videos, and virtual worlds that involve explicit sexual relationships between 
fictional characters usually of the same sex because they worry that ‗slash‘ can give a bad 
image to the original work and author and may harm the audience of the original work 
who consume such re-creations.
955
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 Indirectly minimal earnings or financial gain sufficient to recover the cost of running a website or making 
a re-creation by advertising or donation should be allowed. However, such cost does not include time 
investment. 
955
 From chapter 5, many original creators participated in the interviewed disapprove of any modification of 
their original elements such as fictional characters in such a way that they involve offensive materials and 
sexual relationship especially between characters of the same sex. Harmful contents that they are worried 
about are for example pornography, erotica or something bad for children (if the audience of the original 
work is children) because: 
(i) They do not want their readers to be exposed to the kind of content they disapprove of.  
(ii) Many creators are concerned that sometimes most readers or consumers of their works are 
children who are not ready to be exposed to adult materials.  




This issue is relevant to the protection of the moral right to integrity.
956
 The 
integrity right allows the author to object to any distortion, mutilation or modification of 
his work which would prejudice the author's honour or reputation. Generally, following 
the Berne formulation, the author must demonstrate that the claimed distortion is 
prejudicial to his honour or reputation. The formulation and application of the integrity 
right vary in national laws. The protection in this matter should therefore be subject to 





, the author of the original work can exercise his right to 
integrity according to the internal laws without restriction by the right to re-create.  
Nevertheless, in considering an infringement of integrity right regarding a re-
creation, this thesis strongly suggests that the court should balance the protection of the 
author‘s reputation with the right to free expression of the re-creator and the wider public 
interests. If an original author was to use the integrity right to prevent re-creations such as 
a parody work, free speech of the parodist and the interest of the public in benefiting from 
that parody would be affected: as a result, strict and strong integrity right protection could 
easily obstruct the utilisation of the right to re-create. To fairly balance the conflicting 
rights and interests, this thesis therefore recommends that the question whether the use of 
original work in question is derogatory to the author‘s honour or reputation should not be 
depending on the opinion of the author himself; instead, the question should be considered 
by the reasonable person whether the re-creation was prejudicial to the reputation of the 
author, not from the author‘s view. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
(iv) people may confuse the association of online re-creation with their official products and 
brands. 
956
  Article 6bis of the Berne Convention safeguards two moral rights: attribution and integrity rights (see 
chapter 2). The right to attribution is reasonably protected within the limited scope of the exploitation of the 
right to re-create (see chapter 6.2.3). 
957
 See section 80 of the UK CDPA 1988 entitled ‗Right to object to derogatory treatment of work‘. 
958
 Article 14 of the German Copyright Act provides that ―the author has the right to prohibit the distortion 
or any other derogatory treatment of his work which is capable of prejudicing his legitimate intellectual or 





6.2.5 Compliance with International Standard 
In regard to the international obligation under the Berne Convention, TRIPS 
Agreement, WCT and WPPT Treaties particularly the three-step test, the right to re-create 
conforms to the international standard. The requirements for any limitations or exceptions 
to copyright are that (i) the limitations must be certain special cases (ii) which do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and (iii) do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the right holder.
959
 The right to re-create can be considered as a 
limitation to the exclusive rights granted under copyright law, thus should be in 
compliance with the three-step test. 
The first condition imposes that any limitations to copyright must be ―certain 
special cases‖. The essence of this requirement is that the limitation be clearly defined and 
narrow in scope.
960
 According to the WTO‘s interpretation, ―there is no need to identify 
explicitly each and every possible situation to which the exception could apply, provided 
that the scope of the exception is known and particularised. This guarantees a sufficient 
degree of legal certainty.‖
961
 Although the right to re-create encompasses various types of 
re-creations on any platform and in any medium, its scope is limited and its provision is 
clearly defined. It should therefore be treated as a certain special case. Certainly, this 
positive right is more limited in scope than the US fair use defence.
962
 Besides, the first 
requirement of the three-step test needs to be interpreted solely to mean that the exception 
or limitation is clearly defined and narrow in its scope and reach, otherwise the human 
rights and public interest elements are not respected particularly in the age of the internet 
where digital content can be created and re-created in various nature. 
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The following two conditions of the three-step test (i.e. the limitations do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the right holder) aim to protect the rights and interests of the 
copyright owner. As discussed above in chapter 6.2.3.2, the new right to re-create should 
be in accordance with the two criteria. Under the re-creation right, a re-creator who is 
entitled of the right can use existing copyright protected works to make new creation 
without authorisation and without remuneration to the right holder. The positive right does 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author since the original 
creator‘s interests are sufficiently and reasonably safeguarded by the criteria to obtain the 
right and the limits of the exploitation of the right (i.e. the online re-creation must be a 
new work which involves creativity on the part of the re-creator, not pure copying of the 
protected work; the existing work used in re-creation must be acquired lawfully; the 
source and the name of the originator of the existing work are reasonably acknowledged; 
the re-creation does not harm the market of the original work; and the exploitation of the 
re-creation is not for direct monetary gain). This is a better balance between the rights of 
the re-creators, the public interests particularly social and individuals‘ benefits of human 
creativity and the fundamental right to freedom of speech, and the interest of the copyright 




As a result of the balance between the interests of the original authors and 
copyright owners, the rights of the creative re-users and the public interest, the notion of 
the right to re-create is that: 
1. Everyone has the right to make his re-creation using existing protected 
materials without infringing copyright of the incorporated works provided that 





2. This right allows the re-creator to exploit his re-creation under the following 
conditions: 
a. the source and the name of the originator of the existing work are 
reasonably acknowledged; 
b. the re-creation does not harm the market of the original work; and 
c. the exploitation of the re-creation is not for direct financial gain. 
Making money directly from the re-creation therefore means possible 
copyright infringement of the underlying original work. 
The right to re-create reasonably recognises the interests of the copyright holders 
and original creators of the underlying work. This is consistent with the social norm 
regarding online re-creations concluded in chapter 5. 
Establishing the new right will achieve a better balance
963
 than improving existing 
copyright exceptions or implementing a new exception for online re-creation. The current 
copyright regime operates with a copyright-centric view and to achieve a better and more 
reasonable balance between the conflicting rights and interests, we need to shift the focus 
on copyright owners to a more consideration on creative subsequent creators. The right to 
re-create is not a balancing exercise: to obtain the right, all conditions must be satisfied in 
order to be entitled to the right. A clear re-creation right can avoid the uncertainty problem 
as found in some copyright exceptions.
964
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 In regard to the Canadian copyright law, Reynolds proposes that ―the fair dealing defence should be 
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 In this regard, Vaver suggested: ―Clearly expressed user rights that avoid the fussy detail in which current 
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understand than a doctrine of fair use, however expanded or labelled, could ever be.‖ (David Vaver, 




Copyright and the right of re-creation stimulate creativity and support the human 
creative process of using pre-existing works.
965
 Both rights encourage free expression of 
ideas and self-fulfilment.
966
 They both support incentives to make a new work: copyright 
provides monetary incentive, while re-creation right protects non-monetary incentive.
967
 In 
summary, they are both in the public interest.
968
 It is reasonable and acceptable to give 
limited protection to online re-creations when they are creative and beneficial to our 
society provided that the rights and interests of the original owners are reasonably 
safeguarded. The positive right to re-create as proposed in this thesis is therefore the best 
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Annex I – Interview Questions Guide 
 
The interview participants are categorised into two groups: (A) original creators 
and (B) online re-creators. Some questions asked in the interviews for both groups are of 
the same issues while other questions are different so as to obtain data from specific 
groups as necessary for this research. 
 
Interview Questions – (A) original creators 
- Ask participants whether they think it is sometimes OK for someone to make 
use of their works and which ways are they happy for their work to be used and 
what they are not happy about. 
- Ask participants for their opinions whether they should be acknowledged by 
name as an original creator when their work is used for online re-creation. 
- Ask participants for their opinions whether an online re-creator should ask for 
permission from them before using their original work. Also, ask them whether 
they would grant permission and on what conditions. 
- Ask participants for their opinions if an online re-creator gains money from re-
creation (using elements of their original work) in three means: by selling the 
re-creation, by advertising and by donation. 
- Ask participants for their opinions whether an online re-creator have to pay for 
using parts of their work in an online re-creation (a) by copying it directly and 










Interview Questions – (B) online re-creators 
- Ask participants whether they make and share a work that involves materials 
from a popular work or an existing work and what kind of work they re-create. 
- Ask participants why they re-create. 
- Ask participants whether they gain anything from making that re-creation. 
- Ask participants whether they have asked permission from copyright owner of 
the original work for the re-creations and if no, why not. 
- Ask participants what they would do if the original creator requests them to 
delete or stop sharing their re-creation due to a copyright claim. 
- Ask participants for their opinions whether they think that an original creator 
should be acknowledged by name when his or her work is used for online re-
creation. 
- Ask participants for their opinions whether an online re-creator should ask for 
permission from an original creator before using the original work.  
- Ask participants for their opinions if an online re-creator gains money from re-
creation (using elements of their original work) in three means: by selling the 
re-creation, by advertising and by donation. 
- Ask participants for their opinions whether an online re-creator have to pay for 
using parts of their work in an online re-creation (a) by copying it directly and 
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